a muslim manual of war

edited and translated by
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George T. Scanlon

With a Foreword by
Carole Hillenbrand

and a New Introduction by
George T. Scanlon

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Foreword

by Carole Hillenbrand
Professor Emerita of Islamic History,
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The twelfth to the fourteenth centuries in the Middle East were a time of wars and rumours of wars. The peoples of the Fertile Crescent lived under a cloud of dread which nothing seemed able to lift. First, there were the unheralded wars of the Cross, when Muslims had to fight an unfamiliar enemy, the Franks. The Crusades were a phenomenon generated by medieval Christendom with its roots and inspiration in medieval Europe. Throughout the world today, there is still a continuing and genuine interest in the history of the Crusades, and these wars between Christians and Muslims still resonate in public discourse in both east and west. Close on the heels of the Crusaders, from 1220 onward, came a succession of invasions from another alien race, this time from the remote east, with the irruption of wave upon wave of Mongol hordes under the command of Genghis Khan and his successors. Later in the fourteenth century, this destructive cycle repeated itself, with the invasions of Timur, who eventually, around 1400, reached the Mediterranean in the west and the borders of China in the east before death arrested his career. It is against this backdrop of apparently endless wars that the treatise edited, translated, and explained by George Scanlon was written.

When Professor Scanlon’s Princeton dissertation about a work by a scholar called al-Ansari (d. 1408), which was in manuscript form in the Princeton University Library, was published by the American University in Cairo Press in 1961 as a book entitled A Muslim Manual of War, being Tafrij al-kurub fi tadbir al-hurub (The dispelling of woes in the management of wars), scholarship on the Muslim art of war was still rudimentary. Inevitably, it seems, it focused on the period of the Crusades, where the historiography was very one-sided and Eurocentric. The success of Runciman’s three-volume work was well deserved, but without a knowledge of Arabic he could draw on only that small number of Muslim chronicles that had already been translated into European languages. So inevitably the
views of this conflict written down by Muslims could not be a major part of the narrative. George Scanlon saw the need for good translations of key Arabic texts and he became a pioneer scholar with his work on the conduct of war seen from the Muslim side.

Since 1961, however, there has been a steady increase in books which have helped to rectify this gap in our knowledge of the Crusades, and scholars such as Sivan and Maalouf blazed a trail which others have followed. George Scanlon’s fascinating study of a Muslim military manual was soon joined by the publication of editions and translations of other works in the same genre by al-Tarsusi in 1968 and al-Aqsara’i in 1979. Doctoral theses on aspects of jihad in the Crusading era have been written, and many more articles on Muslim aspects of the Crusades have been published. Popular graduate courses on Islam and the west, the history of war, and the Crusades such as those offered, for example, at Saint Louis University in the US, and Royal Holloway and Queen Mary in the UK, would no longer contemplate omitting the Muslim dimensions of these exciting and important subjects. So the re-publication of George’s pioneering book—an in-depth study of a key primary Arabic source—in electronic form will be warmly welcomed by scholars and students across the world. George Scanlon’s book provides an elegant translation of the Arabic text, the Arabic text itself, an erudite overview of the history of medieval military manuals, and a very useful glossary of military terms.

Al-Ansari, an influential figure at the Mamluk court, a man who held the high office of qadi al-‘askar in Aleppo and who suffered imprisonment when Timur attacked Syria, presents a fascinating picture of how war was conducted in Egypt and Syria at a time when the Muslim memory of being attacked by the Crusaders from the west and the Mongols from the east was still green. There is no reason to doubt that much of the content of al-Ansari’s treatise is relevant for an understanding of warfare in the immediately preceding centuries. Al-Ansari gives advice on a wide range of military stratagems, pointing out the importance of good leadership and the value of excellent communications and the sending of messages by pigeons or by riders on fast horses, mules, and camels. He also states firmly that it is preferable to avoid engaging with the enemy and that fighting should be a last resort.

It is a great pleasure—on several counts—to write a foreword to this most welcome reissue of George’s book. First of all, it is
good and right to honor a scholar who has worked so assiduously in his field for so long. Indeed, this new electronic version of al-Ansari’s work could be seen as a kind of diamond jubilee celebration for George’s tireless activity in the study and in the field alike. Next, it is always good news when an established classic is snatched from the jaws of the antiquarian market and made available once more to the wider and less wealthy public (including students, of course) eager to consult it. George’s book has been a rarity for decades and has been virtually unobtainable. No longer. And with the exponential growth in Crusader history over the last thirty years or so, accompanied by a correspondingly increased interest in the Muslim side of this extended conflict, this treatise can now come into its own for a new generation of readers. And finally, thinking of George always involves me in a trip down memory lane, to the Oxford of the late 1960s, when his annual visits to the Oriental Institute were eagerly awaited by students of every stripe—for his fame as a charismatic lecturer on Islamic history preceded him. Impeccably tailored and groomed in a distinctively dashing style, he would stride into the lecture room, eyes sparkling with determination to make Islamic history fun. I still remember him describing the early Mamluk state as an eggshell reality balanced between the Crusaders and the Mongols, or characterising Jalal al-Din, the last of the Khwarazm shahs, harassing the Mongols, as “a valorous gadfly on the underbelly of the galloping horde.”

George could make the gravel on the road interesting, and it is symptomatic of his catholic interests that his reviews of books on Islamic history, art, architecture, and of course archaeology are consistently worth reading for their width of reference, their piercing insights, and their style, at once vigorous and elegant. So George is a man of parts. He will be remembered as the archaeologist who patiently sifted, categorized and explained the treasures of Fustat for the benefit of future generations. His translation of al-Ansari showcases his talents as an Arabist. His diverse publications on many aspects of Islamic art and architecture make him a critic to be reckoned with in that field too. And running through these multiple contributions is his steady accomplishment as a caring, inspiring teacher, a guru who will be remembered by the thousands of young Egyptians whose horizons he broadened and whose talents he cultivated. His contributions to his adopted country have been immense. Long may his restless curiosity and his sparkling prose continue to entertain us.
New Introduction to the Electronic Reissue of the 1961 Edition

George T. Scanlon

A Second Introduction, Half a Century (+) Later! Why?

This is a facsimile edition of the book, published by the American University in Cairo (AUC) Press in 1961, whose source was my doctoral thesis, defended and approved at Princeton University in September 1959. The conditions under which the 1961 edition was printed and distributed were unusually stringent—a direct result of new regulations introduced by the Egyptian revolution of 1953 and the consequent Suez War of 1956. Part of that first (and only) edition was lost to thievery, severely tried postal operations, and the struggles of the Press to achieve adequate distribution. Except for notice of its publication, the volume was but sketchily reviewed, though its substance was discussed at the 1960 Congress of Orientalists in Moscow and Leningrad.

This rather troublesome nativity was exacerbated by the signal shift of my interest and career toward the fields of archaeology and art history, which pursuits proved to be totally absorbing, and in which I found satisfaction and pedagogical success. I scarcely noticed that my own two remaining copies of A Muslim Manual of War had been stolen somewhere within the newer termini of my working life (Cairo, Oxford, and various teaching posts in the United States). Though my health prospered and continued beyond the usual span allotted to most scholars, I never returned to the original bent of research occasioned by this first publication.

But time worked its revenge, for on August 31, 2011, I found myself in retirement still without a thought of that first, comparatively brief immersion into this world of Muslim warfare. Then accidentally a review copy of Dr. Peter Gubser’s Saladin (Gorgias Press, 2010) reached me, which I read with relish but no honest regret, insofar as its author, with unoriginal qualifications, anchored his work in the ‘great men of history’ theory. While I was
yet absorbed with Gubser, the Department of Arabic and Islamic civilizations at the American University in Cairo (AUC) suggested, through the AUC Press, that a facsimile of the original edition, replete with a newer introduction, would make a fitting compliment with which to mark my retirement and would serve those who—like myself—had lost the fraught original edition, or desired it for their libraries, particularly those dedicated to its arcane subject. I would like to thank Professor Nelly Hanna, the department’s chair, and Dr. Amina Elbendary, who suggested its reissue to the AUC Press; and Mr. Neil Hewison, the Press’s associate director for editorial programs, who accepted it.

The opportunity now becomes more precious, for very, very few scholars after so long a hiatus return to comment on their debut publications in a field they had abandoned expeditiously, no matter the circumstances. However, the conditions of this reissue do not permit internal corrections: whatever was printed originally remains in the electronic facsimile. Thus my commentary will take the form of a) considering the original introduction as an antique in itself; and b) providing something of an overview of what movements in the field have gained visibility since 1961. Neither part will be exhaustive, but each will be relevant to points raised in the original. The erasers alluded to on page 33 of the first introduction have not been handled since 1960 but they will be useful at this moment, even after fifty-two years.

Is the Original Edition and Translation of Tafrij al-kurub fi tadbir al-hurub an Antique in Itself?

By newer sophisticated standards of research, composition, and publication, it is. But such a conclusion would be tantamount to applying the hard-won norms and techniques of 2012 to those available in 1961. The political and economic landscape of Egypt after the Suez War was not propitious for sophisticated academic publishing. This facsimile edition preserves the truth of that statement, insofar as the paper, and the incapacity of the fonts to hold the ink, are concerned: typos and blurrings abound, and the footnotes are not consistently arranged, so that page layouts appear wavering to the eye. Many of these blemishes might have been resolved had I been in Cairo; but I was in Nubia, unknowingly embarked on a totally different career. What might seem somewhat slipshod as published was signally less so in manuscript. Hence the
more egregious errata are now acknowledged and can be seen in the final section of this second introduction. Regrettably, any corrections to the Arabic text of the Tafrij cannot be accommodated in the electronic reissue.

The style of the printed translation within this volume will certainly appear awkward to a keen ear. It was pursued at a time when *idafa* and *ta’marbuta* were stumbling blocks in medieval Arabic relative to exact grammatical referencing, made more onerous in the absence of correct and consistent vowelization by the scribes. These flaws, of course, could not be corrected within the text; but by the utility of brackets and parentheses the exact meaning would be conveyed in translation. Had a revised translation been possible, the keen ear would have found the translation flowing but no less exact.

“*A Preliminary Glossary of Muslim Military Terms*” (pages 123–30 of the facsimile edition) was deemed necessary by the Press for the edited text, in preference to an index of the translation. It had formed part of the dissertation, where it represented my experience of the terminology discovered in studying the manuscripts surveyed in the introduction. The terms do not all appear in the edited text of Tafrij, but were broadly common within that range of manuscripts. It goes without saying that today the list of terms would have to be quadrupled at the very least. And more importantly, such an up-to-date glossary would draw on manuscripts in the various categories of ‘ulum al-harb in Persian and Turkish (in all their written variety), plus their equivalents to the terminology in Arabic.

**Overview of Muslim Warfare Studies since 1961**

When a field of academic endeavor achieves both popularity and intellectual regard, it gains the almost inalienable right to its own channel of publication. In the interval between the original edition and this new introduction, the field of Muslim warfare now possesses two separate outlets for publishing original sources and discussion of what these sources add to the field: whether they are formal repetitions, or if they, in sum or in part, represent genuine additions to what we know of chronology, attribution, and the dangers inherent in copying earlier sources. These are the Osprey Press in the United Kingdom, and more recently Kitabat in Cairo; together they contract the number of excuses for non-publication to nullity.
Two scholars, in the interval from 1961 to 2012, have distinguished themselves through their manifold publications on all phases of warfare in the dar al-Islam: David Nicolle and Shihab al-Sarraf. Dr. Nicolle has been the shaping spirit insofar as his work has included practically all forms of military activity throughout the medieval world. His early and sustained interest in Muslim warfare has recently been capped by the publication of his research on the Mamluk military artefacts from excavations at the Damascus Citadel: *Late Mamluk Military Equipment* (Damascus/Beirut, 2012), including an exhaustive bibliography encompassing all the published materials within the interval alluded to above. In his introduction he refers to the *Tafrij*, agreeing with Dr. al-Sarraf that its text is really an uncredited excursus on the work of the Abbasid savant Ibn Akhi Hizam, whom Dr. al-Sarraf considers the father source of all works on furusiyya.

Had circumstance dictated that there would have been no seismic shift of my career so soon after the publication of the *Tafrij*, I would be hugely indebted to Shihab al-Sarraf—as are the majority of scholars in the interval. His three-volume doctoral dissertation on Muslim archery contains a magistral survey of all writings on medieval Muslim warfare to the date of its submission (“L’Archerie mamluke AH 648–923/AD 1250–1517,” 3 vols., PhD diss., Université de la Sorbonne, Paris, 1989). He proceeds well beyond the scope of the antecedent scholars surveyed in my original introduction and conjures the free utility of manuscripts (both the extant, and those destroyed or lost but alluded to in later works) but in such a comprehensive manner that we see the slow establishment of reputations unknown to Sprenger, Mercier, and Ritter.

The most important early masters were well-established Abbasid court and literary figures whose works were constantly cited and/or copied throughout the Mamluk period (for example, Ibn Akhi Hizam, Ibn Hartham, Ibn Manjli, and the author of the *Tafrij*) when most of the better premodern studies were written, and survived until the present day. However, it seems to me that this most valuable activity is flawed by Dr. al-Sarraf’s insistence that all the manuscripts surveyed in his dissertation be considered exclusively as within furusiyya, and no other classification employed by scholars antecedent to himself can be accepted. His idiosyncratic position is fully posited in his article “Furusiyya Literature of the Mamluk Period” in *Furusiyya*, ed. by David Alexander, Riyadh: 1996, vol. 1: 118–
34. This is awkward, even illogical within his early research into archery, simply because the unmounted archer was always part of field tactics, and in Europe (after the battle of Crécy, where the longbow was singularly successful) achieved strategic parity with mounted archers. This held true until the introduction of gunpowder.

This unresolved ambiguity of approach has left the landscape of Muslim warfare studies in an unfortunate stasis. It postpones the cleanup of attribution, even chronology, and theoretical discussion; and finally it exhausts scholarly patience. Dr. al-Sarraf was quite right to discern how much of the Nihayat al-su’l, hitherto the lode-stone of scholarly approach, was really a restatement of the work of Ibn Akhi Hizam. The same holds true of the Tafrij. But not entirely, because both authors were more redactors (when possible) than unscrupulous copyists; after all they were deeply interested in the ‘manual’ aspect of the undertaking. According to Dr. al-Sarraf’s trawl of the manuscript sources, there are ten extant copies of the Nihayat al-su’l; when carefully edited with redactions, and fully translated, the total reality must demonstrate something more than plagiarism of a dead author’s masterpiece.

There remain one minor and two major points consequent to this republication of the Tafrij. The minor one is quickly resolved: in this overview I limited myself to mentioning those trends and scholars looming in publications since 1961. Especially in non-furusiyya publications, many eminent scholars have made signal contributions to our understanding of medieval Muslim warfare. Their names and works can be appreciated in the magnificent bibliographies of David Nicolle and Shihab al-Sarraf alluded to above. For example, I would cite Robert Elgood’s cumulative publications within the ancillary field of Muslim arms and armaments; the same bibliographies chronicle the utility of newer manuscript data within historical publications since 1961, most particularly those relevant to the technical aspects of warfare during the Crusades. When the proceedings of the colloquium on Muslim warfare hosted by the Institut français d’archéologie orientale (IFAO) in December 2011 are published, this process will become apparent and apposite to our aims.

The first of the major points confirmed by the Tafrij is that most of the authors of Mamluk manuscripts relevant to warfare were not military officers as such but, being the only literate caste at the time, probably ‘ulama commissioned by the sultan, or a leading
Mamluk within his entourage, to educate himself about subjects of immediate or remote interest—though ones that would require what we would deem ‘research.’ In the introduction to the original edition, such an author’s work would achieve resonance through connections to the masters of the past; but such masters had to be consistent in terms of Muslim belief and experience, so our Mamluk author would redact what he was reading and copying to conform to the mores and mindset of his own day. In my original introduction, our Mamluk author is deemed an ‘armchair strategist’; if I were permitted to reedit that introduction he would be considered a well-read and most literate redactor.

The other major point is as important today as it was in 1961: namely that the Muslim masters of warfare, their patrons and rulers, their soi-disant strategists, did not view field confrontations as opportunities for illogical heroics, but rather as the result of training and logical conformations, of knowing when and how to fight; one prayed for victory but fought by the book. Essentially they took the view that what might come by chance is to be faced with cunning and hope . . . and correct procedure. The Tafrij confirms that the guiding light of a great field commander is not to waste men or the addenda of battle, so that even single combat had its rules which cannot be forsworn for chimerical rewards. One is left with the feeling that jihad per se has no place in the Muslim warrior’s consciousness once the battle has begun. The reiteration of this guiding light throughout the manuscript resources provides the ideational penumbra for the consideration of medieval Muslim warfare . . . a very, very good thing indeed to read constantly. Once stated, this one Martian generality would not be gainsaid by any eraser conceived by men.

Errata in the facsimile edition

p. 4, note 11, line 7: for Murda read Murtada.
p. 7, two lines above footnotes: for “leads Ritter,” read “led Ritter.”
p. 8, ten lines above footnotes: for “Mamlu,” read “Mamluk.”
p. 9, line 4: for “tournament play,” read “tournament, play.”
p. 20, four lines above footnote: for “ma e,” read “make.”
p. 43, line 18: for “Antarat,” read “Antarah.”
p. 44, line 12: for “encircling trenches,” read “encircling moats.”
p. 45, note 5, penultimate line: for “the Greek,” read “Alexander’s.”
p. 46, line 14: for “be t,” read “best.”
p. 48, note 9, line 2: for “qu ting,” read “quoting.”
p. 49, line 9: for “Halab,” read “Halab (Aleppo).”
p. 51, line 12: for “against him rather for him,” read “against the ruler, rather than for him.”
p. 52, line 10: remove comma after “about.”
p. 59, two lines above footnotes: for “t,” read “to.”
p. 60, line 14: for “ev ry,” read “every.”
p. 71, line 9: for “donned,” read “worn.”
p. 74, line 12: the footnote number at the end of the paragraph reads “4.”
p. 86, line 26: for “negligence about him,” read “negligence about it.”
p. 87, line 8: for “that they,” read “that some.”
p. 87, line 24: for “un il,” read “until.”
p. 87, line 29: for “a a,” read “at a.”
p. 107, line 9: for “for he,” read “for him.”
p. 119, line 7: for “(Ture),” read “(Tyre).”
p. 122, note 1, lines 4/5: for “and theory, and both,” read “and theory; both.”
A MUSLIM MANUAL OF WAR

being

TAFRĪJ AL-KURŪB
FI TADBĪR AL-ḤURŪB

by
‘UMAR IBN IBRAHIM AL-AWSĪ AL-ANSARĪ

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Atiya

Ayalon

EI
Encyclopedia of Islam

GAL

H. Kh.

Hava

Huuri

Lane

MF

Mercier

Nihāyat-al-su’l
<table>
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INTRODUCTION

I. Source materials for the study of Muslim warfare.

War has fascinated the mind of Western man from earliest antiquity, and his literature, reflecting his interest, attests the development of his understanding of this awesome phenomenon. A work such as Machiavelli’s The Art of War represents in the broadest terms this development.\(^1\) It integrates the military perceptions and technical accomplishments of the classical and medieval worlds while mirroring the modern concept of war as a gauge of social and technological progress. It, and other works of its type, form a chain of authorities from Vegetius and Aelian and Arrian to a Köhler.\(^2\)

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   In his treatise Machiavelli insisted that he was limiting himself to what we today would deem the Western European scene. But his concerns and sometimes his very language seem to duplicate those of the author of this treatise. Wiistenfeld believed that Aelian was available to the Muslim theorists (infra), and Aelian preceded Vegetius, the authority most often found influencing Machiavelli’s thought. It seems that common sources of authority on military matters were appealed to on both sides of the Mediterranean in the Middle Ages.

   (The most common classical sources on the art of war, and all employed by Machiavelli and his successor-theorists were: Aelian, Greek citizen of Rome who dedicated his treatise on tactics to Hadrian c. 106 A.D.; Arrian, who died in 180 A.D., who also wrote a treatise on tactics and the famous history of Alexander’s wars; and Vegetius, who wrote in the 4th century A.D. on the military practices of the Romans.)

   It is in his insistence on the tactical superiority of the armed footman over the lightest of cavalrymen, an idea derived directly from Aelian and Vegetius and their celebration of the phalangial battle formations, that Machiavelli parts company with the Middle Ages and with the Muslim military traditions. Apropos of the latter, one can point to the Mamluks who suffered defeat rather than reform their military organization by giving primacy to infantry-adapted firearms and artillery, accessible to them before they were to their Ottoman conquerors. (Ayalon, Chapter III.)

2. G. Köhler, Die Entwicklung des Kriegswesen und die Kriegsführung in der Ritterzeit, 3 vols. (Breslau: 1886-89). The Muslim activity and contribution is found in Vol. III, pts. 1 and 2, passim, but only insofar as they relate to fortification, ballistics, and fire-projectiles. The tactics of the Muslim armies during the Crusades and
a Delbrück, an Oman; a continuum of military history and military theory clear and accessible to investigation. And the sources pertinent to war, both in its historical and technical facets, have been made available to anyone choosing to study European warfare from any angle whatsoever.

Yet should the same person attempt to assess the same subject and the same development in a Muslim setting, he would encounter a comparatively shallow treatment. The primary sources about Muslim warfare were not employed by either Röhrich or Prutz, who depended almost entirely on Western chronicles and those portions of the Arab historians to be found in the Recueil for their analyses of the Crusades.

In 1848 Reinaud published a cursory and exploratory article on Arab military tactics and weapons, and specified those treaties still in manuscript form upon which future research might be based. Wüstenfeld published a portion of such a source and its translation in 1880. He found the names of Aelian and Polybius mentioned therein and described for the first time the relationship between classical tactics (no doubt received through the influence of the Byzantines) and the Muslim military strategists of the Crusades and post-Crusading period.

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those of the Mongols and Ottomans are discussed in pt. 3 of the same volume, pp. 136-273 and 401-487. He relates Wüstenfeld’s article on Muslim leadership (infra) to later Ottoman tactics (Vol. II, p. 643.)

(3) Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, 4 vols. (Berlin: 1900-1920). In vol. III, p. 210-231, he discusses the Muslim military organization’s relation to the feudal social and political system, and traces, through appeal to the work of Welbush and Weil, the emergence of the “military-state” in the era of the Crusades. As did Kohler, he handles Ottoman tactics and military organization by focussing on the battle of Nicopolis, op. cit., pp. 487-496.


(5) Reinhold Röhrich, Beiträge zur geschichte der Kreuzzüge, 2 vols. in 1, (Perlin: 1874-78).

(6) Hans Prutz, Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge (Berlin: 1892); Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Historiens Orientaux (5 vols; Paris: 1872-1906).

(7) M. Reinaud, “De l’art militaire chez les arabes au moyen âge”, Journal Asiatique, VI série, no. 12 (1848), pp. 193-237. His main interest, however, was the origin and development of “Greek-fire” and the evolution of cannon. His and other works on this subject are discussed by Ayalon in the Introduction to his volume on firearms. (Ayalon, pp. ix-xvi).

(8) F. Wüstenfeld, “Das Hearwesen der Musamedanian nach dem Arabischen”, Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen (1880). This is an edition...
It is true that military history, or the sources relevant to the Muslim military techniques, did not interest the great Orientalists to any extent; or if they did, it was only to the degree that they made some political or economic or social point clearer. Indeed so great a military historian as Sir Charles Oman, disinclined to ferret out and use Arabic sources, had to depend on Leo’s Tactica for his analysis of Muslim warfare. He was unsure how to gauge the Muslim improvement in tactics and armaments between Manzikert and the fall of Acre. What he said of the “Saracen” army of the tenth century,

“But they never raised a large standing army, or fully learned the merits of drill and organization,”

simply did not obtain in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries when the Mamluks of Egypt, a standing army built into the very structure of society, ousted the Crusaders and kept the Mongol hordes at bay. The body of manuscripts to be discussed later bears witness to the degree of drill and organization to be found among these later Muslim armies, if it was not already present in the tenth and eleventh centuries, particularly in the military reforms and organization of Saladin.10

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and translation of the second half of Gotha MS 258, f. 110-215.
In an addendum to his edition of the Nihāyat al-su’l, Dr. Lutfal-Huq contends that this fragment is directly related to the work he edited:

“Das Heirsessen der Muhammedaner consists of the Arabic text of the chapter on the different swords of the Muslims from the first section of the second half, and the Lessons viii and ix of the second section of the second half, with their German translation. These two Lessons with their various diagrams are the same, word for word, as those of the Nihāyat al-su’l except that some chapters are wanting in the former. So it may be that this extract has been derived either from a work upon which the Nihāyat al-su’l is based, or even from the Nihāyat al-su’l itself.”


Except insofar as jihād was related to fiqh, or the various equestrian arts to cavalry training, the Muslim writers up to the Crusading era devoted very little of their talents to military affairs. In the Fihrist of books relating to war, which Aloys Sprenger compiled in 1840 in Arabic at the request of Lord Munster, the greater part of the first list, i.e. those books relating to military sciences specifically, is given over to a discussion of saddles and bridles and stirrups, hunting, the names of horses, etc.; while the second list is of various historical accounts of wars and battles and famous warriors. It is not until one reaches the middle of the eleventh century that one begins to hear of books devoted to lance and sword exercises, cavalry practices, archery, fortification, missiles, etc.11 There can be little doubt that the Crusades brought home to the Muslims their vulnerability and their need to improve their standing army in Egypt of 8,640 men; and, at Ḥiṣṭin, in addition to the 4,000 trained troops accompanying him from Egypt, he had 7,000 more seasoned men from Syria and the Upper Euphrates area, op. cit., pp. 310-315.

By the middle of the 14th century, an author can describe the great army, al-'askar al-azam, as numbering 16,384 men, exclusive of auxiliary troops and tribesmen, Nihāyat al-sulṭān, p. 148. Oman’s “classic” estimate for the ready army of the Byzantines numbers but 4,600 men. Though this figure is for the tenth century, one still wonders what he means by “large”, especially as it relates to the size of the Muslim armies. The “classic” estimate was again irrespective of auxiliaries, op. cit., vol. I, p. 198.

11 Aloys Sprenger, Fihrist al-kutub allati narghab an nabhā‘a, (London: 1840). This was compiled on the request of the Earl of Munster, and is generally referred to in the literature on the subject of Muslim warfare as “The Munster Fihrist” (hereinafter MF). The first eighty-two pages are devoted to military terminology, weapons, battle formations, camping, single combat, siege machines, etc. The drawings prove that Sprenger had seen and studied such treatises as the Nihāyat al-sulṭān, that on weapons by Murād al-Tarsūsī (infra) and those on archery by Taybughā and on tactics by Muḥammad b. Manklī (infra). Both Reinaud and Wüstenfeld quote the MF, but its Arabic composition placed it outside the needs of the western military historian.

The majority of the manuscripts mentioned by Ritter and Mercier (infra) are not cited in Sprenger’s list, leading one to believe that he did not take into account the libraries of the Maghrib and of Istanbul. The Tafrīj al-kurūb is not mentioned.

The first list (pp. 106-160), is entitled “Kutub fi ‘ilm al-barb wa al-siyasah‘ and contains some 298 titles. The second list (pp. 84-106), called “Kutub fi al-ta‘rikh”, cites over 500 titles. To date there has not appeared a critical appraisal of the MF; Mercier, Reinaud and Wüstenfeld merely checked titles which they had compiled against this earliest of all bibliographies in the field of Muslim military history.
military tactics and armaments in the face of the heavier European cavalry and more complicated siege machines and weapons.\(^\text{12}\)

Professor Atiya, in speaking of the remarkable technical literature occasioned by the Crusades, remarked that parts of it were concerned with the weapons of war and their proper usage, and other parts with strategy and tactics and battle formations.

"These are intended for the initiation of the ranks and for the edification of the generals who led the Muslim battalions. This extensive literature imparts the impression of an elaborate system of war which accounts for the brilliant victories of the Islamic armies ... The material extant in this field is ample enough for the writing of a book on the History of the Eastern Art of War..."\(^\text{13}\)

It is this literature which proves that after the eleventh century the Muslim armies had a military skill based on something more than "their numbers and their extraordinary powers of locomotion".\(^\text{14}\) It is our purpose here to investigate the extent of this literature and the research it has prompted.

In 1922, Louis Mercier published the second part of a lengthy treatise, entitled \textit{Tuhfat al-anfus wa shi'ar sukkān al-Andalus} ("L'Ornement des âmes et la Devise des Habitants de l'Andalousie"), by the Andalusian savant, 'Ali b. 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Hudhayl al-Andalusi, composed sometime in the last decade of the fourteenth century on the orders of the Sultān of Granada, Muhammad b. Yusuf VI, who reigned between 1392 and 1408.\(^\text{15}\) This second section bore, in Mercier's edition, the title \textit{Hiyyat al-fursān wa shi'ar al-shujā'ān} ("La Parure des Cavaliers et l'Insigne des Preux").\(^\text{16}\) To his translation of this text, published in 1924,

\(^{12}\) See Reinaud, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 212 et passim, for the first mention by an Arab writer of the Franks' accuracy with the new, deadly hand-weapon, the \textit{zamburak}. For a wider discussion of the introduction and variety of uses of this weapon and of the meaning of this word, see Huuri, pp. 96-97 and note 4. Hava, p. 297 lists the word, without plural, as meaning "metal-spring cock of a gun". Steingass, p. 623, calls it simply "crossbow".


\(^{16}\) Louis Mercier, \textit{La Parure des Cavaliers} : Arabic Text (Paris: 1929); translation (Paris: 1924). The latter is hereinafter referred to as Mercier. Another edition of
he appended a detailed list of the manuscript materials in Arabic on
the subjects of hippology, veterinary sciences, falconry and "furūṣiyah". In
addition to the material available in Brockelmann, the Führst of
Ibn al-Nadîm, Hājjī Khalīfah, and the Munster Führst, he culled
the catalogues of the collections of Oriental manuscripts in Europe and
incorporated the bibliography of titles on hippology brought out by
Hammer-Purgstall in 1855. This represented a considerable improve-
ment on the Munster Führst, and, more than the translation itself,
revealed to the scholarly world the range of materials yet to be mastered
before any definitive comment could be made on the subject of Muslim
military techniques.

The most penetrating review of Mercier's work appeared in 1929.
In it Ritter took Mercier to task for the inaccuracies he detected in
terminology, but devoted the major part of his review-article to a
criticism of Mercier's listing of the manuscript sources. He then proceeded
to provide an annotated list of the manuscripts present in Istanbul and
Europe which had been overlooked by Mercier (or listed incorrectly
by him) and which Ritter felt to be of the first importance on the subjects of "furūṣiyah"; archery; and tactics, strategy, weapons and military
organization. It is this list of thirty-eight separate treatises which forms
the basic corpus of these subjects. The Tafriṣ al-kurūb is listed among
them.

Ritter arranged his list in three categories, and it is convenient
here to follow his method, making additions or corrections as subsequent
research has provided:

A. "Furūṣiyah". It is important here to remember that this subject
covered the training of the horse, the training of the rider to wield

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= the text, collated from two more MSS than were available to Mercier, was brought
out by Muḥammad 'Abd al-Ghāni Ḥasan (Cairo: 1951).

(17) Mercier, pp. 432-459.

(Wien), Phil-Hist Kl., VI, (1855), pp. 211-246. A discussion of the relevant biblio-
graphy will be found on pp. 212-223.

(19) Helmut Ritter, "La Parure des Cavaliers und die Literatur über die ritterlichen
The criticism is on pp. 116-119; the remainder of the article is given over to citation
and discussion of the manuscripts overlooked or slighted by Mercier.

(20) Except where otherwise noted the location of the MSS is given in Ritter and/
or Mercier.
certain weapons consummately, e.g., sword, lance, battle-axe, mace, bow and arrow, etc., the concerted actions of cavalrmen on the field, the technique and variety of single combat, tournaments, and the basic elements of veterinary science.

1. *Kitāb al-furūsīyah wa al-bayṭarāh.*

Though none of the manuscripts available to us antedates the beginning of the 13th century, this work, under a variety of titles, provides the basic teaching and practice of Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb b. Akhi Ḥazzām (or Ḥizām) al-Khattali. He was the master of horse to the ʿAbbāsīd Caliph, al-Muʿtaṣīm (218-227/833-842). He admitted the primacy of the Persians in the fields of cavalry training and tactics. However, since the manuscripts extant come after the Crusades and after the period when Byzantine sources on military techniques were available to the Muslims, an investigation of this body of manuscripts is essential before the question of incorporated influences can be safely decided.\(^{(21)}\)

2. *Kitāb al-makhzūn (fi ?) jāmiʿ al-funūn.*

An abridgement or variation of the above work. Ritter relates this Paris manuscript (28263) to Ibn Akhi Ḥazzām’s work.\(^{(22)}\)

3. *Kitab al-khayl wa ṣifātihi wa alwānihi wa shiyātihi etc.*

A compilation based on the work of Ibn Akhi Ḥazzām by Ibn Abī Qutayrah, who flourished in the reign of the Rasūlid, Muzaffar Yūsuf al-Saʿīd (647-694/1249-1295).\(^{(23)}\)


This covers the same material as the work of Ibn Akhi Ḥazzām, and it leads Ritter to believe that its author, called simply Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad, might be Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb b. Akhi

\(^{(21)}\) There seems to be some disagreement about the correct transliteration of this man’s name, and whether he held his position under al-Muʿtaṣīm or al-Mutawakkil (Mercier, p. 433), or al-Muʿtadd (Ritter, p. 125). Whoever he was, and this is a matter that cannot be determined until all the relevant MSS, particularly those ascribed directly to him, have been collated, suffice it here to point out that his work appears to be fundamental to an understanding of the Muslim art of “furūsīyah”. Cf. Ritter, pp. 120-126 and Mercier, pp. 433-35.

\(^{(22)}\) Ritter, p. 123, the final paragraph discussing the parts of the *majmūʿ* contained in Welkēdīn 3174. Cf. Zāki, p. 155.

\(^{(23)}\) Ritter, p. 125.
The manuscripts date from the 9th century H./15th century A.D.\(^{24}\)

5. *Qaṭr al-sayl fi amr al-khayl.*

This is an abridgement of al-Dimyāṭi’s work, *Faḍl al-khayl.* The author, ʿUmar b. Raslān b. Naṣr al-Bulqīnī (d. 805/1402), goes beyond the subject of hippology and speaks of cavalry and tournament exercises.\(^{25}\)


This is the basic work of the great tournament master and lance-jouster, Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb al-Aḥdab al-Rammāḥ (d. 694/1294). It was the source book for all future work on the subject of cavalry exercises, tournaments, and battle formations. No less than thirteen manuscripts, covering the whole or parts of the treatise, exist, many of them illustrated. Of particular note is the exhaustive treatment of offensive and defensive lance-and-javelin play.\(^{26}\)

7. *Tawārīkh salāṭīn Mīsr.*

Rather short historical studies of the wars of the Mamlūk Sultāns of Egypt, from 778 to 841 A.H. (1376-1438 A.D.). Author anonymous.\(^{27}\)


This work by Lājin al-Ḥusāmī al-Ṭarābulṣi incorporates the work of Najm al-Dīn al-Aḥdab and adds several variations on tournament exercises and lance-play. These jousting-exercises (*band, pl. bānūd*) are illustrated in many of the manuscripts. Brockelmann ascribes this work to Muḥammad b. Lājin al-Ḥusāmī al-Ṭarābulṣi (no. 9 below), but Ritter contends that there are two different authors involved.\(^{28}\)

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\(^{25}\) Ritter, p. 127; Mercier, p. 444; M. Kh., II, p. 238. For a discussion of al-Dimyāṭi see Mercier, p. 447 where he notes three authors with this name, one of whom is cited in the *MF*, p. 95; and *GAL*, I, p. 88 for mention of the *Faḍl al-khayl*.

\(^{26}\) Ritter, p. 126. Cf. Mercier, p. 441 for different titles of what Ritter believes to be the same work. The man and his work are discussed by Ritter on page 127.

\(^{27}\) Ritter, pp. 129-130.


This work of Muḥammad b. Lājin al-Ḥusāmi al-Ṭarabulṣī al-Rammāḥ is quite similar to no. 8. Numerous illustrations of cavalry exercises with weapons; of tournament play, and types of single combat. 29

10. Ḥikāyat ibtidā’ ‘uddat al-jihād.

Anonymous sketches of not more than a folio apiece on various tactics and ruses employed by Muslim generals in the past. 30


Anon. A short study of the lance exercises of the masters. 31


Another work of Najm al-Dīn al-Āḥdab al-Rammāḥ, illustrating the seventy-two basic lance exercises, both astride and afoot. 32


Anon. Almost a book of adab on the proper deportment of the cavalier in preparing for war and upon the battlefield. 33


Anon. A selection from the works of Najm al-Dīn al-Āḥdab and Lājin. The choice fifty exercises from the seventy-odd prescribed by the masters. 34


The author, Muḥammad b. ‘Isā b. Ismā‘il al-Ḥanāfī al-Aqsarā’i

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(29) Ritter, p. 131; Mercier, loc. cit. The list of works assigned to both Lājin and Muḥammad b. Lājin pose the same sort of problem as encountered with Ibn Akhī Hazzām, supra. Again, only a fuller analysis of the available manuscripts will provide a solution. Cf. the lists in Mercier, p. 438 and 456; the citations in GAL, II, p. 167f.; and Atiya, p. 544.

(30) Ritter, p. 129 f.

(31) Ritter, p. 131. Considering that no. 12 (infra) is part of the majmū‘ containing no. 11, this is no doubt a selection from the lance exercises of the masters.

(32) Loc. cit.

(33) Ibid., p. 132.

(34) Loc. cit.
(c. 800?/1400?), based this exhaustive work on the military handbooks of Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥādī. Ritter considers it the most important of all the sources in Arabic on Muslim military organization, training and theory. It is divided into twelve lessons (ta'lims) whose titles indicate the amount of material covered in the text:

Lesson One: archery.
Lesson Two: lance-play and maneuvers with lance.
Lesson Three: exercises in the use of sword and shield.
Lesson Four: numerous problems relating to the use of the shield.
Lesson Five: handling of mace and sword.
Lesson Six: military play and exercise for cavalry.
Lesson Seven: various kinds of weapons, and problems relating to soldiers in the field.
Lesson Eight: recruiting and formation of the army; the strengths of units; their chiefs and commanders.
Lesson Nine: disposition of the army in the battle-field in accordance with the circumstances.
Lesson Ten: ruses of war and fatally poisonous smokes.
Lesson Eleven: division of booty and various problems of Islamic law relating to giving protection (amān) to the enemy peoples, and the conclusion of treaties.
Lesson Twelve: various branches of knowledge required by fighting soldiers, such as the drawing of augury, interpretation of the various signs of nature, precautions to be taken on the move, and wounds and their treatment with poultices, plasters and medicinal powders.36

(35) Ibid., pp. 132-135; Mercier, p. 438, lists it as anonymous. Atiya, p. 544, ascribes it incorrectly to Badr al-Dīn Baktūt (infra). In his discussion of the MSS of the Niḥāyat al-su‘l, Dr. Lutful-Huq disproves any other ascription but that noted above. Ritter calls him a student of Najm al-Dīn Ḥādī, and therefore probably writing during the sultanate of Barqūq. But Dr. Lutful-Huq thinks him rather a student of a student of Najm al-Dīn, and has placed him chronologically, pp. 7-10.

(36) Ibid., passim.
Dr. Lutful-Huq based his edition on five of the nine known manuscripts. This edition, that of Zoppoth (no. 34 below), and this edition and translation of the Taqrij (no. 35 below) represent the only work done on the subject suggested by Ritter's basic list.


B. Archery. These works include descriptions of the various types of bows and arrows, their manufacture and operation, the names and deeds attached to the masters. They tend, in general, toward being half prose and half poetry in composition, and not a few of them use the hunt, rather than the battle-field, as their basis of consideration. In this section Ritter depended quite a bit on the exhaustive survey of archery literature with which Hein prefaced his monograph on archery in the Ottoman era.

(37) That he missed the superb British Museum Add. 18,866, surely the oldest, most beautifully illustrated, and most clearly written of the MSS, is strange indeed. The omission was brought to the attention of the present editor in a letter, dated 24 June 1959, from Mr. J. D. Pearson, the Librarian of the University of London.

(38) Ritter, p. 135 and 138.

(39) Ibid., p. 140. This is listed with the archery MSS, since it is part of a majmāʿ on archery. But its very title forces one to place it with the “furūsīyah” treatises.

(40) Joachim Hein, “Bogenhandwerk und Bogensport bei den Osmanen”, Der Islam. XIV (1925), pp. 289-360. This was in turn an analysis and discussion of a work by a certain Mustafa Kani, Auszug der Abhandlungen der Bogenschützen (telhis resüll er-rümiṭ). Though archery is not the subject of this dissertation, it is interesting to note Hein's distinction; p. 309:

Aḥmad b. ‘Abdollāh Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Tabarī (d. 694/1295).[41]

18. *Kitāb* fī ‘ilm al-nushshāb.
Anon. A compilation in East Turkish of various Arabic works on archery.[42]

Anon. A commentary on an urjūzah of Ṭaybughā al-Baklamishi (no. 20 below). Composed for the Mamlūk Sultān, al-Malik Ashraf Shaʿbān, who reigned from 764 to 768 A.H. (1363-1376 A.D.)[43]

20. The manuscripts of the works of Ṭaybughā al-Baklamishi al-Yūnānī (d. 797/1394) which appear under the following titles:
   a) *Kitāb* fī rimāyāt al-nushshāb wa ismuhu bughyat al-marām.
      Dedicated to al-Malik Ashraf Shaʿbān.[44]
   b) Ghunyat al-murāmi.
      Dedicated to al-Malik Ashraf Shaʿbān.[45]
   c) *Kitāb* munyat al-ṭullāb fī maʿrifat al-ramy bi al-nushshāb.
      A work for the most part identical with 20b. Copied in 864/1459 for the Mamlūk Sultān, Al-Malik Ashraf Sayf al-Dīn Ināl (857-865/1453-1460).[46]
   d) *Kitāb* sharḥ ghunyat al-murāmi wa ghāyat al-marām li al-maʿāni.
      This text of Ṭaybughā’s work forms the major portion of a majmūʿ whose overall title is *Kitāb* fī maʿrifat ramy al-nushshāb wa rukūb al-khayl. The other parts are selections from the works of Najm al-Dīn al-Abdāb, Lājin, and the *Nihāyat al-suʿl*. Thus in one book were combined archery and lance exercises, cavalry tactics and battlefield deportment. It is interesting to note that the number of lance exercises (bhūd) has reached 108. The majmūʿ is dated 802/1399.[47]

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21. *Irshād al-ikhwān fī alkhām al-rihān*.
   Anon. Comments based on the *Shari‘a*, referring to various military contests or simple tests of skill, including archery matches.48

22. See final entry in section of “furū‘iyyah”.

23. *Urjūzah fī ‘ilm al-rimāyah* or *Al-nihāyah fī ‘ilm al-rimāyah*.
   This lengthy poetical work with prose commentary is by Husayn b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallāh al-Yūnānī (d. 650/1252).49

   Husayn b. Muḥammad b. ‘Absūn al-Ḥanafī al-Sinjārī. The manuscript noted by Ritter seems to be unique and was ordered by the Mamlūk Sūltān, Al-Malik al-Zāhir Sayf al-Dīn Jaqmaq (842-857/1438-1453). The copy is dated 855 A.H. (1451 A.D.).50

25. *Ḥall al-ishkāl fī al-ramy bi al-nibāl*.
   Anon. A commentary on a poetical work on archery.51

   Muḥammad b. ‘Ali al-Sughayyir. The manuscript noted by Ritter is dated c. 821/1418, and seems to be a rather free abridgement of an unspecified longer work by the same author.52

   This work by the celebrated polymath, al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), mentions a work on archery, apparently lost, by ‘Īzz ad-Dīn b. Jamā‘a (d. 819/1416). The Mamlūk Sūltān Qa‘it Bay (873-901/1468-1493), possessed this short work of al-Suyūṭī’s.53

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(49) Ritter, p. 140; Hein, op. cit., p. 396; H. Kh., VI, p. 403 uses the latter title. Cf. GAL, Suppl. I, p. 905 for a MS with commentary.
(50) Ritter, p. 141 f.
(51) Op. cit., p. 141; Mercier, p. 454. This work forms the first half of the *majmū‘* which contains the *Ta‘* MS of the *Tafsīr al-kurāb (supra)*. The poetical work on archery on which this work is a commentary may be that of Ṭaybughā al-Baklamishī or Husayn al-Yūnānī (no. 23 *infra*) or Mīnqar al-Ḥalabi (supra).
(53) Ritter, p. 143; Mercier, p. 449, does not include this title among al-Suyūṭī’s works. But the *MF*, p. 98, does mention a work on archery, “Kitab ʿulā al-asbāb fī al-ramy bi al-nushshāb” by Ibn Jamā‘a.

A short and rather pious treatise on archery by al-Hāfiz Abī Ya‘qūb Iṣḥāq b. Iṣḥāq Ya‘qūb al-Qarrāb. Ritter was unable to identify the author and he does not figure in the lists of the Munster Fīhrist nor in that of Mercier. Neither Ḥājjī Khalifah nor Brockelmann provides any further identity.  

29. Kitāb faḍl al-ramy wa ta‘limihī.

A collection of ḥadīth about archery compiled by al-Ṭabarānī (d. 281/892). The manuscript and that of no. 28 are included in the same collection which dates from the end of the 12th century.  


A very thorough study of the Muslim army in the field and under siege; in twenty-four books, the titles of many of which resemble those of the Ṭafrij al-kurūb. The author, ‘Alī b. Abī Bakr al-Ḥarawi (d. 611/1214), covers all the above-named subjects. It is Ritter’s belief that this book was most probably composed under the influence of the Crusades, and incorporated whatever the Muslims had learned about offense and siege-craft. The unique Istanbul manuscript is dated 602/1205, within the author’s lifetime. Sections of it were copied in 875/1470 for Qa‘it Bay.

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(54) Ritter, p. 143f.
(55) Loc. cit.
(56) Ibid.
(57) Ritter, pp. 144-146. There are “books” on ambassadors, spies and agents, protection of booty, camping, stratagems to avoid meeting the enemy, ambushing, siege and fortification, etc.

This basic work by Muḥammad b. Mankli, head of the Sulṭān’s guard in the reign of al-Ashraf Shaʿbān, discusses the military systems and tactics of the Franks, Greeks, Turks, Arabs, and Kurds. It includes various sketches of battle-formations, very much in the style of those found in the *Nihāyat al-suʿl.* The exact date of his death is not known, but it is assumed to be c. 780/1379.58


Another and more exhaustive work by Muḥammad b. Mankli. A wide-ranging investigation of the tactics to be employed in a variety of types of warfare and under a variety of circumstances.58

34. *Kitāb siyāsat al-hurūb.*

The Pseudo-Aristotle “‘Taktik’; written by “‘Aristu” for “‘Iskandar dhū al-qarnayn”’. A comparatively short analysis of tactics by an anonymous author. One Istanbul manuscript dates sometime after 1000/1592 and was copied for the Ottoman Sultan, Muḥammad III, who ascended to power in 1003/1595. Another is written in a fifteenth-century naskhī style. It is doubtful if this particular work could antedate the work of Najīm al-Dīn al-Ḥadīb and Lājin, or of that of Muḥammad b. Mankli.60


Ritter thought the author was anonymous, and the Istanbul manuscript, unique until another copy was found in the Yahūdah collection, now being catalogued in Princeton, carried no author’s name. From the Yahūda manuscript it appears to be one ʿUmar

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58 Ritter, pp. 146-148; Mercier, p. 457, does not mention either of the two works cited here in Ritter’s list (Nos. 32 and 33), and assigns 1362 A.D. as the year of his death.


60 Ritter, p. 124 and 149. The text, based on the three known manuscripts, has been edited by Gerhard Zopf (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis), University of Vienna: 1951). Mercier’s only citation of Aristotle is to his treatise on animals, translated into Arabic, p. 442.
b. Ibrāhim al-Awṣī al-Ansāri, and the work was written in the reign of the Mamlūk Sulṭān Malik Faraj b. Barqūq.\(^{61}\)

36. *Kitāb aniq al-manājiq.*

The author of this treatise on various siege-machines mentions Mankli and the taking of various fortresses, particularly in the Crusading period. His name, however, was somewhat obliterated on the Istanbul manuscript, and Ritter reports it as “... ibn Arnbughā al-Zardkāsh”. There are two dates in the colophon, 774 and 775, placing either the copy or its composition (since the author's dates are unknown) in the reign of Al-Malik Ashraf Sha'bān (supra).\(^{62}\)


A Pseudo-Alexander treatise: “min ḥikm dhū al-Qarnayn”. In whole or in part, this work was copied throughout the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It seems related in spirit to the Pseudo-Aristotle “Taktik” (no. 34 above), but distinct from it in composition.\(^{63}\)

38. *Kitāb al-mubārak fihi ma'rīfat la'ib al-dabbūs wa al-ṣira wa al-khayl ind mulāqāt al-khasm fi awqāt al-lurūb.*

Anon. This treatise details the steps to be taken when engaged in single combat and the methods of wielding various weapons while astride, particularly the mace. The unique copy in Istanbul is dated 779/1377.\(^{64}\)

39. A short untitled work about war machines and military implements, “Greek-fire” and other pyrotechnics; written relative to experiences occasioned by the “Frankish” (Crusader ?) wars. The MS is dated 871/1467.\(^{65}\)

It should be noted that Mercier's specific interest was hippology, rather than any of the subjects noted by Ritter, and he included the latter only insofar as they clarified the former subject. Withal, their

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\(^{61}\) See discussion of MSS and author infra.

\(^{62}\) Ritter, p. 150 f.; Zaki, p. 159, refers to him as “Ibn Arinbugha al-Zardakah”, and places the date of the composition on catapults at about 867/1463.


\(^{64}\) Ritter, p. 152.

\(^{65}\) *Ibid.* , p. 153 f. This may be similar to the anonymous treatise on the same subject referred to by Atiya, p. 544.
two lists, rather than the unspecific one in the Munster Fihrist, constitute the fullest survey of the basic materials for a study of Muslim military history.

There are, however, other manuscripts noted elsewhere, or made available since the appearance of their work, which must be appended to it to round out this study. In the field of "furūsiyāh"; Brockelmann notes the following:

a. Two works ascribed to Muḥammad b. Lājin al-Ṭarābulṣī:
   2. Kitāb mubārak yashamal 'alā bunūd al-rimāḥ wa ghayrihā min al-fawa'id wa al-mayādin (GAL, Suppl. II, 167).

b. A work ascribed to Tayburghā al-Baklamishī, the authority on archery (cf. no. 20 above):
   Kitāb fī al-jihād wa al-furūsiyāh wa funān al-ādāb al-ʿarbiyāh (GAL, II, 169).

c. A work on cavalry practices and lance-play by Badr al-Dīn Baktūt al-Rammāh al-Khāzindarī (d. 711/1311):
   Kitāb fī 'ilm al-furūsiyāh (GAL II, 168) or, Kitāb al-furūsiyāh wa la'b al-rumh (Mercier, 444).

Some additional manuscripts in the field of archery:

a. Another poetical work on archery attributed to Ḥusayn b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. Abdallāh al-Yūnānī (cf. no. 23 above):

b. A work composed in the form of 400 rajaz verses on the art of archery by Abū Bakr al-Ḥalabī Minqār (d. 887/1482):
   Al-urjūzah al-Ḥalabiyāh fī ramy al-sihām 'an al-qusī al-'arabiyyāh (GAL, II, 170).

c. An anonymous work giving many details on fingering, aiming, and shooting, and on the various styles of the masters of archery. This manuscript has been edited and translated:
   Kitāb fī bayān faḍl al-qaws wa al-sāhīm wa awṣāfihimā (Garrett Coll. no. 793)⁶⁶.

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d. Another treatise on archery by Ṭaybughā al-Baklamishī:
   Kitāb al-ramy bi al-qaws wa al-nushāb.

e. A treatise on archery by the famous al-Sakhāwī (d. 902/1497).
   Princeton is especially fortunate in having an autograph:
   Al-qawl al-tāmm fī faḍl al-ramy bi al-sihām (Yahūdah 3551).67

f. An incomplete MS on archery exercises and competitions by an
   11th century author, Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Laṭīf
   al-Khuḍayrī:
   Kashf al-niqāb ‘an al-musābaqaḥ wa al-ramy bi al-nushāb (Yahūdah 2312)

g. A rather late work on archery with commentary by Abū al-‘Abbās
   b. Sibṭ b. Ḥirz Allāh written about 1000/1591:
   Kitāb hidāyat al-rāmī ila ṣariqat al-marāmī68

The following additions should be made to the above list of manuscripts in the general field of tactics, weapons, and military organization:

a. A work on tactics, strategems and ruses by Abū Bakr Muḥammad
   b. ‘Ali b. Asbagh al-Ḥarawī, whom Brockelmann thinks might be
   the son of the author of no. 31 above:
   Kitāb al-badā‘i‘ wa al-asrār fī haqīqat al-radd wa al-intiṣār wa ghāmiḍ
   mā ijtama‘at ʿalaṣyhi al-rumat fī al-amṣār (GAL, Suppl. II, 166).

b. A work on artillery, probably composed in the late 15th century,
   originally in Spanish, and then translated into Arabic. It shows
   some knowledge of the development of siege craft and field pieces
   of the Spanish armies, at that time attacking the Muslim positions
   in the south of Spain and along the Maghrib littoral. Its author
   bears the Spanish name of Arribāsh, and is otherwise identified as

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(67) This was mentioned in the MF, p. 98, as being anonymous, and reported by
Mercier, p. 456, as such. On the strength of ‘Awwād’s hasty reading of the Yahūdah
MS, Zaki, p. 157, reported the author as simply Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
al-Shāfī‘ī. Not only did ‘Awwād miss the more pertinent “al-Sakhāwī” of the
autograph, he also reported it as Yahūdah 3088 rather than 3551. Kūrkīs ‘Awwād,
“Al-makḥūṭaṯ al-‘arabiyah fī dūr al-kutub al-amirikiyah”. Sumer, VII, no. 2
(1951), p. 250. It can also be found cited without author in H. Kh., IV, p. 583.

(68) Hein, op. cit., p. 306, and note 2, where mention is made of one commentary
adding the words, “fīn al-rimāyah fī al-bunduq”. Zaki, p. 159 f., reporting a
Cairo manuscript, misreads the author’s name and adds to the title, “fī ʿilm al-
ramy bi al-bunduq”. 
Ibrahim b. ‘Ali Ghānim b. Muḥammad b. Zakariyah al-Andalusī:  
Al-‘izz wa al-manafi‘ li al-mujāhidin fi sabīl Allāh bi al-ālāt al-hurūb wa al-madāfi‘ (GAL, II, 617 f.).

c. A treatise on the manufacture and operation of various siege machines and weapons, and directions for the manufacture of various types of armor. The author, Murdā b. ‘Ali b. Murdā al-Ṭarsūsī, composed it for Salāh al-Dīn sometime before or after the taking of Jerusalem (583/1187). The more important extracts of this work have been edited and translated:  

d. A very interesting treatise dating from the 16th century on military geometry and surveying, the throwing of missiles, and the digging of mines. It was written by the Arab-speaking interpreter in the fortress of Bulghar on the Volga, ‘Uthmān al-Muhtadī (d. after 960/1553). The manuscript in the Garrett Collection, probably unique, dates from the early 19th century:  
Hidāyat al-muhtadī fī ‘ilm al-handas wa al-misābah wa ramy al-khamīrah wa ḥafīr al-lughm (Garrett Coll. no. 1056).

e. A work noted by Mercier and Brockelmann and overlooked by Ritter; a treatise on war by Mūsā b. Muḥammad al-Yūsufī al-Miṣrī d. c. 759/1358):  

f. A very late work on jihād by Ahmad b. Zaynī Daḥlān (d. 1304/1886):  
Irshād al-hādir wa al-bādīd limā jâ‘a fī faḍā‘il al-jihād (Yahūdah 2623).

From this list of over fifty titles, five only have been made available, and in varying degrees of quality and completeness, for scholarly consideration, viz, Lutfūl-Ḥuq’s edition of the Nihāyat al-su‘l, based upon five of the nine known manuscripts; Fāris and Elmer’s edition and translation of the Garrett manuscript on archery; Cahen’s edition and translation of extracts from Murdā al-Ṭarsūsī’s work on weapons


(70) Zaki, p. 158, refers to the author as one of the ‘halqa’ leaders in the time of Sultān Jaqmaq. According to Ayalun this would put him in one of the non-Mamlūk Cavalry squadrons, p. 62-3 et passim, and note 93 for other references.
and armor; Zoppoth's edition of the Pseudo-Aristotle treatise and the present edition and translation of the Tafrij al-kurūb. Though not all of the works are of equal value, it would appear that between fifteen and twenty are of the first importance in Muslim military thinking, since the various copies of any single one of them span as many as four centuries.\(^1\) It would seem impossible to gauge that renaissance in Muslim strategy and tactics which begins with the roll-back of the Frankish invaders and reaches its apogee in the Ottoman assaults on Vienna without resource to these rich and vital materials.

Two monographs on the subject of Muslim field and hand weapons, both employing some of the manuscripts named above, illustrate one phase of the problem of the disinclination of the Orientalist to pursue the technical study of Muslim warfare. In his study of the history of medieval artillery according to Oriental sources, Kalervo Huuri devoted the greater part of his work to elucidating the approximate meaning of various military terms, not only those employed in the Byzantine and Arabic worlds, but in the Persian, Indian, Chinese and Mongolian as well. Thus, he had to trace the terminology for both crossbow and arbalest (both under "armbrust"), and the separate body of terms relative to siege-machinery, e.g., the ballista, the mangonel, the culverin, etc. To clarify the difference between light and heavy field or siege pieces ("leichte steinwerfende" and "schwere steinwerfende"), Huuri made appeal to the illustrations accompanying the manuscripts of Najm al-Din al-Aḥdab's work, and categorized the siege-machines as being either traction-fired ("ziekhraftbilden") or fired by means of torsion-release ("torsionsschleudergeschütze"). His glossary of hand and field artillery is a scholarly landmark of its kind, and any future research of the topic will be greatly indebted to it.\(^2\)

Although Ayalon's purpose in his monograph on Mamlūk weaponry was ultimately to make a comment more relative to social and intellectual history, he was forced to make a detailed study of the nomenclature of firearms and gunpowder, and to outline the evolution of the uses of the words naft and bārūd from their utility in medieval pyrotechnics to their later relevance to the arquebus, the mortar and the cannon.\(^3\)

\(^{1}\) For example, one MS of the Nihāyat al-suʿl is dated 29 May 1841 whereas the earliest one was copied in 1372. Nihāyat al-suʿl, pp. 1-3, and note 37, supra.

\(^{2}\) Huuri, pp. 94-192 passim for the evolution of Islamic field weapons and their attendant terminology; pp. 255 ff. for the glossary; and cf. illustration nos. 15-19.

\(^{3}\) Ayalon, Chapter Two on terminology; Chapter Three, passim, for the attitude.
Since Huuri’s work had little to do with firearms or naptha, except insofar as it was used as a projectile, Ayalon’s terminological findings are at once original and seminal. In both cases, however, the space devoted to assaying terminology points up the inadequacy of the published lexicographical and technical literature through which this important phase of Muslim development has to be assessed.\textsuperscript{74}

It is against such a background of primary and source materials, available or still in manuscript, and in terms of the technological and terminological problems, that this edition of the \textit{Tafri\={j} al-kur\={u}b} and its somewhat problematic translation must be gauged. It proposes to do no more than bring to the attention of the scholarly community one more original source-book on the subject of Muslim warfare, and to illuminate, insofar as the literature makes possible, some of its puzzling aspects.

When all the sources are published and the terminology proven accurate, perhaps then Western military theorists will understand that the military supremacy of the Mamlûk and Ottoman societies was based on something more than mere numbers and hit-and-run tactics. These societies put primacy upon the military vocation, and their basic security was in military success. They maintained the tempo of success, initiated by Saladin, throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It must have been based on superior patterns of logistics and armament and tactics, as their discipline must have canalized their zeal.\textsuperscript{75} The basic sources discussed above and this present study might be considered as fairly contributory to making plain those patterns and defining that discipline.

\textsuperscript{74} It is interesting that Ayalon could find but two definitions relating \textit{naft} to \textit{bâr\={u}}d in his study of the evolution of the terminology for gunpowder. These were supplied by Ibn Khaldûn and al-Qalqashandî. Ayalon, pp. 21 ff. and notes.

\textsuperscript{75} Atiya’s summation, p. 482, of the military inadequacy of the Christians in the 13th and 14th centuries can hardly be bettered or disputed, and forms an interesting corollary to Ayalon’s work which proves the disinclination of one Muslim group to reshape their formerly successful tactics and weapons. However, the Ottomans did make the necessary shifts in weaponry and continued into the 16th century the substance of Muslim military superiority. As the sources detailed above become available, and as they pertain to the period before 1683, they will complement these two seminal studies, and those of Huuri and Smail (\textit{supra}).
2. The manuscripts, the author, the work.

This edition is based on the collation of the only two manuscripts known to the editor. One of them is listed in Brockelmann (GAL, II, 168) as an anonymous work written for “al-Malik al-Nāṣir”. This is somewhat misleading for it could refer to al-Malik al-Nāṣir b. Qalāʾān, who is indeed mentioned in the treatise.1 However, in the eulogistic introduction accompanying this manuscript of the work (which is missing from the Yahūdah text), the ruler is correctly identified as Abū al-Sāʿādat Faraj b. al-Sulṭān al-Malik al-Zāhir Abū Saʿīd Barquq. Upon his succession to the throne (15th of Shawwāl 810/20 June 1399) he was given the throne name of al-Malik al-Nāṣir.2

It is number 35 in Ritter’s list of manuscripts and he correctly reports its composition in the reign of Sulṭān Faraj b. Barquq.3 He reports it as a large octavo volume of 152 folios with no other work included within its binding. Photostats of a film of this MS were secured for the editor from the film library of the Arabic Manuscript Section of the Arab League in Cairo. The title-page is illuminated with a decorative medallion as its center-piece. The tughra of the Ottoman Sulṭān Mahmut I (1143-1168/1730-1754) appears to the right, as does a remark to the effect that this volume has been made part of the royal waqf and has been so recorded by Darwīsh Muṣṭafā, the superintendent (mufattish) of the royal awqaf. Beneath this is the seal-mark of Darwīsh Muṣṭafā.4

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1 Book IV, Chap. 1: p. 40, γ (Hereinafter the first page reference will be to the translation; the second to the edited text).
3 Ritter, p. 149.
4 An explanation of the seals and of lacunae in Fa’ was kindly supplied the editor by Dr. Albert Dietrich of the German Archaeological Institute in Istanbul in a letter dated 26 February 1959. Some of the missing words were obviously inscribed in gold and have flaked off, or were in a light red or blue pigment which has faded. Paper was thin and soft, and a light outline of some words appears on the folio beneath, giving one the impression of a palimpsest. Dr. Dietrich found conclusively that it was not so.
The manuscript is undated and was copied by al-Faḍl b. ʿAbd al-Wahāb al-Sinbāṭī, who was undoubtedly an Egyptian. It is written in a clear 9th/15th century naskhi with nine lines to a page. Book and chapter titles are written somewhat larger and are allotted distinguishing lines to themselves. Most of the text is vowelled but not always correctly and not completely, e.g. those vowels indicating case ending and tense forms are seldom included. The clarity of the copy and the illuminated title-page lead one to believe that this copy was destined for the royal library and may have been executed within the author's lifetime, though the absence of his name from the copy is puzzling. This manuscript is no. 3483 from the Fāṭih mosque in Istanbul, and will be referred to hereinafter as Fā'

The other manuscript is contained in the majmū, which is numbered ELS 3954 in the Yahūdah Collection now in the process of being catalogued in Princeton University. It contains:

1. f. 1b-91a. Ḥall al-ishkāl fī al-ramy bi al-nībāl, which is a commentary on an urjūzah on archery by an unnamed author.5 This copy is by the same kāṭib who copied the Tafrīj al-ḵurūb, and was completed on the 24th of Šāfār 924/8th of March 1518.

2. f. 94b-153a. Tafrīj al-ḵurūb fī tadbīr al-ḵurūb, a treatise in twenty books on the arts of war by ʿUmar b. Ibrāhīm al-Awsī al-Anṣārī. The copyist was Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Rifāʿī al-Ḥasanī al-Shāʾī who completed his work on the 25th of Muḥarram 924/7 February 1518.


Various short selections of poetry with commentary or other excerpts are copied in the intervening folios. The leather binding and the pages of the majmū are severely worm-eaten, but fortunately most of the damage is in the marginal area of the text, permitting an almost perfect reading. It measures 15 by 21.5 cm.

The script is a rather debased naskhi and is immediately seen as such when compared to Fā’. There are thirteen lines to a page except for one with fourteen, and two, including the colophon page, where there are fifteen lines. There is practically no vowelling, and the incursion of

5 See no. 25 of Ritter’s list, supra, and note 51 accompanying it.
worm holes makes the proper pointing of a word a difficult problem. The marginal area of some folios is filled with various medical formulas, diagnoses and treatment. They are completely unrelated to the text and subject-matter of the Tafriij al-kurub, and are not in the hand of its scribe, but rather in a hand which appended commentaries to other parts of the majmu'. This manuscript will be referred to hereinafter as Ya'.

Except for the introduction which forms a part of Fa' and is absent from Ya', the two manuscripts are in most respects textually identical. The differences are ones of word order, more grammatically correct forms, and lacunae of from a word to a whole clause. In the latter case, and lacking any other MSS. upon which a decision of textual correctness might have been reached, the wording of the more complete text was retained. Incorrect forms of the verb and incorrect usage of cardinal numbers (e.g., thalath rather than thalathah with fusuł) are the most glaring of the grammatical errors, but they occur with such regularity as to give credence to the belief that during the Mamluk period the Arabic language as a literary medium was undergoing some process of decay. Stylistically there is little to commend the work. It was a work, however, which was meant to convey a good deal of supposedly practical information to certain people, and its language is neither farfetched nor abstruse. Except for some words of a purely technical nature, this work in its simplicity would be accessible to any literate person in the epoch of its composition.

Though the author is named in Ya', the given form of his name is such that it is difficult to identify him exactly. An 'Umar b. Ibrāhim b. 'Umar al-Anšāri al-Awsī al-Mursī is mentioned by Brockelmann, but he died in 633/1234. Neither of the two biographical sources for this period, viz., al-Sakhawī's Al-daw' al-lāmi' and Ibn Taghrī Birdī's Al-Manhal al-ṣāfī, cites anyone with this particular name. Ḥājjī Khalīfah lists neither author nor work.

However, using simply ' 'Umar b. Ibrāhim'' as a clue, and knowing that the author had to live during the reign of Sultān Faraj, both the Daw' and the Manhal mention and draw attention to the important offices held by a member of a renowned family of Ḥanafī jurists from 'Aleppo. His full name is given in the former as: 'Umar b. Ibrāhim b.
Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Muḥammad b. Hibat Allāh al-Kamāl Abū Ḥaḍī b. al-Kamāl Abī Isḥāq b. Nashīr al-Dīn Abī ‘Abdallāh b. al-Kamāl Abī Ḥaḍī al-Uqayli al-Halābī. He was generally known as Ibn al-Adīm or Ibn Abī Jarādah. The *Daw* gives his birth date as 754/1353, but the *Manhal* has 760 or 761/1359. These latter dates are cited in the *Daw* but are considered inaccurate. He died in 811/1408. His family-tree as deduced from the *Manhal* is demonstrated by Wiet. In the usual manner he studied *fiqh* and the *uṣūl*, and with his father and a certain Ibn Ḥabīb he pursued the study of *ḥadīth*.

He was appointed *Qādī al-‘askar* in the Aleppo district, and later deputy to his father, the Ḥanafī *qādī*. In 794/1392 he became Ḥanafī *qādī* in Aleppo and in this position amassed great wealth. He visited Cairo, but cut short his stay when he heard that the Tatars of Timūr Lenk were ravaging the Syrian provinces. He was taken prisoner and very badly treated. When Timūr withdrew in 803/1401, he attached himself to the entourage of the chief Ḥanafī *qādī* of Egypt, Abīn al-Dīn al-Ṭarābulsi. In 805/1403 he succeeded the latter, and held at the same time the position of head of the Shaykhūnīyah *ṭarīqah*. Due to his association with the Mamlūk *amīrs* and his growing influence at court, he was appointed *shaykh al-shuyūkh* in 808/1406. Upon his death less than three years later he was succeeded in his office of chief *qādī* of the Mamlūk realm by his son Nashīr al-Dīn Muḥammad.

Al-Sakhāwī maintains in the *Daw* that he used his position at court and his connections with the various *amīrs* to amass great wealth and neglected, or performed only perfunctorily, his religious duties. These were charges no doubt garnered from al-Maqrīzī who esteemed ‘Umar not at all. Ibn Ṭaghhrī-Birdī, however, defended him:

> “Cadi Kamāl al-Dīn was a leading and erudite scholar, respected and highly regarded by the rulers, sedate, and a man of noble qualities and virtues. Shaikh Taqī ad-Dīn Maqrīzī charged him with faults of which he was innocent; the charge was the result of some difference between them — God pardon them both.”

Though a student of al-Maqrīzī’s, Ibn Ṭaghhrī-Birdī was the son of a...
leading Mamlūk amīr, and the phrase "respected and highly regarded by the rulers" might be construed as betraying a parti pris.

For purposes of identification, three facts from this biographical sketch should be noted. His holding of the position of qādī al-'askar would have made him conversant with army organization and he would have ridden with the army in any general operations around Aleppo. His presence in Syria during the depredations of Timūr, and his consequent imprisonment, gave him some knowledge of Mongol military organization, tactics and strategy. The author of the Tafrīj al-kurūb is moved to include the mode of Mongol mobilization for battle in his discussion of the usual Muslim theory of battle-rankings:

"The Mongols from among the Turkish people accustomed their people [to fight as] a single squadron of cavalry, so that they struggled together against the enemy. Retiring [from the battle] and returning [to it] was denied to each of them. They gained from this great experience which was not[duplicated]by others." 10

And, speaking of the problem of razing captured fortifications, the author adds:

"This was the method also of the Tatar rulers, such as Hūlākū and Ghāzān and those after them. They had demolished many of the cities and fortresses; some whose rebuilding ensued, and some which remained as they were." 11

Finally there is the tone of the introduction as related to his companionship with the important Mamlūk amīrs and his fulsome praise of the Sultān. The author of the Tafrīj al-kurūb says that he pursued his research and wrote his treatise for two types of readers:

1. "...he who chances upon it of the [Sultān's] noble commanders and the leaders of his armies",
   and

2. "He among them who did not experience the path of war, because of the youth of his age..." 12

In both cases it is directed at the Mamlūk military caste, for the second group might be thought of as the Mamlūks undergoing their training in the Citadel. The author did not have sultān Faraj in mind, for "... he

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10 Book XVI, Chap. 3: p. 103, vv
11 Book XIX, Chap. 3: p. 119, 4, 4
12 Introduction: p. 41, 4
has gone through the wars and experienced them and has known, by
exploits and battles, their conditions and their nature."13 Thus, on
the basis of chronology and these three biographical possibilities, it may
be that 'Umar b. Ibrāhīm Al-Awṣi al-Anṣārī and the chief qādi of Egypt,
Kamāl al-Dīn Abū Ḥafṣ 'Umar b. Ibrāhīm, known as Ibn al-'Adīm,
are synonymous. But even this possibility is rendered yet more tenuous
by the distinction between 'Awṣi' and 'Uqayli'.

On the whole, one must admit that there is something deficient in
the Tafrīj al-kurūb. It is a work of the second rank, lacking the detailed
scope of the Nihāyat al-su'l, the urgency of Ibn Hudhayl's call to the
jihād, the practiced warrior's flair for military exercises and tourn-
aments and duels which animates the works of Najm al-Dīn Aḥdab and
Lājin. The work reeks of the library and of the court, rather than of the
camp and the battle-field. Its tone is that of the observer rather than of
the participant. Platitudes and amusing stories abound when one had
hoped for more concrete strategy or more varied tactical analysis.
Though stylistically mediocre, one is moved to count it among the works
of adab, rather than those of funūn ḥarbiyyah.

Although the author contends that he reflected upon the opinions of
the military experts and upon their recommendations to future military
leaders, not once does he cite the name of Najm al-Dīn or Lājin or
Taybughā or al-Ḥarawī or Muḥammad b. Mankli or Moḥammad b.
ʿĪsā b. Ismāʿīl al-Hanafī, the author of the Nihāyat al-su'l. It is from the
books of hadīth, of Ibn Iṣḥāq, al-Wāqīdī, al-Jāḥīz, Ibn Sā'd and Ibn
al-Athīr that citations are drawn. Saladin and Baybars and al-Malik
al-Nāṣir b. Qalāʾūn are mentioned, but are not so prominently invoked
as are the Persian kings of pre-Islamic times, or Alexander and Muʿā-
wiyyah. The questions of armor and archery are slighted, while hand
and field weapons are simply named in passing. Where the Nihāyat
al-su'l describes and illustrates five separate methods of battle for-
mations, the author of Tafrīj al-kurūb is moved to describe only a five-
line battle array with straight- or curved-line variants.14 Finally, it
is only at Book Nine, exactly half-way through the treatise, that the
army moves out to battle. By then we have been treated to lengthy
discussions of peace-time vigilance, agents and spies, envoys, deceptions
and stratagems to avoid battle, consultations about going to battle,
the qualifications of generals and troops, etc. The adjuncts of caution

(13) Loc. cit.
(14) Books XVI and XVII passim.
and diplomacy and the exhaustion of alternatives seemed to have usurped the place of military action in the thinking of our author.

Paradoxically it is in the relationship of this last point to the military thinking of the Middle Ages that the work makes its soundest contribution. All later military historians have looked upon the disinclination of the Muslim armies to engage in immediate battle, and their super-sensitive cautiousness and their appeals to stratagems and cunning and trickery to avoid open battle as derogatory aspects of Eastern warfare. In taking the modern military historians and theorists to task for their inept handling of warfare during the Crusades, Professor Smail wrote:

"The interpretation of the events of one age in the light of the assumptions and prejudices of another can never produce satisfactory history, and the story of medieval military methods told wholly or principally in terms of battle is very far from complete. It was not an age when commanders in war consciously applied strategic doctrine, but they were well aware of the risks involved in giving battle, in adverse circumstances they prepared to refuse it. Yet even when they decided against combat, conditions in the Latin states were such that by keeping their army in being in the neighborhood of the enemy they achieved important military objects."  

In an adjoining footnote, he points out that the most widely influential military theorist during the Middle Ages was Vegetius, and that he "more than once stated that battle was an uncertain business, to be rejected in favor of other means unless circumstances were favorable."  

Smail believes that both sides during the Crusades fought along principles of "Eastern" warfare, i.e., erection and maintenance of fortified strategic points, a small army ever ready and practiced in quick forays, the avoidance of open battles, per se, until the last minute. His work points out with singular clarity that the Latin armies lost or were put at serious disadvantage only when they veered from these principles as a result of rash leadership, personal vendettas, or inaccurate or incomplete intelligence about the enemy. The chivalric impetuosity

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(15) R.G. Smail, Crusading Warfare (Cambridge: 1956), p. 15. For the shortcomings of the historians of crusading warfare see Chapter One of Smail's work, and cf. the first paragraphs of this introduction.

(16) Smail, op. cit., p. 15, note 2.
of the Christian warrior appears less than laudable against the intelligent policy of caution served alike by the Byzantines and the Muslims. These latter groups had cognizance of the terrain, particularly of the logistical problems of engaging in battle beyond the fortified frontier, or between fortified places; of the dependence of the various elements of public security upon an army that had to be kept in being and whose numbers could not be hazarded at every alarm; and, lastly, of a particular type of strategy and tactics, honored by usage and dictated by numbers and terrain, which contravened the training and experience of the invaders from the West. By constant arrow fire and feigned attacks and diversionary ambushes, the Turkish militia on the Muslim side generally established whatever superiority they could before coming to fight at close quarters. This, contends Smail, was "a natural expression of the common sense maxim that, before irrevocably committing itself to battle, an army should gain every possible advantage over its opponent." 17 The Eastern warrior thought it "no less creditable to retreat than to pursue"; he was like a fly "who could be beaten off but not driven away." 18 Thus if overweening cautiousness was uppermost in the mind of an Eastern general, then deliberate tactics of attrition were employed by him in confronting an equal or superior enemy.

Battle, then, was the very last resource; and it could not be countenanced until every other one had been investigated and found nugatory. Chapter One of Book IV of the Tafrīj al-kurūb affirms the utility of deceptions and stratagems so as to avoid war by appeal to Law and Reason, and then goes on to cite cases from the Islamic past, including the words and actions of the Prophet and his Companions, where they were employed successfully. 19 In Chapter Two of Book VII, the author compares confronting a strong enemy at the very moment of his appearance to stirring a serpent from its lair while one is unarmèd, and says quite distinctly that such action is not permissible. 20 And in the same chapter his words form an informing corollary, as it were, to Smail’s thesis about Crusading warfare:

"In general, the one seeking to do battle against the enemy should not move to engage him, but should accept safety and peace as

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(17) Ibid., p. 83.
(18) Ibid., p. 78.
(19) Book IV, Chap. 1 and 3 passim.
(20) Book VII, Chap. 2: p. 78,14.
long as they are granted to one. The Prophet said, "Don't seek to encounter the enemy; rather ask safety of God. They can conquer just as you can conquer." If you have met them, stand fast. One should not become disgusted at the procrastination of one's enemy; for in the interval of waiting is the grasping of possible circumstances and what has been concealed of their affairs. One does not seek victory by engaging him so long as victory can be attained through stratagems. For going out against the enemy involves exposing one's self to danger and the endangering of one's wealth and being distant from one's country, even if only to the frontiers of it. Considering what may be in this going-forth of expectation of the perishing of self and the courting of dangers, and the bearing of affliction, it may be that stratagems can do that which battle cannot."\(^{21}\)

This same philosophy attaches to the wiping-up operations following a rout, our author going so far as to point out that no soldier should get in front of a routed army, nor seek to shunt it from its path of flight, nor deny the defeated access to water if they seek it. He says, further, that "standing in the direct path of routed warriors is not sagacious".\(^{22}\) And he cautions the commander of an army laying siege to a fortified place:

"It must also be stressed that the besieger of the enemy is also besieged in the sense that he is not secure from their going out against him and their hastening to do so when the opportunity, during the day or night, presents itself to them; for they desire victory as much as the besieger desires it over them. Hence it is incumbent upon the commander to be cautious with respect to himself and those of the army with him as much as possible."\(^{23}\)

It is the Mongols, the various Central Asian tribal conglomerations moving as a unit, who bring to the late Middle Ages the military theory of "total war," of total devastation and almost total annihilation. The Muslim armies of western Asia and the southern Mediterranean littoral and their European medieval opposites, particularly during the Crusades, fought the same general type of war, though the tactics differed, as they sprang from somewhat analogous feudal societies. Their warfare

\(^{21}\) *Loc. cit.*

\(^{22}\) Book XVIII, Chap. 1: p. 113, Λ
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\(^{23}\) Book XIX, Chap. 3: p. 118, ιτ
"... but rarely afforded the spectacle of two armies bent on mutual
destruction; the true end of military activity was the capture and
defense of fortified places. In its simplest form the struggle could
be between an army on one side, and a garrison manning its
walls on the other." 24

Both sides came to know that "decision by battle was more likely to
serve the ends of the aggressor than those of his intended victim." 25

Obliquely, the Tafriž al-kurūb adds something of note to the most
ambiguous of the military problems of Crusading warfare, viz., the
evolution of the role of infantry. Smail emphasizes the lack of conclusive
proof from the Latin side for the prominence of the pedites, and high-
lights, in his discussion of the Muslim armies, the almost complete
tactical dependence upon lightly-mailed cavalrymen. 26 Yet, between
Ḥittin, the terminal date of his study, and the beginning of the fifteenth
century which saw the composition of the Tafriž al-kurūb, a tightening
of the military organization took place, which, while it did not give
strategic equality to the infantry, integrated their activities more reasona-
bly in military thinking. Thus in Book VI, Chapter Two, the author
deems it necessary to include the qualifications of infantrymen. They
had quite specific places within the camp, and were not grouped with
either the tribal auxiliaries or the general camp followers. 27 And he
explains the tactical use of the infantry during the battle and the
wiping-up operations in Books XVII and XVIII. Though these are
minimal in comparison to the space allotted the organization and
operations of the cavalry divisions, it does indicate a tighter organization
of the various elements of the army, more concern for the infantrymen
and a wiser use of their capacities.

Thus one finds in the Tafriž al-kurūb a value more relative to time
and place and to perceptual realities vis-a-vis war on the part of a
differently motivated civilization than to absolute military considerations.
It complements the work of Smail, though its ultimate contribution
may be, like Ayalon's work on the gunpowder and firearms, in the
fields of social and intellectual history. Withal, it gives to the study of
Muslim warfare a wider context and touches, in its best moments, a
set of generalities heretofore unavailable to the scholar and the student
of the Muslim East.

(24) Smail, op. cit., p. 39.
(26) Ibid., pp. 106-120 and 75-83.
(27) See the diagram of a Muslim camp in the Nihāyat al-su'l.
3. Acknowledgements

This work is substantially my doctoral dissertation. It can be fairly said that not one line of it would have been possible without the sustained aid of the Department of Oriental Studies of Princeton University. To all its members, I convey my gratitude for the sustenance and concern rendered on my behalf.

Dr. Rudolf Mach was the first to rouse my interest in the problem of Muslim warfare by making available to me the copy of the text in the Yahūdah collection, and facilitating its photostating for my use while in Cairo. For this and his subsequent assistance I remain much indebted.

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Two sets of colleagues did yeoman service on my behalf and sometimes at a distance of a continent or two: Mr. Majed Saʿid, who checked my translation and assisted me in tracking down some obscure references in Arabic literature; Mr. Michel Mazzaoui, who typed the Arabic text of the edition from pages which carried the corrections and notations of a two years' struggle; and Dr. John A. Williams, who never failed me when I needed his opinion or his services in checking the contents of works inaccessible to me. To my thanks to these three Princeton friends I add the same to the following in Cairo: Dr. Charles Geddes, of the School of Oriental Studies of the American University, who told me about Dr. Lutful-Huq’s edition of the Nihāyat al-suʿl; Mr. Maurice Ṣāliḥi of the same institution, who read through with me my rough translation of the collated text; and Mr. Rashād ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib, of the Arabic Manuscripts Section of the Arab League, who checked my unraveling of the Yahūdah manuscript, and who secured for me photostats of the Fāṭih manuscript in the files of his office.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank most respectfully Dr. David Ayalon and Dr. ʿAziz Suryāl ʿAtiya, from whose conversations and correspondence I garnered the intellectual support to pursue my research in the somewhat neglected field of Muslim warfare.

No one of the above persons or institutions can be considered remotely culpable for any errors contained herein; they are but products of my own oversight, haste and ignorance. But, since this does but
represent the inauguration of more pertinent, and, we trust, less assailable work, it is Time which will grant the final indulgence and the cleansing correctives.

"Outweariers of Apollo will, as we know, Continue their Martian generalities. We have kept our erasers in order."

E. P. Homage to Sextus Propertius

Cairo, 1960.
EDITOR'S PREFACE

For the sake of convenience the source of the Qur'ānic quotations was placed after each one in both the text and the translation. The translations are those of Professor Arberry's *The Koran Interpreted* (2 Vols; London: 1955).

The notes accompanying the Arabic text are those prompted by the collation only. Explanatory notes and problems of literary sources accompany the translation.

A comparatively short glossary of terms relevant to Muslim military nomenclature has been added after the translation. Its scope, however, is beyond that of the terminology encountered in the *Tafsīr al-kurūb*.

Two variations on the Princeton system of transliterating Arabic should be noted: "b." is used throughout for "ibn", except where the latter is the first element of a given name; and "Abī" is used for "Abū" when the latter appears in the genitive case. Long vowels occurring at the end of words were given macrons.

In the translation, the words between brackets are editorial insertions; those between parentheses are either explanatory or convey alternate meanings and usages.
TAFRĪJ AL-KURŪB
FĪ TADBĪR AL-ḤURŪB

TRANSLATION
The first folios of the Istanbul Manuscript (Fātiḥ 3483) of Tafriḥ al-kurūb.

الصفحات الأولى من مخطوطة استنبولي (مسجد الفاتح 3483)
The colophon of the Istanbul Manuscript (Fâtiḥ 3483). Though giving the name of the scribe, it lacks a date. Probably late 9th/15th Century.

الصفحة الأخيرة من مخطوطة إسطنبول (مسجد الفاتح 3483). رغم أنها تورد اسم الناقد إلا أنها غفل من التاريخ والمرجع أنه كان في أواخر القرن التاسع الهجري (الخمس عشر الميلادي).
INTRODUCTION

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE ... he is the supporter of Islâm by his power, the conqueror by the might of his victory ... and the humbler of the nose of the deviator from His obedience by quickening his destruction and returning his malice to his own throat ... exhibiting to him through the destruction of his enemies that by which the wise person is instructed and which the contemplator numbers among the miracles of his age ... And [he is] the cause of his noble sire’s happiness through the annihilation of his enemies, tyrannical and heretical. And God is the determiner of his affairs ... [wherein] he brought the nation from hardship to relief ... and he raised from [his] subjects, by the kindest rule, every hardship and misfortune (contraction of heart) ... and He lightened the hearts of the people by the most fortuitous of kings, from the odor of whose flowering days, the sweetest fragrance and the most evanescent perfume is inhaled.

I declare that there is no god but God alone, with Whom there is no partner: a declaration which the greatest kings inherit, the great from the great (i.e. the son from the father) ... The first of them recommends

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1 This introduction does not appear in Fa', where the opening takes the following form:

IN THE NAME OF GOD, the Compassionate, the Merciful. Praise belongs to God, the Lord of the Worlds and the Reward is for the Godfearing. May His blessing be upon our lord Muḥammad, the Seal of the Prophets, and upon his Family and his Companions; may He bestow upon them a Great Benediction.

This book is entitled “The Dispelling of Woes in the Management of Wars”, arranged in twenty books, and in each of these is three chapters about the management of wars and what is known of the nature of battles and its explication. The author, the humble slave of God, the Exalted, is ‘Umar b. Ibrahīm al-Awsī al-Anṣārī; may God, the Exalted, have mercy upon him.

Either there are chapters missing from both MSS, and this seems hardly possible due to the enumeration of book - and chapter-titles in Fa’, or this is a patent addition on the part of the scribe. In thirteen of the twenty books there are but two chapters apiece, while in one, Book VI, there are four chapters; leaving but six books with three chapters each.
it to the next in continuity unbroken, and the son undertakes to uphold it after the father and he relates it on the authority of the victorious to the [oncoming] victor ... I declare that our lord Muḥammad is His slave and His messenger; favored with [His] support throughout the continuation of Time; the Victorious by [reason of] the terror which impresses the hearts of the people of unbelief at a distance of a month’s journey. May God bless him and his family, whose battles fulfilled for the enemy the dates of Destiny, and whose swords gulped the blood of unbelief, returning with the saffron of victory and not with the crimson of shame; with a blessing [such that] their stars rise in the galaxies of stars, and whose form does not change with the passing of Time; if God, the Almighty, wills it. And may God bestow a great benediction.

To proceed: Since the great Sulṭān, the King, the Victor, the Sage, the Just, the Struggler, the Perseverer, the Trail-blazer, the God-supported, the Conquering, the Victorious, the Ornament of the World and of Religion, the Sulṭān of Islām and of the Muslims, the Rejuvenator of Justice in the Worlds, the Heir of the kingdom of the Kings of the Arabs and the Persians and the Turks, Shadow of God in His land, the Upholder of God’s sunnah and of His Ordinances, the Alexander of the time, the Bestower [of that which is possessed by] the possessors of thrones and crowns, the Donor of provinces and countries, the Destroyer of tyrants and oppressors and unbelievers, Protector of the two sacred places (Mecca and Madinah), Possessor of the two qiblahs (Mecca and Jerusalem), the Unifier of the word of Faith, the Unfurler of the banner of justice and benevolence, the Master of the Kings of the time, the Imām of the pious, the Partner of the Commander of the Faithful: Abū al-Saʿādāt Faraj, son of the Sulṭān, the Martyr, al-Malik al-Zāhir Abū Saʿīd Barqūq; may God, the Almighty, through the length of days, give long life to his rule and may He give victory, through the passing of the ages, to his soldiers and armies and associates.

He is the one whose constancy and strength subdued the kings of the...
earth, whose [military] numbering and equipment rendered limit and
description impossible, and whose fame and mention and repute spread
to the distant horizons. And Victory surrounded him from every side.
In the recurrence of battles, his victory and his conquest are recurrent.
A seeker did not approach him with evil except that he returned a failure;
and no one cast at him with cunning except that the arrow of his cun-
ing turned back upon him unerringingly. He did not desire the surmounting
of a difficulty except to achieve in its surmounting the ingeniously
miraculous. He did not attempt to effect a conquest except that the
tongue of Victory spoke out to him, “Help from God, and a nigh
victory”. (61:13) His well-being through victory is ever assured, and the
arrow of his happiness in every time récites:

'Gainst a Victor, Oppression’s warriors are worn;
Stratagems are useless, they work not his taking.
Who butts a rock all day ends not with its breaking;
So does the mountain-goat, and splintered is his horn.3

I was among those who looked into the books of history in their
variety, and reflected upon the battles of wars in them with their dif-
ferent types; and upon that which the people of management among
the chiefs [of wars] had arranged; and upon that which the opinion
of every one of the shaykhs of war and its experts, ‘ulamâ’, had prescribed;
and upon that which the most learned of writers had cited in the
recommendations to the leaders of the armies; and upon that which
happened to the ingenious men of wars of the stratagems of the tricker,
of the cunning of the cunning.

This prompted me to contribute to his treasure, may God make it
prosperous, by the continuation of his rule and the lengthening of his
life and the elevation of his luminous stars and the shining of his light,
by a book which I composed about the management of wars and their
organization; about the knowledge [accrued] about the conditions of
fighting and their assessment, so that he who chances upon it of the
[Sultân’s] noble commanders and the leaders of his armies [might]
be guided by it. He among them who did not experience the path of
war, because of the youth of his age, can be guided by its [expert]
informants. [But I did not compose it for the Sultân, for] he, may God

(3) These lines are by the Arab poet al-A’şâ (d. 8/479); see Rudolf Geyer, ed.,
The Diwan of al-A’şâ. (Gibb Memorial Series, New Series, Vol. VI· London :
1928), p. 46.
make fixed the basis of his state and put the fate of his heretical enemies in his grasp, has gone through the wars and experienced them and has known, by exploits and battles, their conditions and their nature (lit., news). Good luck has served him and gave him after each battle a victory; fortune accompanied him and victory did not desert him, neither while afield nor in fixed abode. And victory is not except from God, the Mighty, the Wise.

I have entitled it “The Dispelling of Woes in the Management of Wars”, and I have put its materials into twenty books.  

(4) There follows a list of book- and chapter-titles, which has been omitted, since they appear at the head of each book and each chapter.
BOOK ONE: About caution in time of peace when the ruler resides in his capital. In it are three chapters.

Chapter One: about the maintenance of caution generally.

Those knowledgeable in military affairs and their management hold that the ruler in time of peace [and] while residing in his capital should be in [a state] of extreme caution against and protection from the enemy; for, if any enemy moves against him, he would be sufficiently prepared; and, if the enemy does not move against him, the precaution will not have been wasted. Injury rarely occurs when precaution is taken, but rather occurs with the lack of caution, with negligence and complacency. God the Almighty, exalted be His Power, ordained caution when He said, "O believers, take your precautions; then move forward in companies, or move forward all together." (4:71). And He, Exalted is He, His Power is mighty, said, "Make ready for them whatever force and strings of horses that you can, to terrify thereby the enemy of God and your enemy." (8:60)

It is related that the Prophet, the Blessing of God and His Benediction upon him, said, "Resolution is suspicion."¹ Of ‘Antarat al-Fawāris it is recounted that he was asked about [the reason for] the great number of his victories in his wars and the lack of success of his enemies against him. He said, "I never disbelieved any report about my enemy, and I did not sleep except with caution about him."²

Generally, one must be suspicious of one’s enemy, in every condition taking one’s caution against him; exaggerating his condition to one’s self; being ready for him with that which is beyond his power. Verily, if one has prepared for him [an amount] greater than [necessary] against him, and then found his power small, this does not injure one; and, if one found his [power] great, one would have prepared for him what is sufficient for him or more than is sufficient for him. Thus one gains mastery over him by preparedness; and victory is from God.

It has been said that one must not feel secure about one’s enemy though he be far from one, nor should one advance carelessly to meet him should he approach one. Yet there should be no postponement of

¹ This saying of the Prophet could not be discovered in the relevant literature.
² The bibliography appended to the article "‘Antara’, EI, 2nd ed., p. 521 f., was exhausted without discovering the origin of this story; nor was it to be found in any of the standard editions of Sirat Antar; see article and bibliography "Sirat ‘Antar’, EI, 2nd ed., pp. 518-520."
meeting him, when his intention towards one is ascertained. Verily, he who neglects doing so at the right time, so that it (i.e. the right time) passes, would have wasted resolution. If fear enters one’s spirit, exposing one’s affair[s] to possible regret, the opportunity rarely repeats itself when [once] it has been wasted. Resolution means that one is prepared for the affair before its eventuality, so that one finds [resolution] when it is needed.

Chapter Two: is about precaution through the use of the walls and trenches of cities and fortresses, and the erection of mirrors in high places for observation [of the enemy].

As for walls and trenches: kings continued in every age to fortify cities and fortresses and citadels with high walls and encircling trenches filled with water. It is obvious what there is in this of great benefit for defense while undergoing siege, should the enemy storm the city or fortress unexpectedly. It has been maintained in the Sahih that the Prophet had a trench dug around al-Madinah on the day of al-ahzab, “the clans”, and he participated in its digging. Had there not been in this complete benefit, then the Prophet would not have done it.

It has been seen in the long period of history that many cities and fortresses were attacked by great armies and were subjected to severe siege, but to no avail. The kings of the Age of Ignorance, al-Jahiliyah, were always aware of this and applied to [the art of fortification] the utmost application. Thus it is said that the walls of Anṭākiyah (Antioch) in the lands of the North (Syria) enclosed the city and its citadel; and its interior contained five mountains, so that there was nothing outside it higher than anything inside it, [no point] from which the enemy could prevail against it.


(4) This is a somewhat misleading statement. The walls of Antioch went along the crests of the hills outside the city, rising to the highest point on Mount Silpius, on which the citadel of the city was perched. There were five main and many posterior gates. The lower defenses of the city faced the Orontes and at one point merged with a fortified bridge over the river. E. S. Beuchier, A Short History of Antioch (Oxford: 1917), p. 4, says: “Four mountains were partially enclosed by the walls, all of them off-shoots of the Casian range”; and in his discussion of Antioch, Guy Le Strange, Palest in: Under the Muslims (London: 1890), pp. 366-77, mentions four hills within the city.
Dalūkah, known as al-‘Ajūz, “the Old Woman”, who ruled Egypt after the Pharaoh, far‘ūn, God curse him, [built] in the lands of Egypt a wall of unburnt bricks, extending over all of it: from al-‘Arish to Ḥasān, from the eastern side and the western side along the slope of a mountain [range]. She put castles along it and a watch tower for every three miles in which she set watchers who could hear one another. Thus, if on the side of one of them a single person made a movement, one would hear [of it] from the others until the news reached the palace of the queen, notifying her in the quickest and shortest time. The ruins of this wall remain until now in the eastern and western mountains and are called “the Wall of the Old Woman”, ḥā’it al-‘Ajūz.5

The wall of Cairo, when it was first built, was constructed of unbaked bricks. The palace of the Caliph [was] in the middle of it, in the [present] location of the Ṣāliḥiyah madrasah and what is around it. But this [particular] wall was not a [salutary] fortification because it was built upon a low place. When al-Ṣūltān Salāḥ ad-Dīn Yūsuf b. Ayyūb, may God the Exalted have compassion on him, ruled the lands of Egypt, he built the citadel of Cairo, Qal‘at al-Jabal, on a raised site, surrounding it and Cairo (the Fāṭimid city), and Miṣr (those parts of the city outside

The long stretches of wall were difficult to maintain adequately, and the city could be taken on its river side, if the enemy sent diversionary parties up along the walls or attacked any number of its gates simultaneously. For the Crusaders’ tactics in capturing the city, see Steven Runciman. A History of the Crusades (Cambridge: 1951-54), vol. I, pp. 213-235, most particularly the plan of Antioch, on page 214 and Plate III, opposite page 220, showing the city from across the Orontes.

(5) The original source for this story was probably Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, Kitāb futūh miṣr; see Le Livre de la Conquête de l’Égypte, ed. Henri Massé (Cairo: 1914), p. 24. It was repeated by al-Mas‘ūdi, Les Prerogatives d’Or, ed. and tr. Barbier de Meynard and Pavet de Courteille (9 vols; Paris: 1861-77), vol. II, p. 398 f. He adds the words (tr. p. 398) :

“On voit aujourd’hui, en 332 de l’hégire, les ruines de cette muraille, qui est nommée Hait el-adjouz (mur de la vieille),”


All sources report that she accomplished this task in six months. She is a mythical character who is thought to have reigned sometime before the Greek conquest of Egypt.
the Fāṭimid wall, particularly Fusṭat), all of them, with a wall of stone. The ruins of the first wall remain until today, near the Bāb al-Ḥadid and other places.  

As for the erection of mirrors in high places for observation: the kings [of the era before Islām] were very particular about this in the cities along the frontiers, al-thughār. Thus when Alexander built Alexandria, he erected in it a tall lighthouse, four hundred cubits in height and placed on its summit a mirror of [many] facets. If a man looked into it, he would see the region which is opposite to it, such as the islands of the sea, and [he would see] what is carried on in them of the building of ships and other things, thus ensuring preparedness against them. 

Matters other than these concerning preparedness engaged the attention of kings in the past. God, the Exalted, knows best.

Chapter Three: about the seeking of intelligence about the enemy in order that one might be prepared for him.

There is no doubt that seeking information about the enemy is among the most important and profitable of affairs. One learns by this the condition of one’s enemy, and whether his intention is [to move] against one or to desist from doing so; so that one will know what his situation is. Hence, for the gathering of intelligence, when the quick arrival of reports is sought, there are methods.

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(6) For an exhaustive discussion of the walls of Cairo, see K. A. G. Creswell, *Muslim Architecture of Egypt* (Oxford: 1952), vol. I, pp. 23-33 and 160-217; and for the plan of the caliphal palace, *ibid.*, pp. 33 ff. He translates labin as either “sun-dried bricks” (p. 21) or “mud bricks” (p. 31).

That part of the original walls survived until our author’s day (the beginning of the 9th/15th century), cf. Creswell, *loc. cit.*:

“... fragments of Gawhar’s wall existed in al-Maqrizi’s day, and the last surviving piece was destroyed in 803/1400-1”.

Though Creswell notes the evidence of Nāṣir-i Khusraw that the brick wall of Jawhar had disappeared by the time of his visit to Cairo in 439/1047 (p. 118), he thinks al-Maqrizi’s word is valid (p. 181, note 5). He discusses, too, the extent of Saladin’s work on the walls (pp. 182 ff.), but finds that the Fāṭimid wazir, Badr al-Jamālī (d. 487/1094), had already begun the splendid stone walls and gates which Saladin was to complete (pp. 160-217 *passim*).

A note that the ruins of Jawhar’s wall were extant around the Bāb al-Ḥadid (the site of Cairo’s present railway terminal) was added in the margin of Tā’ in a hand rather like the scribe’s. This note adds veracity to al-Maqrizi’s statement, *supra*, and gives the lie to Nāṣir-i Khusraw’s.

(7) For a thorough coverage of the Arabic literature on the question of the lighthouse, see M. Asín Palacios, “Una description neuva del Faro de Alejandria”,...
The quickest of these is the kindling of fires on the summits of mountains; for, if something happened in an extremity of the kingdom, such as the movement of the enemy and similar matters, and there were high mountains: then, if it happened at night, fire [signals] can be lighted on the summit of a high mountain; while by daylight smoke signals can be sent from the top of one mountain to the one which comes after it. This is repeated until [the information] reaches the place for which it is intended.

In the beginning of the Turkish rule (i.e. of the Mamlûks), when war broke out between the rulers of the Egyptian lands and the Tatars (Tartars), men were stationed on the summits of mountains, paid for this work by arrangements with the Sulţân (i.e. paid from his privy purse), and concentrated along a line from the Euphrates to Ghazzah. If any movement of the Tatars was noticed, the fire would be kindled and they would make smoke [signals], and this [information] would be relayed from the Euphrates to Ghazzah in the shortest time. Thus it would be known, generally, that an incident had occurred. Then pigeons would be sent from Ghazzah to Egypt. News of this event would be known in one day. The achievement of peace between the Tatars and the rulers of the Egyptian lands obviated this [mode of communication] and its [various] components fell into desuetude.8

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8 Al-Andalus, I (1933), pp. 241-300, particularly the reconstruction of the lighthouse based on these sources, pp. 293-300. For materials available subsequent to Palacios’ study, see E. Lévi-Provençal, “Une description Arabe inédite du Phare d’Alexandrie”, Mélanges Maspéro III (Memoires de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale du Caire, Tome 68; Cairo: 1943), pp. 161-171; and Gabriel Ferrand “Les monuments de l’Égypte au XIIe siècle d’après Abû Hamid al-Andalusi’i”, ibid., pp. 57-66. The latter source mentions that the mirror was made of “fer chinois” and could concentrate the rays of the sun on any approaching vessel and so set it afire (p. 58).

Most of the authorities agree on a height of four hundred cubits. Al-Maqrizi assigns various heights at various times, but believed that it attained a height “près de 400 coudees”; but that time, earthquakes, and rains had diminished its height considerably: op. cit: text Wiet, pp. 113-125; tr. Bouhiant, pp. 444-451.

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8 Al-‘Umari, Al-tafrîf bi ‘al-muṣṭalah al-sharîf (Cairo: 1894), pp. 199-201. Cf. M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, La Syrie a l’époque des Mamelouks (Paris: 1923), pp. 258-261; and J. Sauvaget, La Poste aux chevaux dans l’empire des Mamelouks (Paris: 1941), pp. 39-41. It is the conclusion of the latter that the men on the signal towers were paid by the Sulţân and that they, and all personnel of the intelligence and postal services, were under his direct surveillance and were sustained by him out of his own income (p. 40 and note 178.)
Less speedy is the arrival of news by pigeon, and that is [because] the pigeon travels from only one country to another. If in one of the countries which have pigeons an incident took place, letters are written and attached to the wings of pigeons and sent off. The pigeons would seek the tower which is in their country, and arrive in the shortest time possible. But it is not possible by this method to obtain [complete] information, rather the necessity of the matter is merely noted, vital information alone being cited.

It is obvious that pigeons are among the fastest means of communication because the pigeon covers the distance of twenty days' walking in less than a day. Ibn Sa'id recounts in his book Ḥayā al-mahf wa janā al-mahf [a story] about the wazīr Abū al-Faraj Ya'qūb b. Killis, the wazīr of al-'Azīz, one of the Fātimid Caliphs. Al-'Azīz said to him, "I have never seen Ba'albak cherries and I would like to see them." The wazīr had pigeons from Damascus and in Damascus were pigeons from Egypt. The wazīr wrote a message and dispatched it by one of the pigeons to Damascus. He ordered them in Damascus to attach to each wing of the Egyptian pigeon berries of Ba'albak cherries. The pigeon arrived with this [message] and they attached the berries to the wings of the bird, immediately, as he had instructed them and they headed it towards Egypt. The wazīr, upon its arrival, went up to the Caliph with [the cherries] on the same day that he ordered them. This astonished him greatly. But perhaps the pigeons took more than this time in passing [over] this distance.

The author of al-Rawd al-Mī'rāfī Khabar al-Aqlāfī relates that pigeons used to be sent from Egypt to Baṣrah, and it is further than Baghdad to the East: a distance of more than twenty days. Ibn Sa'id also relates

(9) This is part of a lost work of Ibn Sa'id, and is not listed in either H. Kh., or G.I.L. Gaudejre-Demounjyes, qu'ting al-Qalqashandī, reports the story exactly as it appears here, op. cit., p. 252 and note 3.

(10) The author of this work is listed in H. Kh., v. I. III., p. 490, number 9557, as Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ḥimyari. But his death is given as happening in the year 1494-5, which would be impossible as a source for our author. Lévi-Provençal believes that this was a mistake on the part of Hügeli and that it should read 1300-1. However, he believes that the author might have been a certain Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Mun'im al-Sīnḥāji al-Ḥimyari who died in 776/1374. Al-Ḥimyari, La Péninsule Ibérique au Moyen Âge d'après le kitāb ar-rāwī al-mīrāfī khabar al-aqlāfī, ed. and tr. E. Lévi-Provençal (Leiden: 1938), pp. xix-xviii. It was from this same work that he published the extract about the Alexandria lighthouse, supra.

Though nothing but the materials on Spain and Portugal and the bit about
in his book *al-Mughrib fī Akhbār al-Maghrib* that the *wazīr* al-Yazūrī al-Maghribi, the *wazīr* of al-Mustaṣrīr al-Fāṭimi, the Calif of Egypt, dispatched pigeons from the city of Tūnis in Iṣrāqiyyah of the regions of the Maghrib. They went to Egypt.\(^{11}\) Reliance for all these stories is upon them (i.e. the authors cited).

The pigeon towers in the kingdom of the Egyptian regions at that time extended from the Citadel in Cairo to Qūs, and to Aswān and ʿĀydāb, and to Alexandria and Dimyāṭ and Suways (Suez) on the Pilgrimage route; and likewise to Damascus and Ḥalab and the rest of the administrative districts, *al-niyyābāt*.\(^{12}\) That this method had value in speeding the dispatch of news is quite clear to a thoughtful person.

Less swift [than pigeons] in the dispatching of news is the postal relay, *al-barād*. It is the one which conveys lengthy written dispatches and detailed information. The *barād* reduces twenty days’ distance to three days, an example of which is reducing the distance from Damascus to Egypt to this period. Perhaps it took more time than this, for some of the relays have gone from Ḥalab to Egypt in four days. The *barād* had been in existence even in the time of the Kosroes’, the kings of Persia, and the Caesars, the rulers of Rūm, for they appreciated its importance.

Then, in [the period of] Iṣlām, Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān, one of the Companions of the Prophet, established it in the days of his caliphate, and it remained after that into the days of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphs and the Umayyad Caliphs, continuing uninterruptedly [for some time] and was suspended in other [times] as conditions dictated. Assigned to it were mules with docked tails, as a sign that they be known [and treated accordingly] as mules of the *barād*. The rulers of Iṣlām in most of the [Iṣlāmic] regions maintained this system except the Zankids, the rulers of Syria, and the Ayyūbids, rulers of Egypt, in that they chose excellent swift camels for this [service]. The situation continued thus until their regime disappeared and the Turkish regime (i.e. the Mamlūks) took over.

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\(^{11}\) *Ibid.*, p. 253, where, on the basis of al-Qalqashandi’s account, the name is given as “Bazouri”. That it is “Yazūrī”, see article “Yazūrī”, *EI*, vol. IV, p. 1172 f. Cf. *CAL*, I, p. 410 f. for MSS.

\(^{12}\) Al-ʿUmarī, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-199. For the routes of the pigeon post and of optical signals, see Sauvaget, *op. cit.*, p. 36-39, particularly fig. 6. For other pigeon-stations see Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *op. cit.*, p. 253 f.
When al-Malik al-Zāhir Baybars al-Bunduqdārī, may God have mercy upon him, established his authority and had united the lands of Egypt and Syria and Ḥalab up to the Euphrates for himself, he wanted information of the kingdom to reach him continuously. He established the barīd in the Egyptian lands and the Syrian regions. Relay centers stretched from the ‘‘well-guarded Citadel’’ (of Cairo) to Alexandria and to Dimyāt and to Qūs; then from Qūs the dromedaries were ridden to Aswān and ‘Aydhāb. Relay centers were stretched also from the Citadel to the rest of the Syrian possessions until it was connected with the Euphrates.\(^{13}\) Of that which is established and known [concerning this system], there is no need to mention [such material] here.

Less speedy than [the barīd] are couriers. They are ones who speed on foot and travel by circuitous routes, al-mulaṭṭfasāt, when it is difficult for the barīd to reach a certain part. This [service] is one of the most important facilities of the Sulṭānate and the most difficult. Ibn al Athir has reported in his history that the first of the rulers to employ couriers was Muʿizz al-Dawlah b. Buwayh, the first of the Daylamite rulers of Baghdad, [sometime] after 330 A.H. The reason was that he was in Baghdad and his brother, Ṣukan al-Dawlah, was in Isfahān, and Muʿizz al-Dawlah wanted his brother to have quick knowledge of recent events. So he organized a courier service. In his days two couriers grew up whose skill had reached [a point] where each of them could run in a day more than forty farsakhs.\(^{14}\)

Slower than [couriers] are informers and spies. [This service] is of all the slowest [in the dispatch] of information in that they have to seek information and follow up its traces. I will speak of this [in more detail] in Book Two, God willing.

\(^{13}\) The fullest discussion of the subject of the barīd is to be found in Suavaget, \textit{op. cit.}, in which the points stressed by our author are to be found. A less systematic analysis, but one which provided the impetus for Sauvaget’s work, can be found in Gaudefroy-Demombynes, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 239-249. These works are in turn based for the most part on the relevant sections of al-ʿUmarī, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 184-196; and al-Qalqashandi, \textit{Ṣubḥ al-ʿaʾshā} (14 vols; Cairo: 1922), vol. XIV, pp. 371-404, who discusses all phases of the Mamlūk postal and intelligence systems.

\(^{14}\) Ibn al-Athir, \textit{Chronicon}, ed. Tornberg (13 vols; Leiden: 1851-83), vol VIII, p. 425. The swift-couriers were named Faḍl and Marʿūf, and the people of Baghdad became partisan about these two champions; one was the hero of the Sunnis, the other of the Shiʿites.
BOOK TWO: about agents and spies and what is pertinent in this matter. In it are three chapters.

Chapter One: about the qualifications which agents and spies should possess.

Spies should conform to [certain] conditions whose fulfilment is necessary. Among them are: that his counsel and veracity be trusted, for, if he be suspected in his [general] advising and be sent to the enemy, his information will not be useful, even though it is truthful; because, though he reports exactly, he will be suspected about it; thus one cannot rely on his word. The counsel will be unavailing for this reason. If he were insincere he would cause harm to his dispatcher because he would be an informer against him rather for him.

That he be a master of unerring conjecture, a keen judge, possessed of excellent insight in order to perceive by [more] observation with the fullness of his intellect and the soundness of his conjecture the conditions [obtaining among] his enemy, and what the enemy avoided in conversation, deducing some matters from others. If he employs insight in a certain matter, and then another supporting conclusion becomes apparent to him, the former matter becomes strengthened in his opinion and he believes it by having one conclusion fortified by another.

That he be well-endowed with shrewdness and perspicacity and craftiness; for, by his shrewdness, he can attain all ends, and by his cunning, he can penetrate all entrances. He achieves his goal by any method available to him. For, were he deficient in these qualities, perhaps the enemy might discover him or he might [have to] return without having achieved his goal.

That he be well-traveled and thoroughly acquainted with the countries to which he is dispatched so that he need not ask questions about them and their people. For, if he asked questions, the enemy may become aware of him [and the purpose of his presence]. This will be the reason for his perishing. Or perhaps he might be tortured, and reveal the condition of his dispatcher. Then he would become an informer against him after having been an informer for him.

That he be conversant with the language of the people of the country to which he is dispatched, for he may pick up some of the talk of those whom he hears among the enemy having intercourse with him. But he should not be of the same race as the enemy. Verily, race inclines
towards race by nature, and the affair could be disastrous for the dispatcher.

That he be patient about that which perhaps incurs punishment for him, in case the enemy seizes him, so that he would not reveal the conditions of his dispatcher and indicate a weakness in him or in his army; [for not even this could] protect him from the hand of his enemy or defend him against [the enemy’s] ill-treatment.

If one finds among spies and informers he who fulfills these conditions, he would be worthy to be sent on missions to, and for the gathering of information about, [one’s] enemies.

Chapter Two: about what is necessary [by way of] honoring agents and spies and capturing their hearts.

The ruler and commander of the army, if he employs an agent or a spy, should evidence affection and sincerity towards him, honor him with gifts, promise him rewards, and shower favors upon him on every occasion before indicating need of him for [a mission]; increase his honors while he is dispatched on important missions; and take care of his family by benefactions in his presence and his absence. In this way one possesses his heart and eases his mind, and he will not notice the meanness of his position and the smallness of his power, if he be lowly, because the matter with which he is involved is great.

If the person whom one sends to the enemy should be condemned to death or should the enemy seize him, one should honor those whom he leaves behind of his family and treat them, by way of benefaction, as one would have treated him had he returned, as an incentive to giving good advice. Should it happen that [an agent] returns without having accomplished his aim, and if he were one of those whose word was trustworthy, do not display to him one’s disquiet and do not criticise him for this or upbraid him; but accord him fairness and treat him honorably. Verily, if he does not accomplish anything for one on this occasion, he will accomplish it on another.

Chapter Three: about what one should do in the management of one’s agents and spies.

As regards the commander of the army: no one of his army should be acquainted with any of his spies. Verily, this is among that which assists the spreading of information and its discovery. But if he can
avoid having an intermediary between himself and one of his spies, he should do so; and if he cannot, then for each one of [the spies] he must detail one of his personal retinue, khawâss, to conduct [the spy] to him alone.

And [the commander of the army] must also guard against his spies being acquainted with one another; for, if they know one another, they might consult about an affair, arrange it [in their own favor], and thus report it. When they return, they might reach an agreement to help the enemy and incline towards him; which is the opposite of the case if they do not know one another. For then each one of them submits a report individually, and the true and the untrue will appear by the circumstances of the case, [wherein] the defection of some to the enemy is not like the defection of all.

He must pay heed to what each of his spies and agents brings him, though their reports vary, and adopt the most cautious [course of action] of those upon which his judgment is brought to bear. He should not consider their divergence a fault in any one of them; [for], though their reports have varied, each one of them is truthful in what he says, because each one of them has observed something different from that observed by another and heard something other than he heard.

Should [the commander of the army] happen upon a flaw in one of his trustworthy and reliable spies, [he should] conceal it from him, and should not seek requittance of it from him or upbraid him, unless he see in reproof an advantage. Then he should reprove [the spy] in private, remonstrating with him about this in easy concourse. Verily, this is the best means towards his correction.

If the spy presents himself before [the commander of the army] to inform him about the enemy, the latter should display self-possession and continued calm without manifesting to the one who brings the report any [particular] joy at what he has presented to him of news about his enemy, or any delight in the report; yet not in such a manner as would make him appear light-hearted about [the news]. Nor should he display any inattentiveness which might cause him to miss the essence of the advice. He should not display to his spy any displeasure at what he has imparted to him of disagreeable news. For [the correct demeanor] calls for the concealment of secrets from [one’s spies]. [secrets related] to disquieting reports [and whose discovery] might lead to harm.
It is related of a king that he used to be more bountiful towards those who brought him disagreeable news than to those who brought him good news, saying, "He who brings me the disagreeable matter awakens me to my advantage." Know that the commander of the army is not able to protect his army from the spies of his enemy; so he must take precaution against them by concealing secrets as much as possible.¹

BOOK THREE: about envoys and what is specified about the characteristics of a well-qualified one, and that which he who strays from correct procedure deserves. In it are two chapters.

Chapter one: about their qualifications.

The wise men, the commentators on the conduct of rulers, have mentioned that the envoy of the ruler must be sagacious of intellect, sound of body, clear-sighted about affairs [of state], aware of conditions, and apt in the usages of words. Ardâshîr b. Babak, one of the kings of Persia, used to say, "How much blood the envoy has shed without justification; how many armies have been routed as [a result of] this and the greater part of them slaughtered; how many forbidden actions have been committed and property plundered and pledges broken because of the perfidy of the envoy, and the lies reported by him."¹

In the envoy of the ruler [certain] conditions must be fulfilled. Among them are: that he be truthful and not too covetous. It has been recounted that Alexander dispatched an envoy to one of the kings of the East. He returned with a message. Alexander doubted a word in it. He said to [the envoy], "Woe to you! Verily, kings are not devoid of those who would set them straight if they deviate. You have brought me a message exact in wording and clear in meaning. Yet I discover in it a word which changes its [meaning]. Are you certain of this word, or do you doubt it?" The envoy said, "But I am certain that he said it."

Alexander ordered that the words be written letter by letter and returned to the king by another envoy, so that it would be read and translated to him. When the letter was read to the king, he came across this word and denied it. He said to the interpreter, "Put my hand on this word," and he put it. He ordered a mark [to be put there] and it was placed on [the offending word]. This king wrote to Alexander a letter, saying in it, "Verily, the veracity of the language of the envoy is the foundation of the kingdom; for it is by his tongue that [the ruler] expresses himself; and it is to his ear that [responses] are confided."

When the envoy returned to Alexander, he summoned the first envoy and said, "What led you [to use] a word by which you aimed at the discord of two kingdoms?" He replied that he had done this

because the king had not given him his due. Alexander said to him, "I see that you had acted for yourself, not for us. When that for which you hoped, but did not deserve from the person to whom you were sent, escaped you, you made this [a cause] of a feud which you wanted to raise in important and lofty spirits." Then he ordered that his tongue be pulled out from behind. 2

That he be bold and daring; for should he be cowardly, [his cowardice] will prevent his taking bad news to the ruler to whom he had been dispatched, in fear and dread of him. Among the best [examples] which have been handed down about this [qualification of an envoy] concerns Mu'āwiyyah b. Abī Sufyān, one of the Companions of the Prophet. During his Caliphate he sent an envoy to the king of Rūm and offered him the blood-wit of two men, diyyat rajulayn, if he would, when he had given the message to the king and concluded his discourse with him, raise his voice in the adhān in front of him.

When [the envoy] arrived at the court and had given the message, he raised his voice in the adhān in front of him. The "'patricians", al-batārīqah, rose to slay him, but the king forbade them. He said, "This is not of his [doing], but of Mu'āwiyyah's; for he wants this envoy to be killed, so that he can slay all of the Christians enjoying security, al-musta'mināt, in the lands of Islam and demolish all the churches therein." Thereupon he showed honor to the envoy and sent him back to Mu'āwiyyah. When he had returned to Mu'āwiyyah, the latter saw him and laughed. He told [Mu'āwiyyah] the news and reported what the king of Rūm had said. [Mu'āwiyyah] said, "By God, I did not wish other than what he said." 3

That he be well-versed in the propieties of address and response: [skill in] address because, if he be well-versed in its propieties, he can say the right thing in the right [place and time] and can establish the case [of his master] against the one to whom he is dispatched. An example of this is recounted of the Prophet when he sent Dihyāh al-Kalbī, may God be pleased with him, to Heraclius, king of Rūm, [then] in Syria. He said to Heraclius,"I beseech thee, by God, do you know that Christ used to pray?" [Heraclius] said, "Yes." Dihyāh said, "I ask you then to whom did Christ pray?" Notice the convincing speech whose argument is conclusive, for the Christians believed that Christ

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(3) The source of this story could not be discovered.
is God. But God does not pray to other than Himself, and only the servant prays. When [Dihyah] made him admit the praying of Christ, be forced him to admit that Christ, upon whom be peace, was the servant of God.  

[Skill in] reply, for, if he be well-versed in its proprieties and a question were put to him, he can reply to it with that which refutes the opponent and checks him. An example of this is recounted of Khāṭīb b. Abī Balta‘ah, may God be pleased with him, when the Prophet sent him to al-Muqawqis, ruler of Egypt. [The latter] asked him about the fortune of the Prophet in battle, and whether he had defeated his people (i.e. the tribe of Quraysh) or had they defeated him. He replied that the war between him and them was a draw, [victory] sometimes to him and sometimes to them. Al-Muqawqis said to him, “The Prophet defeated !”; and Khāṭīb said to him “God crucified !” Al-Muqawqis became silent. This was because al-Muqawqis desired to set up a strong argument against Khāṭīb b. Abī Balta‘ah [by indicating] that [the Prophet] might be defeated in war, and such a thing, in his opinion, is not worthy cf a Prophet. Khāṭīb b. Abī Balta‘ah controverted him by the fact that the Christians asserted that Christ was a God and they say that the Jews killed him and crucified him and this is among that which is not consonant with the dignity of God. For, if he were God, as they assert, the Jews could not have had mastery over him by killing and crucifying, according to their assertion.

If the envoy of the ruler fulfils these conditions and that which is intended by them, he would be worthy to be sent on important missions and to carry correspondence between rulers. When one of these conditions is unfulfilled in him, he must not be employed at all as an envoy.


In the bibliography appended to the article “Dihya”, EL, vol. I, p. 973 f., two corrections should be noted. The first entry after “Ṭabarī” should be changed from “i. 1755 et seq.” to “i. 1560 et seq.”. The entry for Ibn Ḥajar should be changed from “no. 2376” to “no. 2386”. The latter source places the meeting between Dihyeh and Heraclius at Ḥims. Ibn Ḥajar, Kitāb al-isābah fi tamyiz al-stīḥābah (8 vols; Cairo: 1853-1907), vol. II, no. 2386.

Further references to this and the following deputation will be found in Muhammad Hamidullah, Corpus des traités et lettres diplomatiques de l’Islam à l’époque du Prophète et des Khalifes Orthodoxes (Paris: 1935), numbers 14-16 and 37-40.

Chapter Two: about the management of the affair of the envoys and what should be relied upon in their affair.

The commentators on the conduct of rulers said of the ruler that he should examine his envoy a long time before dispatching him on an embassy so that he knows the truth of his character. Then he would be certain concerning him; he can rely on him about that which he sends him. It used to be the practice of the kings of Persia in by-gone days that, if they desired the dispatching of a person on an important mission, they first gave him an examination by sending him to one of the special officers of the king, khawāṣṣ al-malik, one who was [in] an established [part] of his realm, on some important matter. Then he set on him an informer [to report] on that which he had sent him, but without his being aware [of it]. If the envoy accomplished his mission and returned with its results, the king would question the one whom he had sent [in the envoy’s] tracks about his appraisal of [the mission]. If the latter’s report tallies with that which the words of the other conveyed to him, he became privileged with the king because he would be an envoy for him to [other] rulers.6

Ardeshīr b. Bābak, one of the kings of Persia, used to speak about the cunning ruler. If he sent an envoy to a king, he was followed by another. If he dispatched two envoys, he dispatched two others after them. If possible, he would not group his envoys on the same road. To be cunning [the ruler] must, when the envoy brings him a message or letter which has in it good or ill about which he is suspicious, do nothing about it until he sends another envoy to the sender with the [sender’s] letter or message, letter by letter, meaning by meaning. For it may be that the [original] envoy missed some of that which had been conveyed to him and had fabricated the writing and changed what had been related to him orally, instigating by this [action] the sender against the recipient, and this results in a strong dissension; as has been related in the story of Alexander in the first chapter of this book.

(6) Al-Jāḥiẓ op. cit.; text, p. 122; tr., p. 142 f.
BOOK FOUR: about deception and stratagems which obviate war. In it are three chapters.

Chapter One: about the instigation of deception in war and the stratagems [to be used] in it.

There is no disputing that deception and stratagems in war are required by law and by reason. As for law: it has been cited in the two Șahâhs, according to the hadith of Abû Hurayrah and Jâbir b. ʿAbd Allâh al-Anṣârî, may God be pleased with them, that the Prophet said, "War is deception." ¹

As for reason: there is no disagreement among men of intelligence that victories which have occurred through excellence of stratagem and grace of ingenuity, with the self safe and the armies preserved and with no expenditure of effort, are the best, more salutary and higher in value and degree; because he who goes out to engage the enemy and engage [his] cavalry in duels, even if Victory helped him and Conquest accompanied him, then in his dangerous adventures involving hateful calamities and the biting of swords and the pain of wounds and the severity of wars and the contention of warriors is the extreme of hardship and the limit of peril, for he does not know whether the victory, after the hazarding of these hardships, will be to him or to his enemy.

Among the best of what is recounted about this matter concerns al-Malik al-Nâṣir Muhammad b. Qâlâwûn, may God the Almighty have mercy on him. In the latter part of his reign, after the peace with the Tatârs (Tartars), he used to treat them kindly, maintaining relations with them and bestowing gifts, both large and small, upon them so that he even used to give [presents] to old women in their houses; [thus] breaking discord and quenching the fire of war. One day he heard some of his personal retinue khâṣṣakiyah, conversing together. Some were saying to others that the Sulṭân gave gifts to the Tatârs out of fear of them. He upbraided them and said, "That which I bestow upon the Tatârs, all of it, does not equal the cost of the shoes of your horses when going out to do battle against them." They submitted to his opinion and admitted the truth in this [matter]. ²

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² This story does not appear in any of the Mamlûk sources, not even the rather full account of his life by al-Malik al-Nâṣir's personal friend, the prince-historian
Chapter Two: about the manner of [working] stratagems and deceits.

This [matter], though it is [a subject which] a book cannot [fully] investigate, yet the basis of it is politics, al-siyāsah, and the apparent capture of hearts and the exercise of thought [in devising stratagems] for breaking up the ranks of the enemy and instigating differences among them and the “leaping” of some upon others through the most cunning of stratagems, the best of deceptions; and to act in each situation in accordance with what reason dictates.

Among the best of the opportunities in this [matter] is to perpetrate [among] the enemy [various] machinations and [thereby] bring about misfortunes. [Another is to] correspond with [the enemy’s] chiefs about that which will incline their hearts and their minds and bring about their [possible] disaffection of obedience to their commander by promising every reward to them, encouraging their hopes for attaining every desire; [promising them] pardon and forgiveness for their transgressions if they lean towards one [after] forsaking their commander and repairing to one’s side; to extend security to all who ask it from among them, encouraging them in every way encouragement dictates, letting them know that if they remain in opposition until one is victorious over them, one will visit upon them the strongest chastisement and disgrace and contempt. Then one calls upon them to rise against their commander if they can, or to secede from him or fly from him if they do not have any power to leap upon him.

Among that which they (i.e. those learned in the usages of war) found useful in this [matter] is that letters be written to some of them (i.e. the enemy) as though in answer to letters sent by them to one’s self and that the letters be written in their tongues. These letters are then thrown in places where it is expected that they will reach their

Abū al-Fidā, Kitāb al-mukhtasar fi akhbār al-bashar (4 vols; Cairo: 1907), vol. IV, pp. 41-194 passim. On his accomplishment of peace with the Mongols after their crushing defeat by the Mamlūks at Marj al-Saffār in 702/1303 and during the remainder of his reign, see Gustav Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen (5 vols; Mannheim and Stuttgart: 1846-62), vol. IV, pp. 299-312 passim; and Ibn Khaldūn, Kitāb al-tibar (7 vols; Cairo 1867), vol. V, pp. 430-32.

Zetterstén calls him “a better diplomat than soldier”; that he sustained successful diplomatic relations with both of the main branches of Mongol hegemony in the West, viz., the Golden Horde on the Volga and the Il-Khāns in Persia, was no small achievement: article “Al-Malik al-Nāṣir”, EI, vol. III, pp. 864-66.

chief. Thus, if their chief notices some of these letter., his thought will be aroused against them, placing them, in his [eyes], under the pall of suspicion. This, then, will be a reason for the dividing off of their counsel, and the separation of their company and the changing of their minds about their chief or the changing of his mind about them. If he should leap upon one of them, or kill him, or spill his blood, fear of the chief would possess them and alarm grip them, prompting them to flight from their leader to one’s [side]. But should their leader be careful and patient, certainly disquietude would remain in the soul of any one of them.

Chapter Three: about the citation of interesting cases of deception and stratagems which were employed by people [conversant with] the management of wars.

[The subject of] this book is one of those without limit. [Examples] of it [drawn from] the books of histories and the biographies of the kings in the Age of Ignorance, al-Jahiliyyah, and [in the period of the dominance of] Islam would fill registers to overflowing.

Among the best and most salutary of these occurrences, with respect to origin, is what Ibn Ishaq relates in his maghazi about the Prophet on the day of al-Ahzab, "the Confederates". The Quraysh and the banu Ghatafan left Mecca and its surroundings and went to Medina, the Ennobled, in order to do battle with him. The banu Qurayzah, the Jews of Medina, had agreed to fight him [in their company]. Their hemming in and besieging of the Muslims was in accordance with what God reported in His saying, "When they came against you from above you and from below you, and when your eyes swerved and your hearts reached your throats." (33:10)

While the Prophet was in this [condition], lo! Nu‘aym b. Mas‘ud, one of the banu Ghatafan, came to him and said, "O Messenger of God! I have become a Muslim, but my family do not know about me." The Messenger of God said to him, "Go and convince those whom you can to forsake [going into action] against us. Verily, war is deception." Nu‘aym b. Mas‘ud went out until he came to the banu Qurayzah, the Jews of Medina. He had been their boon companion in the Age of Ignorance. He said to them, "You know my friendship towards you and I am a sincere advisor to you. The Quraysh and Ghatafan have come from their city to do battle against Muhammad and his Companions, and you have agreed with them to fight him. But it is
you who dwell in this city, in it are your wealth, your women, and your sons; while their wealth and their women and their sons are far off. If they see an opportunity they will make the most of it. [But if things go badly] they will go back to their own land and leave you to face the man in your country and you will not be able to do so [alone]. Thus do not do battle against [Muḥammad and his Companions] until you take hostages from their chiefs who will remain in your hands [as security that they will fight Muḥammad with you until you make an end of him].” They said, “You are sharp of opinion.”

Then he departed to the Quraysh and the Ghaṭafān and said, “You know my affection for you and that I have left Muḥammad. I have brought you good counsel, but regard it as confidential. The banū Qurayzhāh have regretted opposing Muḥammad and have agreed with him against you and promised him that they would take from among you a hostage of your chiefs and would deliver them to him so that he might kill them. So do not deliver to them a single man from among you.”

When the Quraysh and Ghaṭafān sent to the banū Qurayzhāh asking them for assistance, the latter requested of them the hostage of some of their men. When [the Quraysh and Ghaṭafān] heard this from them, they said “Nuʿaym b. Maṣʿūd was correct in what he said.” They refused to give them hostages. Thus a breach was occasioned amongst them. They were routed and victory was to the Messenger of God and his Companions.8

Al-Jāḥiz recounts in one of his works that Bahrām Gūr, one of the kings of Persia, upon succeeding his father, Yazdagurd, had some of his frontier areas conquered by the enemy. He feigned inattention in the affair of the enemy and lightness towards it until the power of the enemy became strong and marched against him. The ministers assembled and discussed the matter with Bahrām Gūr. “Leave him be,” he said, “I am more aware of his weakness than you.”

When the enemy had entered his realm, [the ministers] entered unto him to inform him of the event. When he understood what they had come about, he took two hundred of his slave girls, appareled them in crowns and beautifully dyed cloths, and made each of them ride a stick, ṣaṣabah. And he also wore a dyed garment and rode a stick. He went out thus [arrayed], with the slave girls singing in front of him,

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8 Guillaume, op. cit., pp. 458-60 Ibn Ishāq’s account is fuller, but the main facts and the motive are identical.
and he also was singing with them. When the ministers and the great men of the State saw him, they despaired of him and left him and went away angry.

He entered immediately after into his apartments and shaved his head and dressed in woolen cloth and waited until nightfall. With his bow and arrows he departed and reached the area adjacent to the scouting party of the enemy. He lay in a place above the road. He was an expert shot, so that there did not pass a bird in the sky or a wild animal in the brush at which he did not take aim and hit, until there gathered to him a great amount of quarry.

While he was so engaged, the general commanding the scouting party of the enemy passed him. He noticed the catch and its number astonished him. He said to [Bahram Gür], "Who are you?" He said to him, "If you grant me security, I'll tell you." [The general] said, "You have security". He said, "I am a page, ghulâm, a groom, sa'is al-khayl. My lord was angry with me and pulled off my garment and shaved my head and dressed me in this garment and starved me, after he had been good to me. I profited by his carelessness and [am now out] to seek something to hunt and eat. This has so engaged me that I shot this quarry with all of the arrows which were with me."

The general of the scouting party seized him and carried him to his ruler and related to him the story. [The ruler] said to [Bahram Gür], "Shoot before me." He shot and his arrows would fall in any part of the game the ruler designated. The ruler was amazed by this and his astonishment increased. He said to him, "Is there in this kingdom any who can shoot as well as you?" [Bahram Gür] laughed and said, "O king! I am among the weakest in shooting." The ruler said to him, "Your king is ignorant. Doesn't he know that I have approached his realm?" [Bahram Gür] laughed and said, "If the king grant me security I will counsel him." He said, "I have granted you security." [Bahram Gür] said, "Our king allowed this, despising you and in contempt of your affair, so that you will proceed further into his country until you cannot avoid his grasp. He has one hundred thousand archers, all of them finer shots than I." When the ruler heard this speech of Bahram, he said, "You have counselled well." He commanded the general of his army to prepare for returning to his country.

Bahram returned to his capital by night. When it dawned, he sat [in public audience] for the people. His ministers and the great men of his State entered unto him. He questioned them about news of the
enemy. They informed him of the [enemy's] departure. He laughed and told them the story.4

Al-Jāḥiz also related that Kisrā Abruwīz, one of the Kings of Persia, dispatched one of his amirs to engage the King of Rūm in battle. He rebelled against him and fled to the King of Rūm and incited him against Abruwīz. The King of Rūm set out to fight Abruwīz with four thousand [men]. When this [news] reached Abruwīz, he resorted to a letter, which he wrote to the amir who had rebelled against him, in the land of Rūm, saying in it, “When this my letter reaches you, burn the lands of Rūm, and you and I will rule Rūm on such and such a day.” He bore a hole in a stick and placed this letter in the hollow of it and summoned a Christian, who was his prisoner and who had evinced affection for [Abruwīz]. He revealed to him the matter of the letter which was in the stick and handed the stick to him, saying, “Go to my amir So-and-so in the land of Rūm and give him this stick and tell him about the letter which is in it.”

The Christian departed and came to the lands of Rūm. He heard upwards of ten thousand [church] clappers striking. The ardor of Christianity seized him and he inclined towards his religion. He came to the King of Rūm and asked permission [to enter] unto him. Permission was granted him and he presented this stick to [the King] and told him of the letter. He drew it out and read it. Distressed by it, he turned against this amir who had defected to him from the side of Abruwīz, and he swore that if his eye fell upon him he would kill him in the most awful manner. When this reached the amir, he fled to save himself, and the King of Rūm returned to his realm. Upon hearing this news, Abruwiz, the ruler of Persia, said, “A word which routed four thousand men! Its power is great indeed.”5

When there was war between the people of Syria and al-‘Irāq at Şīfīn, and the war had lengthened between them, the people of al-‘Irāq were about to defeat the others, and success and victory and conquest loomed for them. The people of Syria knew that they were surrounded by them and prepared themselves for the [inevitable] rout.

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Then some of the people of Syria quickly raised the pages [of the Qurʾān] aloft on spears. Difference of opinion broke out among the people of al-ʿIrāq because of this; some of them saying, "We will fight them," and others saying, "We will not fight those who raise to us the pages [of the Qurʾān]." By this [action] the fire of war was quenched and this is the reason for the victory of the people of Syria over the people of al-ʿIrāq.

The stories about this [matter] are numerous; their citation would lengthen [this discussion].
BOOK FIVE: about consultation in the matter of war. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One: about the inducement to seek consultation about war.

There is no disputing that consultation about the matter [of war] itself is desirable. It has been related that the Prophet said, "He does not fail who seeks light from God, and he does not regret who seeks advice." 1 There is no doubt that in war it is most necessary. God had ordered the Prophet about this [matter], though he was the most gifted of men in intelligence and the purest of heart among them. He said, exalted be the Sayer, "Hadst thou been harsh and hard of heart, they would have scattered from about thee. So pardon them, and pray forgiveness for them, and take counsel with them in the affair." (3:159) Many of the commentators hold that what is meant by this is consultation about wars.

It is recounted of the Prophet that he often sought counsel about his wars. Ibn Ishaq relates in his Sirah that when the Prophet arrived at Badr in order to meet the Quraysh and fight them, al-Ḫubāb b. al-Mundhir said to him, "O Messenger of God! Is this a place which God has ordered you to occupy, so that we can neither advance nor withdraw from it, or is it a matter of opinion and war and strategy?" The Prophet said, "It is a matter of opinion and war and strategy." [Al-Ḫubāb] said, "This is not a place to stop. Rouse the men so that they will go on until we come to the water nearest the enemy and we will alight there. Then we will stop up that which is behind us of qutāb, (that is, the wells). And we will construct at [that point] a cistern and we will fill it with water. Then we will fight them, for we will be able to drink and they will not be able to drink." The Messenger of God said, "You are right of opinion." Then the Messenger of God roused those men with him. He marched until he arrived at the water nearest to the enemy and alighted there. He then ordered the wells [behind them to be stopped up]. He built a cistern over the well at which he had alighted. He fought [the Quraysh] and victory was to the Muslims as God had reported in His saying, "And God most surely helped you at Badr, when you were utterly abject." (2:11) 2

Al-Wāqidi relates in his Maghāzi that when the Prophet alighted

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(2) Guillaume, op. cit., p. 296 f.
at Khaybar, [in order] to invest it, he stopped among the palm trees near the fort. Al-Ḥubāb b. al-Mundhir said to him again, ‘‘O Messenger of God! If you alight here and if it be by an order [from God], command it and we will not dispute; but if it be by opinion, then we will dispute [it].’’ The Prophet said, ‘‘It is by opinion.’’ [Al-Ḥubāb] said, ‘‘O Messenger of God! You draw nigh the forts and alight among the palm trees. The arrows of the enemy will reach us quicker because of [the enemy’s] height in their forts. Since I do not trust their night raiding against us, through which they can enter the shelter of palms, shift, O Messenger of God, to a place free of swamps and pestilence. Thus we place the stony tract of land between them and us so that their arrows cannot reach us and we will be secure from their night raiding and free of the swamps.’’

The Messenger of God said, ‘‘You are sharp of opinion.’’ Then he summoned Muḥammad b. Musrūq and said, ‘‘Look for a place removed from their forts which is free of pestilence and in which we will be secure from their night raiding.’’ This he did and the victory was again to the Prophet.³

Chapter Two: about the correct procedure, ādāb, of consultation about war.

The experts in the matter of wars have stated that matters consulted upon be of two types. First: that the matter to be consulted upon be such that its manifesting is advisable [when solicited] and whose dissemination is not undesirable, such as consultation about the matter of the apparent enemy who [is to be] faced by design. The most important aspect is that the advice of the men of intelligence and learning be presented. One of the learned had been asked, ‘‘Which things are the strongest support to the ruler and which are the most harmful to him?’’ He said, ‘‘The strongest support to him [comes from doing] three things: consulting the experts, his becoming experienced in affairs, and his being thoroughly briefed [about any matter at hand]; and the strongest in harm comes upon him from three things: stubbornness of opinion without [seeking] advice, neglect [of affairs] and

(3) J. Wellhausen, Muhammad in Medina, tr. of al-Wāqidi’s Kitāb al-maghāzi (Berlin: 1882), pp. 267 f. and 273 f. Later the Prophet ordered this palm grove leveled, but was dissuaded by Abū Bakr after four hundred trees had been felled; article ‘‘Khāibar‘’. EI. vol. II. p. 869 f. The fort was called al-Natāb.
precipitancy [in acting upon them].”

It was said to a man of the banū ‘Abs, “How often you are in the right!” He said, “We are one thousand men and among us is one decisive person. We consult him and we become as though we were one thousand decisive men. If proper judgment does not appear to him in the opinions of great men [of the tribe], he seeks the opinion and the consultation of all the highest and the lowest [in the tribe]; for [true] opinion may be found where its discovery is not thought possible.”

Al-Ḥasan said, “The Prophet used to consult even the women. Should [one of them] demonstrate to him [the truth] of a thing, he accepted it, saying, “The decisive of men ceases not consulting those sound of opinion, even the foolish slave girl.”

How marvellous is the person who said:

Despise not what is soundly sufficient
Thought uttered by the roundly deficient.

Second: that the matter consulted about be one whose divulging is not advisable, such as: if the consultation be about a secret [matter] which requires concealment from the people, exclusive of one’s special retinue, al khāṣṣah – for example, intending to raid the enemy in their lands suddenly, etc; one imparts it privately to the persons whom one chooses from among one’s special retinue and advisors, and one’s blood relations whom one trusts.

If one chooses one single person, one does not inform others about the matter. It has been related that one of the kings of India consulted his ważīrs about a matter. One of them said to him, “May God lead the king aright! Verily, in the maintaining of secrets is the gaining of desire and safety from disorder. For this, our secret, two tongues and four ears only are suitable.” — that is, the consultants be two. The king took him aside and talked to him privately.

Should one desire to consult a group of one’s special retinue about [a matter], one should consult each of them privately, without informing him that one has revealed the matter to any one else. This assures the concealing of the matter and prevents its divulging; for each of them will be wary of revealing it; thus causing its [controlled] dif-

(4) This saying of the Prophet could not be discovered in the relevant literature.
(5) The source of this line of poetry could not be found.
fusion for it is his belief that no one else knows it. 6

If the revelation of this secret be not advisable, or [it is not prudent] to consult any one at all, because of the gravity of the matter, the proper procedure is to compare it with its analog from [past] affairs and gauge it by the correspondences [thus discovered]; and harken to that which occurs in the speech of the people about this [matter] without revealing [one's] motive in listening. It has been related that al-
Manṣūr b. Abī ʿĀmir, the ruler of al-Andalus (Spain), in one of his raids, entered the lands of the infidels of al-Andalus and penetrated deeply into them. Winter closed in upon him and the enemy surrounded him and he feared the destruction of himself and the Muslims. He went disguised among his army and encountered two men playing chess and beside them another man. One of the players said, "Checkmate! as al-Manṣūr b. Abī ʿĀmir is checkmated." The man beside them said, "He is not checkmated, and neither is al-Manṣūr b. Abī ʿĀmir." He continued watching the person supposed to be beaten until he won.

Al-Manṣūr came before [the one who had passed the latter remark] and the man did not recognize him. He said, "You have said that he wasn't checkmated and your words were true and that al-Manṣūr b. Abī ʿĀmir was not checkmated. What is the method of his deliverance?" The man said to him, "The method for this is for him to cut trees and collect stones, making it apparent that this place is the most wonderful for settling and that he intends to remain in it, to build and cultivate and not to depart from it. If the enemy hears this, he will not like [al-Manṣūr’s] being neighbor to him. He will vacate the road [for al-
Manṣūr’s retreat] and open the mountain passes so that he can leave." Al-Manṣūr left him and returned to his royal abode [within the camp] and afterwards sent for this man. When he came before him, [al-
Manṣūr] made himself known to him and said, "Have you any opinion other than the one you reported to me [beside the chess game]?" The man said, "No." So al-Manṣūr did as he had been advised. When [his actions] reached the enemy, it troubled him and he feared to have al-Manṣūr settle as his neighbor. So he opened the passes for him and his road [of retreat] became clear and al-Manṣūr departed safely.7

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6 For a discussion of the same type of discretion and checking on those privy to a royal secret, see al-Jāḥiz, op. cit.: text, p. 94 f.; tr., p. 119 f.
7 Ibn al-Athīr records this ruse but without any reference to a chess game, op. cit. vol. VIII, p. 498 f. Dozy recounts the story from a Christian source and again without any mention of a chess-game, but with details missing from Ibn a‘-Athīr’s account.
BOOK SIX: about the qualification[s] of the general of the army and those of his troops and how he should handle them. In it are four chapters.

Chapter One: about the qualifications of the general of the army.

The experts in the matter of war and trained in its affairs said the general of the army must be perfect of intelligence, strong of heart, full of courage, greatly vigilant, very cautious, strong in resolution; perceptive about the rules of wars and the occurrence of opportunities in them, aware of stratagems and deceptions and tricks [practiced] in them; informed about the management of armies and the organization of troops; experienced [with regard to] roads and watered places and water sources, and the conditions of way-stations and camping grounds, and the times during which marching and camping are proper; pains-taking about the maintenance of morale among his soldiers; disinclined

"Once, for instance, [Al-Manṣūr] penetrated a hostile region through a narrow defile between two lofty mountains; and although his troops ravaged and pillaged in all directions the Christians did not venture to resist them. Upon retracing his steps, however, Almanzor (al-Manṣūr) found the pass occupied by the enemy. As it was impossible for the Moslems to force it, their position was hazardous; but their General instantly conceived a bold design. After selecting a place suitable for his project, he caused sheds and huts to be erected, and ordered a number of prisoners to be decapitated and a rampart to be constructed with their bodies. Then, after his cavalry had scoured the country without finding provender, he collected instruments of husbandry and set the soldiers to work at tilling the ground. Greatly perturbed at operations which seemed to imply that the Moslems had no intention of quitting the country, the Christians proposed peace on condition that the enemy would abandon their booty. But Almanzor rejected the proposal: 'My soldiers,' he replied, 'prefer to remain where they are: they recognize that it is scarcely worth their while to return home, for the next campaign will begin almost immediately.' After further negotiations the Christians ultimately agreed to allow Almanzor to depart with his booty, and their dread of him was such that they even undertook to provide him with beasts of burden to carry it, to supply him with provisions as far as the frontier, and to remove the corpses which obstructed the route of his army.'

Reinhart Dozy, *Spanish Islam*, tr. F.G. Stokes (London: 1913), p. 524 f. The source is Rodrigo Ximenez de Toledo's *Historia Arabum*, which is appended to Thomas Erpennius' *Historia Saracenica* (Leiden: 1625). The latter work is a translation of extracts from the chronicle of al-Makín (Jirjis b. al-ʿAmid).
to give battle through favoring stratagems whenever possible; prepared in the science of the various stages of battle and the investment of fortresses and of repulsing [such] investment; patient about the [possible] lengthening of battle and of siege; capable about retreat after the accomplishment of the purpose [of the campaign].

In addition to these [qualifications] he should be knowledgeable about horses and their brands and their apparatus and the superintending of their needs; of the types of weapons, of that which is preferable among them and that which is suitable to be donned among their types at any given moment in war. [All this is] beside being noble of conduct, pure of heart, clean of soul, good intentioned, generous in bestowing bounty, cheerful whenever [bounty] is asked of him, preferring forgiveness to punishment, and forebearing in retaliation. If he makes a promise, he must fulfil it; if he says a thing, he must do it. If he makes a treaty of peace, he must carry out [its provisions] and adhere to it. If he exchanges [a pledge] of security, he must abide by it within the keeping of the law, the maintenance of pride and the manifestation of prestige.

If he satisfies all these qualifications and that which is intended by them, he is worthy of the command of the troops, [and of being] entrusted with the affairs of the armies and of war.¹

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¹ Cf. Khaddûrî, op. cit., p. 87 f.:
"The duties of the special command are included in the general and may be summarized as follows:

1. The leading of the army, including taking care of individual warriors, the inspection of horses and equipment.

2. The conducting of fighting and the encouragement of the army in fighting.

3. Application of military skills and techniques, in accordance with the Prophet's saying that "war is trickery", so as to protect the army from sudden attack and to win victory. The commander has also to choose the best possible strategic position for attack.

4. Observation of military duties such as patience and perseverance in fighting the enemy, and to see that no jihādist deserts the army. The jihādists, on the other hand, are under obligation to obey the commander's orders and to accept his decisions in cases of personal conflict.

The general command includes the foregoing duties together with a mandate to negotiate and sign peace treaties and direct division of the spoils of war."
Chapter Two: about the qualities of the troops [in general] and of the men of the army in the cavalry and infantry who are suitable for meeting the enemy and engaging him in battle.

It is required of one of the army who seeks to go out to meet the enemy and engage him in battle that he be brave, dauntless, trained in the art of war, familiar with its affairs, greatly patient with [being] distant [from home] and with the hardships of marching, [capable of] withstanding dangers without anxiety or annoyance or slacking or negligence; being, in addition to this, strongly attached to the person he is serving, counselling him, painstaking in assisting him, preferring his life to one’s own life, attending to that which he needs by way of service, giving him his due service, obeying him to the extent of his power and his capability.

And, too, he should be knowledgeable of horses and their apparatus and of some parts of the blacksmith’s [trade], so that he can put a nail in the hoof should one fall in the road, and [be capable of] repairing that which needs repair of the apparatus of his horse and of his weapon when necessity calls for such actions. If he be a cavalryman, he should be trained in riding horses and in their movements in war, and in what the cavalryman needs [to know] at the time of meeting [the enemy] with regard to facing and engaging in combat and constancy should he be in need of them; and of wheeling around in battle and feinting when necessity bids them;² and of evasion and renewed attack when need invites them.

If he be an infantryman, he should not mind long marches, and be aware of the positions of attack and [how to find] cover from it, and of mutual affliction of harm by infantry, and of the chasing of cavalry, and of [how to] check them, and of [how to] scatter horses and startle them and other than these of the affairs incumbent upon the cavalryman and the infantryman.

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² This is the classic Arab mode of fighting, fashionable in pre-Islamic Arabic, called "karr wa farr":

"... a sudden attack by the full strength of the army on the enemy followed by a quick retreat. This was repeated during the battle and it often inflicted damage and confusion in the enemy ranks while the Muslim forces remained intact. In these operations the cavalry usually played a more important role, for they were quicker and more effective," *Ibid.*, p. 92.
Chapter Three: about the knowledge which the commander of the army should have about his officers.

The men of experience in wars said that the commander of the army should know those whom he can of his officers and his army one by one, each in his particularity, and of what type of warfare he is expert, and what is particular to him of courage and cowardice and the rest of his qualities; and that he should know [a variety of] types of courageous men and what distinguishes each of them in his courage. For among them is the courageous person [who is] the steadfast one, the persevering in his post, determined against his adversary. Among them is the courageous [person who] attacks and withdraws, he who retires and then returns [to battle]. Among them is the courageous [one] who roves among his opponents, the one who does not choose a specific adversary but who seizes an opportunity when it presents itself. Among them is the one who excels in battle as a cavalryman, and the one who excels in battle as an infantryman, and the one who excels in thrusting the lance, and the one who excels in shooting arrows. And among them is the cowardly, who imitates the courageous in their external apparel; and the cowardly who is obviously cowardly, and other than these of the qualities of courage and cowardice.

Thus the commander, if he knows each one of these in his qualifications, will put him in his [proper] position in battle and will establish him where his position will be most appropriate; producing from him the desired result. If he be a coward, [the commander of the army] will dismiss him from any of the battle stations and deflect him from them; for, if he did not know his condition as to courage and cowardice, he would not know where to place him or in which post to put him.

And, along with these [considerations], it is incumbent upon [the commander of the army] to know the qualities of the rest of the people of his army and the possessors of the offices, arbāb ważā'if, of his state, dawlah, and what each one of them possesses of high virtues, so that each be appointed to that for which he is [best] fitted and be placed in a position which is proper to him. And he should know the possessor of sound opinion among the highly-placed of his state, arbāh dawlatih, making him the nearest of people to him and the most privy of them to him. Verily, [correct] opinion is the strongest benefit in the affair of wars; it is even preferable to courage. Suffice it to quote Ibn Abī Tammām al-Ṭā'i:
The men of opinion, not those of courage, are finer:
Their place is prime; the others’ place is minor. 3

It is told of Muhallab b. Abi Ṣufrah, the shaykh of wars and their imām, that a man of the people of his army, named Bayhas, departed from it. [Muhallab] said, “It does not please me that there be in my army one thousand courageous [men], should Bayhas desert me.” He was told that [Bayhas] was not of the highest rank in courage, and he replied, “Yes, but he is strong of resolve, clear of intelligence. Were a thousand courageous men in his place, I would not feel safe about them.” 1

Chapter Four: about the method [of control] to be exercised by [the commander of the army over] his army and of the management of his troops and how he should handle them.

The first [thing] that he must do in this [matter] is to place each one of them in his [proper] place, directing [him] to a station fitted to him, rendering him his just due of honors, acquainting himself with the importance of what he has done of that which is expected of [the man’s] peers. Then [he should] reward the benefactor for his benefaction, and punish the evil-doer for his mischief, and forgive the lapse of one who seeks to be cleared of guilt. He should lead his army and his followers in comradeship and helpfulness and mutual assistance, extracting rancor from their breasts and drawing bitterness from their hearts. For, verily, good relations are most conducive to victory and [bring one] closer to the attainment of an objective.

And [the commander of the army] should prevent any of [his men] from molesting any who pass by [the army] of the people of obedience

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3 This line is not by Abū Tammām, but by al-Mutanabbi, Diwān (4 vols; Cairo: 1936), vol. IV, p. 174.

4 This Bayhas was most probably the Khārijite Bayhas b. Ṣuhayb, whom Muhallab encountered during his successful campaign against Nāfi’ b. al-Azraq in 65/685. The source of the story is al-Mubarrad, al-Kāmil, ed. W. Wright (3 vols; Leipzig: 1864-81), vol. I, p. 673. But our text has “yaghibu” whereas Wright has opted for “badala”, in the meaning of “in exchange for” or as “a substitute for”. This is more sensible, for it simply means that Bayhas, obviously fighting on the Khārijite side, was the equal in al-Muhallab’s eyes of one thousand courageous men in his own ranks.
and submission [to the ruler], and from stretching hands to a thing of their property, and from molesting their women. And he should promise them recompense for that which they [would otherwise] have obtained from their enemy, if they triumph over him.

If one among them should commit an offense, he should be held responsible for it and have meted out to him the equal of what this offense enjoins. Among [such treasonable acts] are indicating to the enemy the weak points of one's companions-in-arms or informing him of their concealment; for, verily, the one who does this is an enemy in reality, because he provides the enemy with that by which he can prevail over one's companions; and he would have conveyed to the enemy what [the enemy] would not have obtained except for him.

Among them are [acts] deserving punishment such as hiding the captive so that he escapes or describing one's companions in terms of [their] weakness, or betraying the men [while engaged] against the enemy, or advancing with [the enemy]. For the one who undertakes such actions is weakening the army and alarming the hearts of the men.

And among them are acts deserving chiding and reproach, such as delaying one's arrival on the day of battle without excuse, or being apprised of a report about the enemy and not forwarding it to the commander of the army. For the delay of a report by one hour may result in a year's disaster.

And among them are acts demanding reproof, such as, having been entrusted with something of the activities of the battle, to be remiss about it, or to be remiss about one's formation without excuse, or describing the enemy as powerful, and such like.

And among them are acts requiring drawing the [special] attention [of the commander of the army] to them, such as one's travelling along any but one's [appointed] path or standing in any but one's own post, or camping in any but one's [proper] area.

To sum up: these [matters] are entrusted to the judgment of the commander of the army; where prudence deems action necessary, he acts; and where it advises non-action, he complies. For each case, there is a rule special to it.
BOOK SEVEN: about the explanation of when it is necessary to encounter the enemy and do battle against him. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One: about what [must be done] if the army is strong and the enemy is weak.

Under these circumstances, opposing the enemy, being prepared for him, and raiding him in his own country are necessary. God had commanded His Prophet to fight the unbelievers and treat them roughly, when He said, exalted be His power, "Struggle with the unbelievers and the hypocrites, and be thou harsh with them." (9:73) And He ordained engaging those of the unbelievers who were near neighbors of the Muslims when He said, exalted be the Sayer, "Find the unbelievers who are near you; let them find in you a harshness." (9:123)

The 'ulama' have said that the least that has been enjoined of raiding of this type is once each year. ¹ The Prophet went forth to fight, ghazā, twenty-eight times and conquered most of the country of the Arabs before his death, may God have mercy upon him and grant him peace. Abū Bakr, the Trustworthy, al-ṣiddiq, may God have mercy upon him, fought after him, in his caliphate, the people of apostacy, al-riddah, who turned away [from Islām] after the Prophet's death, and refused to pay the zakāt. He said, "Were they to refuse a poor tax ('iqāl) which they used to give to the Messenger of God, I would fight them for it."² He conquered Buṣrā (Bosra) in the land of Syria in his caliphate, and it was the first city to be conquered in the land of Syria.

After him, 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, may God have mercy on him, conquered Damascus and the rest of the land of Syria, and beyond this to the East until his conquests reached to Khurāsān and the lands adjacent to it. And, likewise, in his reign some of the cities of Syria and Egypt and Barqah and other places were conquered. In the

¹ For an analysis of war as a legal institution of Muslim society, see Khaddūrī, op. cit., p. 51-82. But one misses in this discussion any clear-cut distinction between jihād, which required the initiation of the call by an orthodox caliph, and ghazwa, systematic raiding into the areas adjacent to the dār al-Islām. It is after the Saljuq expansion into Anatolia that one witnesses the prominence of the ghāzi over the mujāhid, or, more accurately the merging of the two concepts. Cf. Paul Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire (London: 1938).

caliphate of 'Uthman, may God have mercy upon him, Kirmān and Sijistān and Fārs and Šahr-Abad to the East were conquered; and, to the West, Ifriqiyyah, that is, the land of Tūnis; and Cyprus among the islands of the sea.

Mu'āwiyyah in his reign raided Constantinople, the capital of the king of Rūm, and put it under heavy siege. After this, the raids of the Caliphs and their conquests succeeded one another in the days of the Ummayyad power and in that of the ‘Abbāsids following it. It is even said of al-Mu'tašim, one of the ‘Abbāsid Caliphs, that he heard a noble lady being tortured by the lord of ‘Amūriyah (Amorium), in the lands of Rūm. The woman shouted, ‘O Mu'tašim! ’ The lord of ‘Amūriyah said to her, ‘Al-Mu'tašim cannot accomplish your deliverance except on a piebald horse, ablaq.’ [Al-Mu'tašim] directed his army to ride piebald horses, bulg. He set out to liberate her, and in the vanguard of his army [alone] there were four thousand piebald horses. He rescued her and returned [to his lands].”

(3) This is a variation on the famous story of the storming of ‘Amūriyah by al-Mu'tašim in 223/837-38, after the Byzantines had captured and razed the fortress city of Zibatrah on the upper Euphrates. Abū Tammām celebrated the event in his famous qasidah rhyming in ba' on this campaign, see infra. The most complete bibliography on the event can be found in al-Ṭabarî, The Reign of al-Mu'tašim (833-842), tr. and annotated by Elma Marin (American Oriental Series, Volume 35; New Haven: 1951), pp. 58-76 and note 293 for the relevant sources for the female captive calling out to the Caliph for help.

The novelty in the present account is the appeal to the piebald horses. Most of the sources simply say that al-Mu'tašim mounted a dēbbah and dragged behind him an iron shackle, ostensibly for the Byzantine emperor Theophilus. Lane, vol. I, p. 253, explains balaq and bulqah as “blackness and whiteness together [generally in horses] or the extension of whiteness in the hind-legs of a horse as high as the thighs ... any color with which white is mixed”; and ablaq as “applied to a horse ... black and white ... or white in the hind legs as high as the thighs.”

Mercier, p. 90, translating Ibn Hudhayl, gives another possibility:

“Si les balzanes dépassent ce point pour atteindre les avantbras et les crisses, le cheval est qualifié ablaq musarwel (pie culotté) soit balzanes haut chausscés ou cheval pie, selon les cas.”

For an example of a white-footed mount, see the horse ridden by the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman in G. Blochet, Muslim Painting (London: 1929), plate CLXXIII and accompanying text.

In the margin of Ta' is a line from Abū Tammām’s qasidah:

Zibatrah's call I hear
And sleep no more;
And kiss no maid
On lips so moist, so near.
Likewise the great conquests of the kings of Egypt continued [the above trend]. The Victor, al-Malik Salāh ad-Dīn Yūsuf b. Ayyūb, may God have mercy upon him, [and] his brother, al-‘Adil, conquered those portions of Syria which the Franks had conquered, namely, Jerusalem and the coast land and Anṭakiyyah, and, too, some of the regions of the Euphrates. Then the Franks conquered some of these again until the Turkish rulers (i.e. the Mamlūks) retrieved them from [the Franks] by the continuous warfare of al-Malik al-Zāhir Baybars and others [after him] until finally [the Franks] were ousted from the coastlands of Syria by the hand of al-Ashraf b. Qalā‘ūn in the year 690 (1291 A.D.).

Chapter Two: about what [must be done] if the army is weak and the enemy strong.

Under these circumstances, procrastination and the absence of haste in meeting the enemy and the eschewing of presenting one's self to him are necessary should he appear; using in this case stratagems and tricks and deception whenever possible. Confronting him at the very outset, while he is in this condition [of strength] is not permissible. To do so is comparable to one's stirring a serpent from its lair [while] one is unarmèd, in order to oppose and defeat it; thus presenting one's self to peril and courting death by one's own hand. Some of the learned have said, “By delaying the battle, [you] do that which benefits you”; and others say this means “as long as you are on the safe side.”

In general, the one seeking to do battle against the enemy should not move to engage him, but should accept safety and peace as long as they are granted to one. The Prophet said, “Don’t seek to encounter the enemy; rather ask safety of God. They [can] conquer just as you can conquer.” If you have met them, stand fast. One should not become disgusted at the procrastination of one's enemy, for in the interval of waiting is the grasping of [possible] advantage and acquiring knowledge of the enemy's circumstances and [that which has been] concealed of their affairs; and one does not seek victory by engaging


(4) Neither Saladin nor Al-‘Adil took Antioch. It fell finally to Baybars in 666/1268.

him so long as victory can be attained through stratagems. For going out against the enemy involves exposing one's self to danger, and the endangering of one's wealth, and being distant from [one's] country, even if only to the frontiers of it. Considering what may be in this going-forth of expectation of the perishing of self and the courting of dangers and the bearing of afflictions, it may be that stratagems can do that which battle cannot, as has been mentioned in the chapter on deception and stratagems.

And one should devote most of one's energies to bringing one's enemy into obedience and submission to one, to the end that this will be preferable to one rather than booty. Verily, the greatest booty, according to those possessing intelligence, is the submission of the enemy and his entering into obedience. Should this occur, [one's] aim has been accomplished. For if nothing were gained by obedience but security of self and property, one should cease killing and shedding blood [as soon as] one is able, if one trusts one's enemy in this [matter]. There is no profit in killing those in obedience. Perhaps someone saved from killing will become of assistance to one after having been of assistance against one.6

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(6) Cf. Khaddūrī op. cit., pp. 96-101 on the invitation to enter into obedience to Muslim rulers and the usefulness of negotiations.
BOOK EIGHT: about the scouting party and the organization of its activities and what these [activities] encompass. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One: about the nature of the scouting party and a description of its horses and men.

As for the scouting party (al-ṭalī‘ah; pl. al-ṭalā‘i‘; used interchangeably): it is defined as a cavalry group which precedes the army for the collection and discovery of information [about the enemy]. It is so called because of its advanced gathering, ʾiḍā‘, of news of the enemy. And it is also called “al-kashshāfah”, because of its discovering, kashf, of news [about the enemy].

As for its men: it is said that it is necessary to choose for the scouting party men of counsel and courage and wise in the experiences (affairs) of wars. For when victory is achieved by the scouting party, it is victory for the army as a whole; and, too, the men of the army rejoice if victory has fallen to the scouting party. It is necessary, too, to place over the scouting party a general, al-muqaddam, to whom they have recourse and at whose word they stand fast (obey), [else] confusion will confound them, and the interest [they seek] would escape them.

As for their horses: it is necessary that their horses be race-horses, sound of back, securely shod; and there be not among them a stubborn one, nor one that is sexually restive. The purpose of the scouting party is the swift dispatch of news and should there be [in the party] a stubborn or sexually restive horse, or one of like qualities, the purpose of the scouting party will not be achieved.

Chapter Two: about the regulations pertaining to the scouting party and what is encompassed by these.

The first of that which must be adhered to in the matter of the scouting party is that none of them should have a breast-plate (or coat of mail), or shield; and that in the quiver of each there should be twenty arrows, or nearly that number. There should not be with any of them anything which might encumber him at all; because this [thing] might prevent the speedy [dispatch] of the news, and it has been pointed out that the speedy [dispatch] of the news is the purpose of [the scouting party].
It is preferable that their advance be over level ground in which, if possible, there is no dust; because [the dust] will catch the attention of the enemy. Should the matter entail ascending to a high place of a mountain or something akin to it, some should ascend while the others remain on level ground.

And the scouting party in the expedition should not proceed further than two thirds of the distance between them (i.e. the army’s encampment) and the enemy. Nor should they hasten to the vicinity of the enemy or stray too far towards their side. Rather their scouting should proceed easily and with [frequent] pauses to scout right and left.

If the enemy should evidence rout at the hands of the scouting party, the [latter] should not follow him; for there might be [in the place to which the scouting party has followed the supposedly routed enemy] an ambush which would be sprung against them, particularly if the rout of the enemy’s scouting party happened in a place other than the vicinity of the enemy’s [main] forces: for example, when the enemy is located to the south, and his scouting party flees in another direction. In most cases, such a thing is not done by the scouting party of the enemy except to spring an ambush against [the army’s scouting party] in the direction (i.e., of the enemy’s fleeing scouts). This is among that which has overtaken many scouting parties and caution must be taken against it.

Further, if the scouting party were but a single horseman, he reconnoiters and reports back. If there were two, one remains [to continue] investigating and the other reports back. Or if there were three, one carries back the information and two remain to complete the investigation. If there were more than this, the general of the scouting party details some of them to carry back the report and [others] to remain to reconnoiter, in accordance with his estimate [of the situation].

The one who returns with the report from the scouting party must be intelligent and truthful. If he returns and arrives where he can see [whether] the army is encamped or marching, he should reduce the galloping of his horse gradually until he reaches the army and enters it calmly. He should inform the commander of the army about what he saw and should not reveal this to any other person.

It is necessary that there be between the commander and the one who brings the report a signal (sign, token, code) by which the commander of the army would understand the news [when] the publicizing of the news is not advisable. It is told of the Prophet that he sent [a
party] to discover the situation of the banū Qurayzah. He said, 'If you see something favorable [to us], reveal it; if you find something unfavorable, speak enigmatically, [and] I will understand; but don't weaken the ranks of the Muslims'; meaning don't inform them of anything which might upset them (prove harmful to them). ¹

Likewise, it is necessary for the one carrying the news, should some obstacle occur between him and the army, which has shifted [its position] or some other change [has occurred], that there be [pre-arranged] signs between him and the commander of the army, by which the contents of his message will be understood, such as: the camping of the enemy or his marching, the greatness or smallness of his numbers. Thus the man's alighting from his horse is a sign of the enemy's camping; and walking to one side is a sign of the [enemy's] marching in that direction; and galloping his horse is a sign of a raid (predatory incursion) by the enemy, etc.

(¹) Guillaume, op. cit., p. 453 and note 1.
BOOK NINE: about the explanation of [matters] which require cautiousness when departing and of what must be done in the circumstances of travelling (marching). In it are two chapters.

Chapter One: about cautiousness while in the process of departing.

Those experienced in the affairs of wars said that the commander of the army should not permit any one of his entire army to depart until after its mobilization; its organization; the mounting of the cavalry and the donning of their coats of mail, lāmat al-ḥarb; and the assignment by the general of the army, charged with its mobilization and organization, of his men to the various divisions of the army with their arms and provisions. When they accomplish this, the men begin loading and departing, while the horses surround them on every side; until, having finished, they march at the time, after the commander of the army has notified each amīr or qāʿīd, of the amīrs (Ar. pl. umarāʾ) and qāʿīds (Ar. pl. quawād), and the generals of the various divisions, and those assigned [specific] tasks of the duties which each one of them should perform in his field, and of that which is his business, in accord with what is appropriate in each situation and with what is needed.

The circumstances concerning being on guard during departure will vary in different places and times. It is no secret that marching at night demands stronger guarding than marching during the day, and [the same] for places possessing various roads [as against] those in which there is but one road.

The commander of the army should not permit any one of the men of his army to precede the scouts of the army under any circumstances. It may be that the one who precedes will be hit, and this will be a reason for the boldness of the enemy towards the army; causing great damage which is impossible to rectify. Verily, [proper handling of] affairs is [determined] by their beginnings.

Chapter Two: about the explanation of what must be done in the circumstance of marching.

The first thing that is incumbent upon the commander of the army is to [order] his scouting party to precede the army in order to reconnoiter the enemy according to what preceded in the book before [this one]. Then, after the scouting party, he should assign a man from among those possessing bravery, with keen vision and expert about
roads, in the company of trusted men of his army; and assign [these] men for repairing roads and cutting trees and building bridges and barrages over rivers and attending to the rest of the necessary [activities] of roads. In so doing, he makes easier the passage of the army along the road, and removes fatigue when there is crowding of the army; for, perhaps [the bad road] would occasion a slackening in the march or a delay in arriving at the goal, which one desires in a fixed time.

Then, the first [group] which he advances of his army is the vanguard, al-muqaddamah, of the army, and it is [composed of] the cavalry which should be in the forepart of the army and the rest of the army should be behind these, in set order, back to the sāqah, and it is the rear [echelon] of the army. [This] will be according to an explanation which will be given of the arrangement of the ranks, God willing.

[The commander of the army] should order some of his scouts to proceed beyond the place in which his vanguard have alighted, to discover what is beyond the place, as the situation demands. Then news of this and of the alighting of the vanguard of the army should be relayed to him, so that he will be aware of these [facts] before he reaches it. Should there be any procrastination about sending him the report, or should doubt enter his mind about the situation in front of him, he should dispatch someone to investigate it, ascertain its truth, and send the report to him. If a report reaches him which upsets him, he must not appear fearful or anxious, for this would trouble the hearts of his army.

If the commander of the army should come upon a narrow place or mountain pass or river or similar things along the line [of march], he himself must pause until the army, to the very last [man] of it, has passed [safely]. If he doesn’t do this, perhaps each one of them would demand precedence for himself over his fellows, and confusion will occur and disagreement among the army will be occasioned, leading to the stirring up of sedition. It was related of al-Malik al-Zāhir Baybars al-Bunduqdārī that, when he entered the land of Rūm and conquered Qaysāriyah (Caesarea) and was returning, it was he who supervised this matter himself and paused at the narrow places and at the river fordings until the army has passed one by one.¹

¹ This took place in 675/1277. The main pass was the so-called Galician Gates. None of the sources mentions specifically this estimable piece of military wisdom;
[The commander of the army] should entrust the rear of his army to a man of those who consult him and who would carry out his orders exactly, with a group of officers. [This man] would detain the soldiers and the ghilmân (sing. ghulām: orderlies, royal pages), preventing any of them from retiring to the rear of the army; nor would he permit one of them to tarry behind the army. For when one of them retires or remains behind the army, he might report about the army something which happened to it, which should not be revealed; or he enlarges upon it, or diminishes it, thereby increasing the confusion of the thoughts of the people.

BOOK TEN : is about the explanation of that which is necessary of precaution while camping and [the period when the army] remains in the camp. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One : about the choosing of the site for camping.

Men of experience in the affairs of war said that the place in which the army alights must possess water and pasturage and firewood and other things upon which the [sustenance of the] army depends. And the place in which the camping occurs should be such that, should the army desire to advance [to meet] the enemy, this would be possible; and should it desire to delay [engaging] him, out of prudence, should circumstances require it --- this, too, would be possible.

[The commander of the army] should strive to place the rear [echelons] of his cohorts against mountains or hills or rivers or that which is equivalent to these, to insure against sudden incursions and ambushes and night raids on the part of the enemy. If he cannot find, behind his army, a mountain or a hill or a river or anything which will afford protection to its rear, he should post behind his army [a group of] watchers comparable to the scouting parties, observing what takes place behind [the army] so as to be secure from surprise attacks by the enemy against [his camp]. This is done because, should the enemy attempt to confront [the army while it is encamped], it ensures the men of the army's [being prepared] to march to engage him, armed to repel him with that which their resources provide of defense. But should [his attack] be upon the rear of the army, and should there be nothing there to protect the rear, perhaps the enemy will attack the army at a time of negligence about him.

Chapter Two : about the arrangement of the army in the camp and that which requires caution in [this matter].

As for the arrangement of the army in the camp : it is necessary first that the alighting of the army be according to a strict arrangement.¹ To each one of the amīrs and important functionaries, arbāb al-waža'if, a specific place must be assigned within the camp of

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¹ Cf. the classical Roman camp described by Machiavelli, The Art of War, tr. Peter Whitethorne (originally published in London in 1588; republished Albany: 1815), Book VI, passim and sketch of camp opposite p. 123.

A Muslim encampment and its diagrammatic explanation can be seen in Wüstenfeld's "Das Heerwesen der Muhammedaner" which is the same one described and drawn in the Nihāyat al-su'l (note 8 Introduction supra).
commander of the army; for, if each officer, ra'is, [were assigned] a specific place, the need to consult with him could be accomplished more readily and locating him would be made easy. Were a single one of the beasts to stray, and its brand were known, its return to [its owner] would be hastened.

As for caution in [the matter of] the camp: if there is fear of an attack by the enemy, it is necessary, when each one of the army has [been assigned and] takes [his] station [within the camp], that they dig a trench around the army [camp], putting upon it two entrance-ways, or more if the army is a large one. Archers and cavalrymen should be posted at the entrance-ways of the trench, ready [against any attack]. Commanders of armies in by-gone times, when they alighted for camping, used to equip the outer reach of the moat with iron-tipped poles, known now as al-zaqāzīq. The iron on each stave was pointed so that no matter how it was thrown on the earth one of its points projected from it. In this way, it was like a wall for the army; because, should the enemy attack it, the points entered the hooves of the horses and the feet of the infantry, impeding their movement.²

When the army has alighted [and] made camp, the commander of the army should dispatch scouts from his army by day into the roads and dangerous places and establish a cavalry group beyond his army in high places and at the narrow passes about the entrance-ways to the army until sunset. When night descends, others should be established in their place un'til sunrise.

[The experts] thought it desirable to post by night a cavalry group behind the troops, close by, who would raise their voices in the tahālîl ("There is no god but God") and the takbīr ("God is greatest") to awaken the army and petition victory from God. This cavalry group is called al-darrājāh. [Other] guards should be placed beyond these a: a distance of half a shawt,³ who would ride all around the army quietly, so that they might discover anyone hidden or lying in ambush to perpetrate

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² The word "thalāth" is written in the margin of Fā', indicating that there were three iron points on each stave.

³ Lane, vol. I, p. 1619, defines this as the distance of a heat in any race, usually horse-racing, which was generally reckoned as the length of the maydān, which was a cleared area for military training and sports, particularly polo.
a trick. Thus, it would not be objectionable at this time to set up an ambush beyond the watch and the guards, and to light fires on every side of the army, to frighten the enemy from afar and [by the fires] to expose [themselves] to [the patrol] by the clearness of light if they drew near.

Should it happen that the enemy approaches by night from one of the sides of the army, the ambush would be sprung upon them, and the cavalry group and watch, who are outside the army, would engage them. Thus the enemy, who had approached them, would be hemmed in between the army and those who went out to engage [them]. The men of the army in this case should be kept in their places and not one of them should leave his place, as long as this is feasible; and no one of them should speak, except the men on the side from which the enemy has come. These men should utter three takbhirs, one after the other, during the approach of the enemy, so that it will be known that the enemy has approached from their direction. If the enemy abandons that quarter and approaches from another, or a party of the enemy other than the first reaches the other side, the men on that side also should raise the cry in order to arouse the rest of the army to support them.
BOOK ELEVEN: about the explanation of when mobilizing and arranging the troops is necessary, and what is required in the matter of mobilizing at this time. It it are two chapters.

Chapter One: about the explanation of when the mobilizing of the troops and their arrangement is necessary.

Men accustomed to war and experienced about its events said that the men of the army, if they are to engage their enemy, should be, both in their marching and camping, mobilized [in proper ranks] and that this mobilization is [as] necessary in a state of security as it is in the state of danger, unless necessity requires the abandoning of this [ranking]; and that this [mobilization] should be maintained as long as possible. It has been recounted about one of the men of resolution that he headed out of Syria towards the East, seeking battle. He made a trench about the first place in which he alighted beyond Syria, with proper mobilization, [his troops drawn up] correctly. This he continued doing until he reached the place of his destination and conquered his enemy. It has been reported that this was the practice of Muhallab b. Abi Ṣufrah, the shaykh of wars and their imām.¹

Others maintain that the mobilization should be maintained only when the enemy is a short distance away. Some of these estimate this [distance] at five stages, marāḥil (i.e., about five days' march). The import of this is that only then is [ranking for battle] necessary and [only then] could the [general battle] circumstances be verified. In general, it is required that there be readiness during the marching and alighting and establishment [of camp]; [that there be] a ready taking to arms at all times; for, when it (i.e., the army) is remiss about preparation, or ignores it, [the army] might expose itself to events that it is not able to handle.

Chapter Two: about the explanation of what is required of mobilizing at this time.

The experts in the affairs of war and its conditions said that if the warrior (i.e., the commander of the army) is not far distant from his

enemy, he should not march except in [the condition of having] a vanguard, muqaddamah, a right flank, maysarah, and a left flank, maymanah, and a rearguard, sāqah;² [all] with unsheathed weapons, their standards and banners unfurled, so that each one of them can be sure about his station and position within the army, and marching under their [various] ensigns. They should take their battle arms and ready themselves for meeting the enemy, aware of their positions in their marching and their camping, and be in their going forth and settling down according to their banners and flags and in their [proper] stations.

Each qā'id or amir should know his men, adhering to positions on the right or left flank or center or rear-guard or scouting party; seeing that they are not remiss about what they are called upon to do, nor negligent about that with which they have been entrusted; so that the troops will be in every place they reach and in each distance they cover like a single army in their [possible] joint action against the enemy. [The officer] should handle [his men] with firmness, seeing that their marching is under their [proper] banners, and their alighting is in their [proper] stations, and that they know their positions.

(2) This marching formation is related to the famous army organization and battle order called “al-khamis”, which goes back into pre-Islamic Arabian military theory. The use of proper standards (or ensigns or flags) is a reminder of the time when “the tribal unit was preserved in each division of the army, and each tribe had its own standards”, Khaddūrī, op. cit., p. 89. For a discussion of the origin of this term, see Harold W. Glidden, “A Note on Early Arabian Military Organization”, Journal of the American Oriental Society, LVI (1936), pp. 88-91.
BOOK TWELVE: about the explanation of the method of mobilizing while threatened in marching and the protection of the treasuries. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One: is about the explanation of the method of mobilizing when threatened in marching.

Men knowledgeable about the management of wars said: when a threat [of attack] while marching becomes evident to the commander of the army and the threat [comes from] in front of the army, he should place half of the left flank in front of the ranks in the march, and half the right flank in its tracks, then the center after it, then half of the left flank after [the center], and half of the right flank in the rear of it. If the threat be from the side of the right flank, he should place the march of the right flank in front of the ranks, then the center, then the left flank. If the threat be from the side of the left flank, he should place the march of the left flank in front of the ranks, then the center, then the right flank. Should the threat be “unknown” (i.e., the direction from which it will be launched is not known), he should scatter scouting parties and horsemen on all sides of the army, and muster the men according to their [battle] ranks and stations. The commander of the army should be in the middle of the center [section of the army].

Chapter Two: about the protection of the treasuries and the baggage.

As for the treasuries: [the experts] said that the commander of the army should deputize [to guard] his treasuries a man who is a wise counsellor and trustworthy, and [assign to] him a group of cavalry who will accompany the transport of his treasuries, alighting when they are put down, surrounding them in marching and alighting, in order to protect them from the deprivations of the enemy, and to guard them from the approach of treacherous men. He should order all the troops to keep away from them and to maintain distance from them while

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(1) Cf. Smail, op. cit., for the skirmishing encountered by the Crusading armies while on the march; and, p. 80, for Muslim tactics forcing the Franks to fight on the march. The Muslims concentrated their attack on the rearguard of a marching column.
marching and alighting, except those who are selected for this [duty] and assigned to it. If there is no one deputized for the treasuries from among the people who would preserve them and overpower those who wish to plunder them, perhaps the enemy will come upon them or the soldiery will hasten towards them and fall upon them, leading to the plunder of the army and the incitement to discord. Verily, the people of discord and those evilly disposed and those inclining towards infidelity are many and their haste towards doing good is far-fetched.
BOOK THIRTEEN: about the description of the method of night attack on the enemy if the opportunity appears. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One: about the description of the time in which it is propitious to attack the enemy by night and a description of the men who are best fitted for this action.

As for the time in which it is propitious to attack the enemy by night: it is necessary to select for this the dark night and the windy night. If this be done during the rustling [of the wind] or the dripping of [rain] water, so as to prevent the discovery of the night prowler who is attacking the enemy, it is better. Further, if the enemy whom one wishes to raid by night were large [in size and numbers], one chooses for [the raid] that part of the morning nearest to dawn, while they (i.e., the enemy) are arising at break of day; then the army will take them. God has praised the steeds for attacking swiftly in the morning in His saying: “By the snorting chargers, by the strikers of fire, by the dawn-raiders blazing a trail of dust”. (100:1).

As for the men who are best fitted for this: [the experts] have reported that those who are chosen for night raiding should be of two types. The first type are men of experience in wars and resolute, because they are those by whom the job is most profitably carried out, since it cannot be executed profitably at that time except by those who are known for resolution and patience in combating warriors in straitened times. The second type are those who are submissive to one who knows more about this [type of operation]; because they become like a tool to the one knowledgeable about war, used profitably by him as an instrument of war, as the sword or spear or other weapons are used. But they must have in addition to obedience the qualities of bravery and patience and firmness and endurance of that for which they are delegated. Yea, the harm of the cowardly in this place is greater than his usefulness.

Chapter Two: about the method of night raiding.

Men, practiced in war, have deemed it advisable, should one desire to raid the enemy by night, to have a group of the army attack by aiming at the middle of the enemy’s [formation], while the remainder [of the army] covers them. Then the group which had aimed at the
middle of the enemy should shout; for, if they shout in their midst at a time [when the enemy is] unaware [of the raiders' presence], confusion and ruin will overtake the enemy. And should the latter seek to use the extremities of their army, they will find that the remainder of the [attacking] army between them [and their middle components] have surrounded them and taken those who are outside [the regular formation] by shooting arrows at them from beyond [the formation]; for, this action, carried out in the night and in great darkness, has a great effect on the combatants.

And if they (i.e., the raiding party) are able to hamstring the beasts of the enemy's army and wound them with spears, having [already] cut their halters and shackles, they should do this; for, if their halters and shackles are cut, and steel [weapons] smite them, they will run amok about [the enemy's] army, because of the pain visited upon them, besides being terrified and startled by the loud voices.

It is advised in this matter that the group which is attacking the enemy by night, when they fall upon the enemy, should not confine themselves to a single place but should increase their movements within [the enemy formation]; for [such movements] magnify the terror, greatly increase the injuries and the [consequent] weakening of the enemy. Further, it is necessary that they be given a battle cry which they shout to one another, such as "May God gladden", or "May God grant victory", or similar cries, in order that they may be distinguished from the enemy.
BOOK FOURTEEN: about the selection of positions of the battle-rankings and the time [to carry this out]. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One: about the selection of position of the rankings.

[The experts] have preferred that the position of the battle-rankings be such that the men of the army, ranked for battle, will have their backs against a mountain or river or hill; so that, with respect to their backs they will be secure from an attack by the enemy against them, and [from] the springing of an ambush behind them; [rankings] similar to those which preceded about the [army's] camping while en route [to battle] according to the explanation which was given in Book Ten. Should nothing like this be available, [the commander of the army] digs trenches and fortifies himself by setting up ambushes to spring against the enemy, should he be moving against the rear of the army.

[The commander of the army] should see to it that the position of the center of the army is on a mountain or on a solid, raised place in which there is no dust. The commander of the army should be in the middle of them (i.e., the center group of the army), in order to be raised above the two armies and to see what takes place in his cohorts and the enemy's by way of lucky opportunities and the plugging of gaps and such matters.

If he finds nothing but a depressed area in which he cannot see the two armies, and if the engagement is unavoidable, he should leave behind in the center formation as deputy one experienced in war, resolute, and skilled in the management [of troops], while he passes on, under protection to the right flank which is adjacent to the center wing. Should he find there a raised place, he should ascend it; if he does not find one there, he seeks it on the left flank. If he cannot find one [anywhere], he should, if possible, erect in the center something upon which he can stand, so that he can overlook the two armies from [its height].

Chapter Two: about the choice of the time for [battle] ranking.

The commander of the army should strive to effect the ranking at a time when the sun and wind are coming from behind the rear of his army. As for having the sun come from behind: this is done because, if it comes from in front, its rays fall upon the burnished blades of the swords and [upon] the helmets and other [metallic paraphernalia of
battle]. And [too] its rays reach the eyes, dimming the sight; causing, perhaps, the total deprivation of sight of some of [the men]. As for having the wind come from behind: it is so that the [warrior] will be protected from what the wind throws in the eyes of dust and sand; for, when the wind raises the dust and sand to the eyes, this induces the lowering of the eyelids against what threatens [the eyes]. It has been deemed foolhardy to lower the eyelids in war, [particularly] while engaged in battle, even though one were to see the sword almost enter one's eye; because, by lowering the eyelids, the warrior would become [comparable] to one who is blinded, and the blind man is useless in war.

If it is not possible to have the wind come from the rear, its approach should be such that it sweeps in from the end of one's right flank towards the left flank of the enemy, thereby occasioning the sharing by the enemy's army with one's own of the [wind's] detriment. Thus he sustains [of disadvantage] the like of that which is sustained by the men of one's own army. If it prove possible, [the commander of the army] should so maneuver that the wind will come from a direction such that the enemy takes [of the wind's disadvantageous direction] his full share. If it is not possible and the enemy persists in seeking battle at this time, or if the wind changes while he is in formation, the commander, apropos of the rankings, should order the cavalry to dismount from their horses, and fight as infantry, crowded together as though they were one man; for the wind's pressure against the cavalry is stronger than its pressure against the infantry, because of the cavalryman's eminence about the ground, and the infantryman's "lowness" through standing upon it.
BOOK FIFTEEN: about the explanation of the setting up of ambushers and the management of their affairs. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One: about the account of the qualities of the men of the ambush, and of the horses for it, and the place in which to spring the ambush.

As for the men of it: it is necessary that they be among the most courageous of the cavalrmyen of the army, the most experienced in war, the most adept in exploits; for they will be isolated from the army and will be in a place in which none of the men of the army can help them or relieve them, because of their distance from them. Besides this, [the commander of the army] must place over them an officer who is knowledgeable of the affairs of wars, experienced in their battles, expert about the proper places for concealment; for this will be more helpful in the accomplishment of the aim of the ambush relative to its concealment, when concealment is called for, and its springing forth when this is ordained.

As for its horses: it is necessary that they be firm-footed, sound of back, free of stubbornness and sexual restiveness, according to what has preceded about the horses for the scouting party. And there should not be in their temperament anything by which they can be recognized during the time of ambush, such as neighing or the like. It is imperative that their horses be all stallions or all mares; for, if stallions and mares are grouped together in the same party, it may prove a clear evidence [of the party’s presence] by their neighing or snorting, thus giving [the enemy] knowledge of the ambush, and perhaps this will lead to the visiting of injury upon all of the army. In general, the commander of the ambush should remove anything which would reveal that which he wants to conceal.

As for the place in which to conceal the ambushers: it is necessary that it be secret, hidden and that establishment in it be bearable if the need calls for long standing; and that there be in it water and pasturage and the rest of what the men of the ambushing party need, as far as possible.

Chapter Two: about the management of the affairs of the ambushers.

The first thing incumbent upon the men of the ambushing party is that they establish for themselves a watchman, ḏaydubān, to scout for
news of the enemy and the latest [situation] in the affairs of the army and acquaint them about them. It is necessary that this watchman be one of those who are trustworthy and whose counsel has been proven. For, if he were of the opposite stripe, he might incline towards the enemy and reveal the ambush and they would be taken at his indication [of the place].

The ambushers should avoid hunting birds or wild beasts from the surrounding area; for, this induces the flight of the birds and beasts and, perhaps, one of the people of the shrewdness about war sees the flight of the hunted [bird or beast] and concludes that it was frightened by a frightener, and he connects this [fact] to his knowledge about ambushes, and [the ambushing party] would be captured.

It is required that the time of the springing of the ambush be at a time of inattention [on the part] of the enemy, this being the period of the oncoming morning (between dawn and sunrise); or while the enemy alights from their beasts and sets them to rest, during the hottest hour [of the daylight] in summer or the coldest hour of the day in winter. Further, their going out from the ambush against the enemy must be in separate squadron formations, kurdušah, pl. karadīs,¹ not far distant from one another; and they should hasten their return to their place of ambush if they do not accomplish their objective. If they should meet the enemy, then they should engage him and each one of them should exhibit what he possesses of strength and valor.

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¹ The Umayyad Marwān II, during the years 128-29/745-47, effected a change in the battle formations of the Arab armies from the straightline formation to fighting by movements of close-packed regiments and/or squadrons. These latter were called karadīs (sing. kurdūs or kurdušah). The word kurduš came to replace al-khamis as the word for the army as a whole. See Ibn Khalidūn’s discussion of the methods of warfare, The Muqaddimah, tr. Franz Rosenthal (3 vols; New York: 1958), vol. II, pp. 73-85; and Glidden, op. cit., passim.

It is interesting to note that by the 8th/14th century both these terms were incorporated into military nomenclature. A khamis contained 8192 men and was itself composed of two parts, each a jaysh of 4096 men. The kurduš contained but 128 men. Thus, in a sizable ambush party, the men would spring forth in squadron (kurdušah) formation. See glossary in Nihāyat al-su’l, pp. 145-149.
BOOK SIXTEEN: about the description of the method of arraying the soldiers when they are mobilized for battle. In it are three chapters.

Chapter One: about that which [should obtain] if the opposing army [arrayed for battle] were small and this is related to a difference of degree of smallness [of numbers on both sides].

Should there be but one person girding for war, one engages his adversary [face to face] in battle, and no other action but this is possible for him. If two combine against one, he draws to one side and tries to defend himself against each of them. If the opponent [girded] for war be three, one of them will be in the center, one of them on the left flank and one of them on the right flank. Some maintain [however] that when there are three gathered [to fight], they are not arranged in this manner, but rather each of them protects the back of his companion. This is a great chapter in war; [only] those experienced in wars have practiced it.

If the persons girded for war be nine, three are in the center, three on the right flank, and three on the left flank.

If there be but two readied for battle, the back of each is placed to that of his companion [if] the enemy separates to strike against them. Otherwise they can face him if he comes from one direction.

If there are four poised for battle, three array themselves as center, right flank and left flank as has been explained, and one of them retires to the side, so that if an opportunity [to attack] the enemy appears, he can seize it; or if his companions need help, he can assist them. This is preferable to mixing with them, except when they are mounted as a cavalry squadron, [in which case] the four should attack en masse.

If there are six poised for battle, they should be arrayed according to what has preceded: two in the center, two on the right flank and two on the left flank. If there are eight, it is best to arrange six in the manner described above, and employ the remaining two in ambush, because springing unexpectedly from concealment while the battle is taking place can cause a great tumult.
Some warriors hold the opinion that, if the opposing enemy's battle strength be generally small, the army should not array themselves [as has been described], but rather should attack the enemy as a single cavalry division. Massing is better for them. In general, the procedure for this is dependent upon the diligence of the combatant to the degree that the situation demands.¹

Chapter Two: about that which [should be done] if the [numerical strength] of the enemy, poised for battle, were great.

[The experts] have judged it proper, if the [numerical strength] of the enemy were great, such as that of the great army, to put the army in five lines. The first line will be the vanguard of the army and [much] depends upon it. It is necessary that the cavalrymen in it be outstanding for strength and courage and conquering spirit and experience in war, for they will be at the throat of the enemy, and those behind them of the [other] lines depend upon them.

[The experts] judged it proper to divide the vanguard into three parts: a center, a right flank and a left flank. The center is the one which is in the middle and they mean by it the center of the [entire (?)] army. The right flank is that which is to the right of the center and the left flank is that which is to its left. And to each of the three is a role special to it. They call the right and left flanks al-mujannabatin, "the two advanced guards", and the right and left flanks are [also] called al-janāḥain, "the two wings". Thus one says "the wing of the right flank" and "the wing of the left flank". Perhaps each [part] of the

¹ There is an ambiguous quality in this entire chapter insofar as the numbers indicated do refer to individual combatants. It seems highly unlikely that an entire army would be poised for battle simply to engage anywhere from one to nine combatants. Further, where single combat is referred to in the text, the more technical term mubārazah is employed. It might be that our author was thinking of ranks or squadrons of combatants, each acting as a unit and to be opposed by a comparable unit. It is the lack of any noun, e.g., mubāriz, kurdūs or 'askar, associated with the given number which causes the ambiguity.

For the fighting arrangements of a massed battalion in Roman military theory, see, Machiavelli, op. cit. Book II, passim and the accompanying sketches of the arrangements.
right flank and of the left flank is called *janāḥ*, "wing".

All of the center and of the right flank and of the left flank are divided into three parts according to what has preceded. Thus one arranges the center [of this vanguard] as a center, a right flank and a left flank. The same is done to the [vanguard's] right and left flanks. Over each of these sections one places a general, *al-muqaddam*, making nine such in the vanguard of the army, so that there will be close supervision of their (i.e., the sections') activity. Verily, the great number of the generals of the cavalry in the sections of the army is among that which strengthens the sections and prolongs their steadfastness, especially if with each general there is a section of the army [under his direct command].

[Experts] say it is necessary to place between the [various] wings of the center and of the right and left flanks a clear path, sufficiently wide between [any] two of them to permit the easy passage of the horses and officers [bound] for single combat (*al-mubārczūh*).

The second line will be behind the first, and will be arranged in three parts: a center, a right flank and a left flank, corresponding to the ranking of the first: center behind center, right flank behind right flank and left flank behind left flank. [The experts] have stipulated that this line should contain celebrated cavaliers, sufficiently comparable to those who are cognizant of the management of war and the execution of its important affairs, patient about its events and clear-headed when its difficulties are manifested.

The third line will be behind the second and it is placed for the

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(2) Cf. Machiavelli on the need of many supervisory officers, *op. cit.*, p. 101 f.: "Cosimo. Though I believe all the officers in your battalion may be necessary, yet I should be afraid that so many would create confusion.

"Fabrizio. That might be the case, if they were not all under the command of one person; but as they are, they rather serve to preserve and promote good order; and indeed, it would be impossible to keep it up without them; for a wall that is weak and tottering in every part, may be better supported by many props and buttresses, though they are but feeble ones, than by a few, be they ever so substantial; because their strength cannot be of much service at any considerable distance. For this reason there ought to be a corporal over every ten soldiers in all armies, who should be a man of more spirit and courage, at least of greater authority, than the rest, in order to animate them both by his words and example, and exhort them continually to keep firm in their ranks, and behave themselves like men."
protection of the baggage. It has been explained that there can be no operation of the army without its baggage. The baggage must be encompassed by those who fear the stain of running away more than they fear death, for there is no sustenance possible for the army without its baggage.

The fourth line will be behind the third, and its role is to protect the rear of the baggage. It has been stipulated that the horsemen of this line be light troops, *khifāf anjād*, from among the people of exploits on battle fields, [who are capable of quick support].

The fifth line will be behind the fourth line, and it constitutes the rear guard of the army. [The experts] have stipulated that this line should have men of boldness and intrepidity, upon whose sufficiency [the commander] can rely, should he need them. Upon this line and the fourth depends the protection of the rear section of the army and the prevention of predatory incursions against the rear of the army insofar as they are able, for the enemy will be emboldened [to strike] against the extremities of the army.

Chapter Three: about the description of the forms of the rankings [should] the enemy be of great numerical strength.

[Experts] have differed about this. Most of those versed in military affairs hold that the best ranking is that of the straight line, whose parts are joined to each other. It is reported that this was the conventional [method] of the Persians in ancient times. God had commended this method in His Honored Book [when] He said, exalted be His power, "God loves those who fight in His way in ranks, as though they were a building well-compacted." (61:4)³.

Some of those experienced in war prefer the ranks to curve out from

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³ This is the famous "closed formation" which Ibn Khaldūn praises, *The Muqaddimah*, vol. II, p. 74.:

"Fighting in closed formation is more steady and fierce than fighting with the technique of attack and withdrawal. That is because in fighting in closed formation, the lines are orderly and evenly arranged, like arrows or like rows of worshipers at prayer. People advance in closed lines against the enemy. This makes for greater steadiness in assault and for better use of the proper tactics. It frightens the enemy more. A closed formation is like a long wall or a well-built castle which no one could hope to move ... A tradition says: "One believer is to another believer like a building of which every part supports the rest."


the wings and in towards the center; thus strengthening the center of
the rankings and weakening the wings. He who does this will delegate
for each of the wings a squadron of supporting cavalry as compensation
for the bending in towards the center.

They disapprove the curving out of the rankings from the center
and in towards the wings, for this weakens the center and strengthens
the wings. Thus he who arranges his ranks like this, will station people
of bravery and valor on the right and left flanks so as to strengthen the
center.4

The Mongols from among the Turkish people accustomed their
people [to fight as] a single squadron of cavalry, so that they struggled
together against the enemy. Retiring [from the battle] and returning
[to it] was denied to each of them. They gained from this great expe-
rience which was not [duplicated] by others.

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(4) These are no doubt the two variations of the crescent formation, hidāli. For this
and other battle formations, see MF, pp. 70-72; Nihāyat al-suʿl, Lesson XI, passim;
and Wüstenfeld, “Das Heerwesen der Muhammedaner”, pp. 29-39 and text.
In the first case, when supporting cavalry are sent to strengthen the wings, we
have a formation termed al-mujennaḥ.
BOOK SEVENTEEN: about what should be done while encountering the enemy and fighting him. In it are three chapters.

Chapter One: about [what should be done] when the army marches out against the enemy before the enemy marches out.

If the soldiers take the initiative in marching out against the enemy, their march should be from a high place, elevated above the ground so that the army will be higher than the enemy. Their going forth should be steady and cautious and slow. There should be in front of the cavalry those of the infantry who will defend it and protect it from the infantry of the enemy. When the infantry of the army have put the enemy's infantry to flight, it may happen that the cavalry of the army will follow upon them in the work of routing. If the infantry of the enemy is routed, and falls back upon their cavalry, it causes their horses to panic and their pursuit by the infantry of the army might be continued. This will be the cause of the break-up of the enemy and his rout.

If the center is required to march out against the enemy, its men should proceed slowly, little by little, without rushing or haste. If haste in movement towards the enemy occurs, perhaps those behind the [center's] ranking will think that they have arrived at the enemy's [position] and that they will be [engaged] with him. They will become disturbed because of this and will be affected by it.

If a troop of men attack the enemy and then are required to retire to their [original] station, they should avoid anything unseemly or hurried in their retreat, for such would indicate fear and anxiety. Rather their retreat should be the most ordered and steadiest of retreats. The unseemliness of their retreat could enhance the covetousness of the enemy towards [the army]. He will pursue it, and rout will ensue.

If the men who attacked the enemy were those of the center in their totality and they are compelled to retreat, they should retreat to a place behind their backs, swerving and looking sideways, some inclining shoulders and heads, and [with] chests in the direction of the chests of the enemy. They should not cease doing this until they reach their [original] positions. While doing this, they [must] display power [by] calling for victory, exhorting steadiness and conquest, so that their companions hear [this call]. This gives notice of the presence of the center and of its power in such cases where the hearts grow faint. If
one of the men of the center attacks and takes advantage of an opportunity against the enemy (i.e., for individual combat) and then has to retire, he should incline leftwards and towards the left flank or towards what is between the wings of the center and left flank.

If those who attack are men of the right flank, they should retire, [if forced to], by walking backwards to their [original] positions. Should one of the men of the right flank attack and take advantage of an opportunity [against] the enemy and [then] wishes to retire, he should incline leftwards towards the center or towards what is between the center wing and right flank. This latter method is easier in retreating than retiring towards the left flank and its vicinity would be.

If all of the left flank attacks, they should retire [by] moving backwards to their positions, as has been noted for the right flank. And if one of the left flank attacks, then retires, he should incline [in retreating towards] the left. If the warrior of the left flank, after the attack, moves towards the area of the center, it [will be] easier for him than [a motion] towards the right flank.

And among that which attentiveness demands is the knowledge that the return of the horseman after the engagement to his station, from which he sallied forth, is most salutary, if it be possible; so that he will be in the position established for him, [making him easier to find later on]. If it isn't possible, he should stand in its vicinity. There should be no altercation about this, because the object is simply that he remain in his [proper] ranking and not [necessarily] in that particular place.

It is required of the warrior [charging] against the enemy that he does not exhaust himself in rushing his horse and that he does not pursue his adversary beyond a third of the distance between him and the enemy. Thus there would be between him and the army a third of the distance, and between him and the enemy two-thirds. To go beyond this is heedlessness.

"For the heedless, no praise
E'en though he come through safe."¹

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¹ The source of this hemastitch could not be found.
[Though] the enemy be put to rout before him, the attacker should not feel secure, because this [rout] might be like a stratagem such as [to enable] the springing of an ambush and the like; unless, of course, the failure of the enemy and his defeat are apparent. In the latter case pursuing the enemy is necessary, but the warrior should not hasten to thrust [too] deeply into the army of the enemy, even if the latter's failure is apparent and his horses are delayed [in retreat], until the men of bravery and patience from his own army join him and the battle-cavalry have come together once more.

If the enemy simulates flight and raises dust, the attack against him should not occur until this dust has settled, for fear of an ambush. If the enemy turns his back and his rout is certain, the entire army should not follow him, rather some of the army should pursue him while others plunder, and the remainder are employed to cover these operations. For the army, as a whole, to pursue [the enemy] is judged blameworthy.

Should the enemy remain standing after his [apparent] defeat, the standard bearer (or flag commander), ṣāhib al-liwā', should advance a little distance, while the cavalry, who are chosen and prepared for that [eventuality], attacks. In this circumstance, it is incumbent upon the army to make every effort to surround them from every side. The commander of the army should set out [towards the enemy] with the largest standard, al-band al-a‘zam, and all of the cavalry should surround and protect him. Verily, in all this there is dread and fright brought upon the enemy, especially if they have [already] tasted the edge of iron. When the enemy dallies at this point, it is the onset of victory, God willing.

If a combatant from the army rides out for single combat, his position should be at a point one third of the distance between his comrades and the enemy. Should the latter simulate flight, he [can proceed] to two-thirds of the distance, but he must not go beyond that. Indeed some have said that he should not exceed a third of the distance between his comrades and the enemy under any circumstances.

Chapter Two: about what [should be done] when the enemy marches out against the army before the army takes the field.

(2) The term for the combatant or duellist is mubahir, here employed in the technical sense, and lends weight to the argument noted in Book XVI, note 1, supra.
Men of exploits in wars hold that if the enemy attacks the army before it can attack the enemy or before its organization and mobilization for battle can be carried out thoroughly, the men of the army should kneel on one knee and point their spears from the upper part of the chest, concealing themselves behind leather shields and cuirasses, arrayed in a single ranking, assisting one another until the enemy is repelled or until [the cavalry's] mounting and engagement have been effected. Those experienced in war say that [this] is the hour of adversity for he who is not accustomed to its like.

Should the attack of the enemy occur after the tightening of the battle array of the soldiers, the infantry of the army should engage them and point their spears from the upper part of the chest and remain fixed in their places; and the archers of the army should assist them by shooting [arrows] at the faces [of the enemy]. If the infantry is unable to stand [the attack] in this manner, the cavalry will then respond.

Patience is most beneficial at this time. None but the people of strength and valor and he who has the practice of battle engagement is firm in this [quality of] patience. [Beneficial, too,] is cautiousness against the army's crumbling during the first attack of the enemy in the first moment [of battle]. The cowards will vacate their positions, and this will be a reason for the break-up [of the army's formation]. Should this happen, the correct procedure is to order their control by placing with them experienced warriors who will stand firmly with them, so that they will be made constant by their constancy, strengthening that which had softened their hearts.

If it happen that one of the men of the army should retire because of his fear of battle or the suffering of wounds, no other person of the army should obstruct him by standing in his way or should send him back to [his] position among the warriors; but rather he should be treated gently and be placated until he attains the rear of the battle-rankings.³

³ It is interesting to note here the humane psychology in the treatment of the cowardly and the wounded. Cf. the attitude of Ibn Khaldūn, on the need of cohesion in the lines, vol. II, p. 75:

"[the closed formation] makes it obvious what great wisdom there is in requiring that the lines be kept steady and in forbidding anyone to fall back during an attack. Battle lines are intended to preserve order, as we have stated."
If the enemy overwhelms [a group] of the army and they fail to repulse his assault, they should return to the [main ranks] of the army, maintaining their zeal until they close ranks, and regroup their cavalry and their infantry and protect themselves with [their] weapons and send to seek assistance and the hastening of it. If ranks are closed and the assistance they sought comes to them, they can join battle again to the degree that the situation demands.

If the enemy gives battle to the army right up to the trenches, the men should be prepared for this in the completest manner possible, and they should attack the enemy in a single foray, observing the footsteps of the enemy rather than their faces. Should the enemy hold forth to meet them at this time, nothing remains for them but to descend upon [the enemy] with swords and pointed maces, *al-dabābis al-muḥarrafah*, and battle axes. And when the army has taken of the battle-field a distance from that held by the enemy equal to the length of [the hurl of] a spear, and this happens again and again, the men of exploits count it among the beginnings of victory.

It is necessary that the men of the army hold to their positions with solid rankings [within the area] where the enemy had aimed at them and that they do not cease pointing their spears from their chests or to shoot [arrows] at them from every side. Should the enemy protract [his efforts] and remain patient [under attack], the men of the army should not become disquieted or anxious, because the suffering [of the encounter] is shared by both factions. God pointed this out in His saying: "If you are suffering, they also are suffering as you are suffering, and you are hoping from God for that for which they cannot hope." (4:104)

Should the right flank of the enemy enter the other parts (reserves?) of the army, no one of the men of the army should leave the ranks unless

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Those who turn their backs to the enemy bring disorder into the line formation. They are guilty of the crime of causing a rout. They somehow cause the Muslims to be routed and enable the enemy to gain power over them. This is a great sin, because the resulting damage is general and effects Islam in that it makes a breach in the protecting fence. Therefore, it is considered one of the great sins.'

he is confident that he can defeat his equal before returning to his battle position, for holding fast in his place and repulsing the enemy [from there] is better than being diverted from it; for he who is cut off from his place cannot foresee what his situation will be, unless he knows that the enemy who is advancing on him cannot escape [defeat]. Then engaging him [elsewhere] is permitted at this time.

Chapter Three: about what is required of cautiousness at the time of meeting the enemy.

Those accustomed to and experienced in wars say if a group of enemy's cavalry comes upon the army from the rear at the time of mobilization [for battle], or should spring an ambush upon them at that time, the commander of the army should establish a group of cavalry, which he sets aside for this purpose, to repel [the enemy] away from the army. If he has not done this, he should choose horsemen from the left flank to frustrate them and prevent them from [succeeding] in this action.

[The experts] say that it is incumbent upon those who go out against the enemy that they do not retreat except at the command of the commander of the army, and that they do not proceed beyond the limit set by him for them, because he knows better what he is directing them toward. In these circumstances, he is like the physician for the sick.

If night covers them and battle has not abated, it is necessary that the infantry and cavalry do not leave battle-stations until their enemy retires from the battle; after which they should retire [to their encampment] in their rankings according to their battle-array, one [ranking] after the other. In this circumstance, cautiousness against sudden attack by the enemy and the entrance of his spies is necessary.

When the men have entered their stations [in the camp], the cavalry officers retire to their posts. They close up the entrance-ways over the trenches. The night patrols and the [detailed] officers go round about with the corps commanders, ru'asā al-ajnād, [visiting those] on watch duty until morning arrives.

If the rankings are arrayed for battle, and night descends and there is no escape from passing the night [in battle formation], the ranks of the left flank should bend towards the middle part of the center and the
edge of the right flank should bend until it is linked to the left flank. The [entire] army will wheel about, the baggage being at this time in the middle [of the formation] and the cavalrmen will surround it. In the darkness before the dawn they [all] return to their regular positions.

There should be shrewd men on all sides of the army who can look upon the faces of people and scrutinize them. He who sees a suspicious person, or imagines one to be such, should seize him and inquire about his business. The nature of a suspicious person is apparent from his face, and the shrewd men, those skilled in physiognomy, will know him as such. If he doubts the outward appearance of a person, and moves to arrest him, he should be wary of him at this moment, for perhaps [the suspect] thinks himself able to kill and hastens towards killing the one who had seized him in order to save himself or to take vengeance before being slain [himself]. Similarly, it is necessary to control those who have sought safe-conduct, al-musta'min, and [any] captives and to bind them after the terms given them have been fulfilled. 6

Know that the conditions of war do not run according to a single plan but vary and change, and perhaps the commander of the army or some of his deputies, having disposed of a matter [in a certain way,] find that circumstances call for another method. He must do at that time what his opinion thinks necessary and his judgment will lead him to it.

It has been related that a fleet of ships, ufrāšah min marākib, of the Franks sought [to capture] the city of Sabta (Ceuta) in the lands of the Maghrib. An opposing force went out to engage it and a great battle ensued between them. Victory went finally to the Muslims. The Christians raised the sails of their ships and sailed away. But one large ship was delayed because of the difficulty in maneuvering it.

(5) This is probably the formation known as al-kurah; for sources see Book XVI note 4 supra.

(6) For the treatment of spies and prisoners and those bearing safe-conduct rights, see Khaddûrî, op. cit., pp. 106-108 and 1163-169.

(7) The origin or meaning of this word could not be ascertained from any standard lexicographical source. It was not included in the most comprehensive study of Mediterranean naval terminology: Henry and Renée Kahane and Andreas Tietze, The Lingua Franca in the Levant (Urbanat 1958).
The archers of the Muslims gathered to do battle against it. [The Franks] shielded it with leather shields and cuirasses. One of the Muslim shaykhs called out to the archers, "Look you to the rope of the Christians. Shoot at it." They did and the arrows became entangled in it and its flow through the pulleys was stopped, because of the arrows entangled in it. The Muslims overtook [the ship] and captured it.  

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(8) The source of this story was not discovered. The Portuguese captured the city in 818/1415. Before that the Genoese had helped to blockade the city at the instigation of the Mawlaheid, al-Rashid, who reigned from 630 to 640/1232-1242. Between 708-716/1308-1316, Jaime of Aragon lent over fifty ships and a number of cavalry to the local ruler of Safat to use against a variety of pretenders; see article "Geuta", EI, vol. I, pp. 836-838. For the later attempts of the Aragonese, in league with the Catalans, to wrest the littoral opposite Gibraltar, see J.A. Robson, "The Catalan Fleet and Moorish Sea-power", English Historical Review, LXXIV, no. 292 (July 1959), pp. 386-408.
BOOK EIGHTEEN: about what should be done while putting the enemy to rout. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One: about that which is related to the completion of the battle when the enemy has been routed.

The managers of the affairs of war said that when the rout of the enemy and his flight are certain, following them and riding in their footsteps, taking up this matter with haste and diligence, are mandatory before they (i.e., the enemy) are able to close their ranks and reassemble their divided cavalry. [It should be done] with caution against ambush and vigilance against its eventuality. It may be that the apparent rout of the enemy is a stratagem or trick similar to that which has been discussed; whereas a real routing can hardly be concealed from the vigilant; yet it may be concealed even from [the vigilant] because of the running out of luck.

Should it prove to be a thorough rout, [the commander] must detail the right flank and the left flank only to seek the enemy. The commander of the army and his banners should be in the center, the standards unfurled, going forward at a gentle pace, little by little. When he arrives at a place in which he prefers to halt, those with him of the center should halt, while the right and left flanks continue [further on] to seek the enemy, but only to the degree that they do not become hidden to the sight of the commander of the army. If the cavalry have to be dispatched to hunt them down, it is necessary to have the infantry attack the enemy so that they might divert the enemy’s infantry from hindering the [pursuing] cavalry. If the commander of the army sees this (i.e., the hindering of his cavalry), and if the numerical strength of the enemy after the rout is still feared, the commander of the center (obviously the commander of the army himself who is with the center group) orders the men of the right and left flanks to march (retreat) towards him but without exposing their backs; rather their retreat should be in a swerving motion, moving in a deviating fashion with their chests in the direction of the enemy, as has been discussed.

Among that which attentiveness requires concerning those put to rout of the enemy is that no man of the army should attempt to get in front of them, nor should they be shunted from their path of flight, nor should they be denied access to water if they seek it. Verily, the routed warrior, when his destruction is apparent to him, attacks with his full strength, fighting a strong battle, in order to purchase his safety. Rather,
immediate fears should be dispelled from them; then they may be surrounded, so that they can be seized from all sides. In general, standing in the direct path of a routed warrior is not sagacious.

Chapter Two: about that which is related to the matter of booty.

Among that which should be considered first in this matter is that, if the rout of the enemy actually happens, the men of the army should not divert from the matter of the battle to seek plunder and booty. If the rout be a true one, the booty will not escape them; if it be a trick of the enemy, it may lead to some villainy which will overtake the army on the heels of the trick. An example of this occurred to the Companions of the Prophet, the blessing of God upon them, all of them, in the raid on Uhud. God had reproved them about this matter: and it concerned the Prophet's ordering some archers to guard a certain place; appointing them to it especially. When the rout of the polytheists had taken place, those archers, whom the Prophet had ordered to protect that place, hastened to the plunder. A great misfortune befell the Muslims because of this. God sent down [the following verses] because of this [defection]: "... after He had shown you [what] you longed for. Some of you there are that desire this world, and some of you there are that desire the next world." (3:152)¹

The division of booty is mentioned in the books of jurisprudence, fiqh. For he who is concerned with the matter in this place [suffice it to say] that the madhhab of al-Shafi'i, the blessing of God upon him, holds that the infantryman be awarded one portion and the cavalryman three portions, for the horse in this matter is equal to two portions; and that the madhhab of Abū Ḥanīfah, the blessing of God upon him, holds that the infantryman be awarded one portion and the cavalryman two portions — here the horse being equal to one portion.² There is no further need to discourse upon the rules of this matter here.

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¹ Guillaume, op. cit., pp. 373-379. In the article "Ohod", EI, vol III, p. 970 f., it is stated that they were to prevent a flank attack by the enemy. Khālid b. Walid, commanding the flank of the Quraysh, noticing their running to plunder, attacked and routed the Muslims.

² A complete discussion of this difference in awarding booty will be found in Khadurri, op. cit., pp. 118-123. For the origin of the distinction between the two methods, see Joseph Schacht, Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: 1953), p. 108 f. and 205.
BOOK NINETEEN: about the description of the practice of taking fortresses and the method of accomplishing this. In it are three chapters.

Chapter One: citation of the types of fortresses and that which each one of them needs of special treatment in order to capture it.

Know that “fortresses”, al-ḥuṣān, in the language refers to anything in which a fortifier entrenches himself, such as citadels and walled cities and mountain forts and trenches and caves and subterranean caverns and thickets of trees and reedbeds and upon the waters and beaches and similar phenomena. For each of these there is a special method for investing and capturing. There may be gathered in any one fortified place a number of the familiar types, such as a citadel on a hill in the interior of a walled city, and about the latter a circumferencing moat; and in the fortress there may be subterranean caverns for concealment and such things. Each of these types requires operations special to its [proper] functioning and management to the degree that its nature demands.

And among them are [types] which call for procrastination and endurance and building of fortifications against them and remaining to besiege them for a prolonged period, such as walled cities and citadels filled with provisions and engines of war. Others for which the merest trick and a few days [of siege] suffice. And between these types of strength are various categories of conditions. Each of them needs special war engines and proper management for investing and offense.

Chapter Two: a description of the method of facilitating the capture of fortified places.

The men of exploits, relative to this matter of the most profitable of actions in the capturing of fortified places according to their differentiation, said that the commander of the army should arrive before [the fortress] at a time of inattentiveness on the part of its inhabitants; and if it chance that this takes place when the gates are open, it will be most opportune. This good fortune happened to al-Malik al-Zāhir Baybars al-Bunduqdārī, may God have mercy upon him, in capturing the city of Anṭākiyāh (Antioch) in the region of Ḥalab (Aleppo). Its conquest
was among the easiest of conquests in spite of its impregnability. 1

When this (i.e., the gates being open) does not happen, then a trick will accomplish the submission of those who are in the fortress and their entering into obedience. Or gaining the assent of those who are amenable among them, so that they will be an aid against the others before the melee, will be preferable. If [the commander of the army] finds no one who will convey this report to them, he should write letters aiming at the stirring up of sedition among them such that it is apparent that some [of those] in the fortress are with him [in secret]. These [letters] he places on arrows and shoots them into the fortress.

He should make apparent to the people within the fortress [his guarantee] of justice and faithfulness, the continuing bounty and respect for those who would descend to him and [the promise] of kind treatment for them. If he should gain a reputation [for these qualities] and it is confirmed by him, it will quicken their submission to him and make more conducive their entering into obedience to him. If they seek safe-conduct, he should bestow it upon them.

If there comes out to him from among them one who seeks safe-conduct, he should give him gifts, out of piety, as he is able to do with caution without letting him feel this [caution]. Should a criminal come out to him, he should quiet his fears and promise him every benefit. If he is able to attract the close associates of the commander of the fortress, so that they would turn against [the latter] or save [him the trouble of dealing with the commander], this would be among the most beneficial actions [in] capturing [the fortress] and among the most important.

If their obedience and submission are not secured, he should attempt a trick which will bring about the sallying forth of the people within

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the fortress to battle, such that they are emboldened to defeat him; or to turn away from them, or to seem to be departing from them, so that they will come forth in pursuit of the army. If they do come out, and [the commander of the army] can elude them and enter the fortress suddenly, this would be most helpful in gaining the objective.²

Chapter Three: about the method of investment.

People experienced in the investment [of fortified places] say that the first of the things done in the action of investment is that one’s men, from the moment of their alighting, surround them (i.e., the people in the fortress) so that no one of them is able to leave and no one can enter to them; nor can they hear from anyone a single word, nor can they see from anyone a sign (or signal), nor can the shooting of an arrow reach them. It may be that a report about the army can reach them by word of mouth had they been able to hear the speech of anyone; or one might make a signal to them about the army which they would understand, or one might write them a letter and place it on an arrow and shoot it to them, thus causing them to take caution [on the basis of any one report relayed to them by these methods].³

Great care must be taken about their messengers, and the commander should not entrust a single one of his army to approach them except those who are conversant with diplomatic exchange, its forms and its techniques. Care [too] should be taken that no one of them (i.e., the enemy’s messengers) should gain a single word or more than this. A single word can open a door fastened against evil.

One’s emissary to those [within the fortress] should be from among those whose counsel and piety and integrity and sound management are trusted.

[The commander of the army] should know the conditions of the fortress, the inaccessible places and those with ease of access; the impossible and the possible places for [military] action; the positions of the fording-places and caves, of the pontoon and vaulted bridges which he must cross to reach the place he chooses from among [the possible] positions [of entrance] to the fortress. Further, he should know the positions for mining [the walls] and for scaling ropes, siege ladders

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³ Cf., ibid., for other ruses by which information is gotten into and out of a place under siege.
and grappling irons.\textsuperscript{4} Similarly [he should be conversant] with the erection of mansonels and the directing of the stones used in them; of the positions for the archers, the slings and the naptha-throwers, and of the method of operating these machines and using them. He who has erected them for battling against the fortress should place them in a position which enemy [fire] cannot attain. In this matter, he should do the most convenient things first.

[ The commander of the army ] must assemble all types of warriors and workmen, that which he requires of iron and wood and similar materials, and the craftsmen of all engines related to war. These craftsmen should begin the construction of the machines and armaments. [The commander] should not-neglect this matter or delay it, and the construction of these should be apparent to the people within the fortress. It should not be concealed, because, by doing it [openly], fright and terror and weakening of their hearts occur.\textsuperscript{5}

He should also supervise the raising of the mansonels and their firing, for by so doing dread is visited upon the people of the fortress. Whenever an opportunity presents itself [to use the mansonels], he should seize it and he should hasten to do so, without warning the people in the fortress before doing so. In delay is respite for them and their taking to arms and the consolidation of opinion amongst them; such delay merely benefits the objective of the enemy [within] and that which redounds to his interest. Verily, for every thing there is a right time; to exceed it is to lessen its degree of usefulness.

When the investment is under way, there should be no pause in the discharging of the mansonels against them, and there should be no abating [of the amount of mansonel fire] in any hour of the day or night. To desist in attack against them is among that which cools their fright and strengthens their hearts.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir mentions that one of Baybars’ enemies had recourse to what the translator calls “iron pegs,” \textit{sikak hadid}, for scaling the walls; \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{txt.}, p. 121 and \textit{tr.}, p. 239.

\textsuperscript{5} Cf. Machiavelli, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 257.

"The besieger[s]... should endeavor by all means to appear as powerful and as formidable as they can, and take every opportunity of making the most ostentatious display of their strength ..."
And when the armed attack takes place, it is necessary that [the men of the army] fight with the most convenient [of arms] first and then the next most convenient, delaying the use of the largest of the machines [of war] to the last of those [implements] which they employ in attacking. [In this manner] it becomes apparent to the people in the fortress that each [successive] implement is a little more powerful than the preceding one. [This procedure is employed] except when necessity calls for beginning [the investment] with the most powerful weapon; then the commander begins with this one.

If the people of the fortress opt for a strong initial action of attack, [the commander of the army] should counter their design and handle them by procrastinating [in engaging them in quick battle], because they would not have opted for quick action unless they had been disquieted. And if they opt for procrastination, he should treat them to quick attack, though procrastination in war is the chief stratagem, and it is the one which requires cool resolution. In general, the foundation of battle is opposition to the design of the enemy.

And among the most laudable actions is that the commander of the army or one of his army whom he deputized should circumambulate the fortress every day or two, consulting the people of judgment on the matter of its capture or about the work [to be done] in taking it. This will frighten [those within].

It must also be stressed that the besieger of the enemy is also besieged in the sense that he is not secure from their going out against him and their hastening to do so when the opportunity, during the day or night, presents itself to them; for they desire victory as much as the besieger desires it over them. Hence it is incumbent upon the commander to be cautious with respect to himself and those of the army with him as much as possible. He should use trenches if there is need of them, and their construction is possible; for this is among the strongest [factors] of resolution and conquest.

And he should put, at the distance of an arrow-shot from the gate of the fortress, some cavalrymen, posted about [this position], who will observe those who leave it; thus they will be in the position of scouts for the army. When they see someone leave the fortress, they will hasten to become informed about him, so that the soldiers of the army can take care of him, or some of their own number will offer opposition to him.
When the besieger of a fortress accomplishes its capture and gains mastery over it, the aims of rulers have varied about [the matter of the fortress' future]. Some insist upon destroying and demolishing the fortress, so that it cannot become a refuge for that one among the enemy who would fortify it another time. Thus the Turkish rulers (i.e., the Mamlûks) destroyed the cities of the coast of Syria, such as Şûr (Ture), 'Akkâ (Acre) and 'Asqalân and others of the leading cities,\(^6\) fearing that the Franks would gain possession of them and refortify themselves within them. This was the method also of the Tartar rulers, such as Hûlûkû and Ghâzân and those after them.\(^7\) They had demolished many of the cities and fortresses, some whose rebuilding ensued, and some which remained as they were. Other rulers did not desire the razing of the fortresses, because the object in building up the land is not its destruction; for the king who rules over that which he demolished among the fortresses will need to build them anew. This entails the extreme of difficulty and expense.

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\(^{(6)}\) Baybars razed the walls of Antioch and Tripoli; and Jerusalem lost her walls sometime after the battle of Hîtjûn. The latter were rebuilt by the Ottoman Sultan Sulayman in the latter half of the 10th/16th century. See appropriate articles on the cities named in the text and those others in *EI*, and the discussion of the fates of the Frankish strongholds captured by the Muslims in Runciman, *op. cit.*, vol. II and III, *passim*.

\(^{(7)}\) Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir gives a sample of the destruction of the Mongols in Syria by the armies of Hûlûkû, *op. cit.*, text, p. 31 and tr., p. 117 f.:

"When the Mongols (may God defeat them) occupied Syria, they began to destroy the forts and walls. They demolished the walls of the fort of Damascus, and the forts of Salt, 'Ajlûn, Şarkhad, Buṣra, Ba'ålbak, Subaibah, Sha'izar and Shumaimis. When the sultan took charge of affairs and God established him as the support of the Faith, he took an interest in the reconstruction of these forts and the completion of the destroyed buildings, because these were the strongholds of Islam. All these were repaired during his time; their fosses were cleared out, the flanks of their walls were broadened, equipment was transported to them, and he sent mamlûks and soldiers to them." It is Sultan Baybars who is referred to here.
BOOK TWENTY: a description of the method of the defense of fortified places and of their protection. In it are two chapters.

Chapter One: about that which the commander of the fortified place must do by way of preparing for the attack of the enemy before the investment of the fortress.

Men of exploits, investigators of this matter say that the first thing which the commander of a fortress needs to do vis-a-vis its condition of security before the enemy falls upon it unexpectedly is to strengthen its fortification and assign positions to its defenders, and to see that it has a sufficiency of men and of all war implements and equipment for a long siege and for vexing the enemy during the attack. By making apparent the readiness of all this, of that by which the enemy, alighting against the fortress, will know that the commander of the fortress is alert against him who attacks it, he will be ready for the siege. This will be a reason for [the enemy's] retiring from the siege and his returning [to his own country].

Among the matters of caution which [the commander of the fortress] should oversee is its unceasing readiness for the enemy at all times; for, if the enemy aims at him, he should find him ready. Neither should he be remiss about any of the matters of defense against the enemy in the period before the investment, nor in any detail of operation and management lest there be involved some weakness or defect. He who delays doing a thing or misses the proper time [for doing it] can reproach no one but himself.

One thing which dashes the hopes of one who seeks to take the fortress is what he sees of the maintenance of precaution. Among the most important matters relative to the incipient investment is the presence of [sufficient] water and food and those necessities which benefit the besieged group. The presence of these favors procrastination which will vex the enemy, and it may be a reason for his retiring.

Chapter Two: about that which the commander of the fortress must do at the time of the actual investment.

[The experts] said that the first thing a besieged [commander]
must do is to exhort his companions-in-arms to constancy, informing
them of all the rewards of patience, warning them about the enemy and
that which they will receive at his hands should he conquer them;
promising them every good upon their victory and the retirement of
the enemy from against them; with safety for themselves and their wealth,
to the amount which would satisfy their souls and enlarge their
hopes.

He should know the extent of his enemy's arming and the extent of
his injury, so that his actions will be relative to these amounts; for he
who knows the extent of that which is with his adversary, builds his
power relative to the certainty of what he knows. He should employ
those machines which counter the operation of the adversary and
defend the fortress, and which abrogate [the effect] of the enemy's
machines. He should not use any arms or projectiles other than those
he is confident will injure the enemy; for, the weapon, when it has
gone from the hand of its wielder, without effecting thereby any injury
to his enemy, has lost its use to the wielder, notwithstanding his urgent
need of it. Perhaps the enemy may gain it and make it part of his
battery against the one who threw it in the first place.

[The commander of the fortress] should not indulge in rushing the
enemy and sallying forth to battle except out of necessity and the need
to defend himself; nor should he engage in battle so long as he has
resort to trickery and stratagem. He must have recourse to procras-
tination and [other means of] defense. If the investment continues,
he must seize the day and the hour and the moment to effect the stra-
tagem prepared [against the enemy], and be aware of the happenings
of the time and whatever relief comes forward. The Verified
Truthful One, [The Prophet], has recounted that victory is with the
patient.

In general, it is necessary that [the commander of the fortress]
possess the hearts of the common people through justice and bene-
cficence; for the reach of the desire of the common people is for naught
but these. He who practices justice and good works, his subjects will
be among the most sincere of his soldiers, because of the tranquility of
their hearts towards him. They may hold fast to their places when the
army of the ruler is absent from them until the coming of one whom the ruler deputizes from among the trustworthy for this [duty of defense].

1 But God knows best.

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1 This book and the preceding one should be compared to the analogous discussion in Machiavelli, *op. cit.*, Book VII, *passim*. However, his discussion makes more of the besieged condition than of the reverse. The concluding sections of Machiavelli's discussion are given over to some general apothegms on military discipline and theory, and both in tone and motive, they read very much like the relevant sections of the *Tafrij al-kurāb*. Both works partake of what might be called the "classical" attitude to war, and the disjunction between the theoretical exposition and the practical application of these rather "bookish" theorems remains to be clarified.
A PRELIMINARY GLOSSARY OF MUSLIM
MILITARY TERMS

امعذ, عربة

mace; war-club.
cart drawn by animals to carry arquebusiers and light artillery.
cavalry officers.

الخيت

ranks of the Mamlûk commands:
1) muqaddam or amîr al-alf: commander of up to 1000 horsemen in ranks of 100 each.
2) amîr al-ṭablîkhânah: commander of up to 80 horsemen.
3) amîr al-ṭarîkh: commander of 10, or sometimes as many as 20 horsemen.
4) amîr al-khamisah: commander of 5 horsemen.
5) al-mamālik al-sulṭāniyyah or aṭṣam al-ajnâd: the royal mamlûks; those nearest the Sultân.
6) ajnâd al-ḥalqah: non-Mamlûk cavalry.
a type of mangonel used for casting stones long distances.
battle-field.
a small machine for throwing stones, inflammables and other missiles.
army; or as ʿaskarī, soldier.
an army of 16,384 soldiers.
night patrol.

اطفال

baggage; materiel.
one who shoots stones from slings.
battle-axe.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>بارود</td>
<td>gunpowder; inflammables.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بیاده</td>
<td>foot soldier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بیات</td>
<td>night raiding or night-attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بیطرة</td>
<td>veterinary science.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بندق</td>
<td>bullet or pellet; later forms:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bunūd</td>
<td>1) bunduqiyah : hand gun, rifle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>burj</td>
<td>2) bunduq al raṣās : arquebus.</td>
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<tr>
<td>burj mutaḥarrik</td>
<td>3) qaws bunduq : arquebus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دبابة</td>
<td>(sing. band ḏah) lance-exercises; jousting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دبب</td>
<td>siege-tower of wood, covered with iron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and leather sheets.</td>
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<tr>
<td>دبوب</td>
<td>testudo; “rat”, i. e., a structure designed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to protect troops manning the ramming</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>devices.</td>
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<tr>
<td>دبب</td>
<td>mace, club, cudgel.</td>
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<tr>
<td>دبداب</td>
<td>small war drum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ضرب</td>
<td>siege-machine; testudo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دالاتي</td>
<td>light, swift troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دراة</td>
<td>leather shield.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دراجة</td>
<td>cavalry guard placed beyond the</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>encampment; upon discovering any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trouble, such as from probable ambushes,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>they shout to alarm the camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ديدان</td>
<td>roving scout for an ambush party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دربع</td>
<td>breast plate or coat of mail; used inter-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>changeably with its plural, dira’ دراع .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>فصيلة</td>
<td>smallest unit of infantry or cavalry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>شبل</td>
<td>an armed body of 5,000 men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>نابل</td>
<td>battle-cavalry; “heavy cavalry” (?).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>تعسان العرب</td>
<td>man responsible for the missiles used in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the mandonels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>حجار</td>
<td>short spear; comparable to the “pilum”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of the Greeks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>حربية</td>
<td>grappling iron; as hasak al-muthallathāt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>حساك - حِساكة</td>
<td>three-pronged caltrops for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>حساك or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>حساك</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
hilāli
inqlāb
iṣbāhbad or iṣbāhbadh
ja’bāh
jābhānāh
jāfīl
jāmikiyah
jawīsh
jawshan
jaysh
jīr or jāsīr
jurkh
kabkabah
kabsh
kāmin or kāminah
kashshāfah
katībah
khamīs
al-khayl
al-muqawwimah

keeping off cavalry, made into the shape of a prickly plant; made of wood with an iron tip having three or six points. crescent-shaped battle formation.

retreating in order to flee the battlefield.
cavalry commander, or, sometimes, the commander of the army. quiver.
magazine for arms and ammunition.
division of the army containing 256 men.
military pay and/or allowances in the Mamlūk period.
foot soldiers.
coat of mail; or protective covering made of leather or iron or hair.
division of the army containing 4096 men; or the army as a whole in more common usage.

bridge, embankment, pontoon, dam.

arbalest for shooting arrows and inflammables; the general sense of an instrument for projectiles.

division of the army containing 512 men
battering ram.

ambush.
scout, scouting party.
squadron; detachment of cavalry; a group of foot soldiers numbering between 500 and 800 men.

classical Arabic battle-formation; a division of the army containing 8,192 men.
supporting or reserve cavalry; in num-
bers matching those they are replacing.
khifāf anjād  lightly armed troops, probably cavalry-men.
khūdah  helmet.
khattāf or khatīf  grapnel or iron hook; used for scaling fortress walls or bringing an enemy ship alongside for boarding.
kinānah  leather quiver.
kullab  pot-hook; spur; talon of a hawk; thorns of a tree; "grappling-iron".
kulutah  "kulota"; head covering worn by the amīrs and soldiers of the Ayyūbid armies, and in the period of Qalāwūn; angular cap wadded with cotton.
kurah  circular battle formation.
kurdūs  a division of the army containing 128 men; a squadron of cavalry; cohort.
kūs  kettle-drum.
lāmat al-ḥarb  coat of mail.
lajm  bit or bridle.
liwāʾ  standard; flag; banner; applied as a name to a brigade of infantry or cavalry. Cf. rāyak, bandā dirafs درفس عم عقاب 'al'am عقاب
manjanīq  mangonel, ballista; machine for casting missiles.
masbak  foundry for cannon.
maymanah  right flank.
maysarah  left flank.
mīdufāʾ  cannon; other names, mostly short-lived:
mukhulat al-naftī.
ṣawāʾiq al-naftī.
ṣawārinkh al-naftī.
ālāt al-naftī.
hindam al-naftī.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>مغفار</td>
<td>helmet; head covering worn under the helmet; a protection for face and neck during battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مقلع</td>
<td>sling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مجناب</td>
<td>division of the army containing 64 men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مسراق</td>
<td>javelin; demi-lance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>معيين</td>
<td>rhomboid or diamond-shaped battle formation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مبندق</td>
<td>arquebusier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مبارز</td>
<td>duellist; one engaged in single combat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مماثة</td>
<td>red-hot molten iron used in bullets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مجنح</td>
<td>winged battle formation with center bending inward.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مكللة</td>
<td>culverin; used interchangeably with <strong>mida</strong> for cannon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مقدم</td>
<td>general; commanding officer of unit of the army, e.g., scouting party, vanguard etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مربع</td>
<td>quadrangular battle formation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مصاف للقتال</td>
<td>battle ranking; mobilization for battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مشبَّه</td>
<td>infantryman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مستطيل</td>
<td>wedge-shaped battle formation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مثلاطة</td>
<td>three-pronged piece put on the top of poles, then stuck in the ground so as to deter cavalry charges near the trenches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>نبلة</td>
<td>arrow, more generally employed in the plural, <strong>nibāl</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>نصير</td>
<td>brazen trumpet; fife or flute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>نفط</td>
<td>naptha, “Greek-fire”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>نعل</td>
<td>horse-shoe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>نقوب أو نقوب</td>
<td>mining. Cf. <strong>lajhm</strong> and/or <strong>lighām</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>نشاب أو نشابة</td>
<td>arrow or arrows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>قذاف</td>
<td>catapult, ballista; engine for throwing stones or darts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>قنَع</td>
<td>siege-machine; type of testudo made of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
wood under which the infantrymen approach the walls of a fortress.
movement backwards; fighting while retreating.
senior officer; deputy of the commander.
vaulted bridge; barrage.
war-engine; "throwing-machine".
bow.
bomb; shell; container of naptha and other explosives; fire-pot.
captain of a troop.
a file of 16 armed or 8 unarmed soldiers.
standard-bearer; flag-officer or flag-commander.
arrows.
rear guard of the army.
a kind of armament for the horse’s head.
saddle.
swift horses; race horses trained for scouting.
garment worn under a coat of mail.
sign, signal, military pass-word, insignia.
curtain or thick net covering siege machine to protect the warriors within.
siege ladder.
war trumpet; clarion; horn.
battle-axe.
mobilization for battle; ranking an army in proper positions for battle.
war-drum; generally sounded for mobilization and in times of stress from the roof of the tabikhānah adjacent to the Citadel in Cairo.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tahlilah</td>
<td>withdrawing from one's opponent in single combat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tā'ifah</td>
<td>division of the army containing 2,048 men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tajfāf</td>
<td>breast-plate or coat of mail for the cavalryman; or, alternatively, placed upon the horse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ta'liq</td>
<td>scout, scouting party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ta'llāh</td>
<td>scaling or grappling with regard to the walls of a fortress. (It is not clear whether the word refers to the action itself or the devices by which the act is accomplished.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taqāṭir</td>
<td>proper filing of the battle rankings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tarīqah</td>
<td>cuirass.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tasarīḥ</td>
<td>disengagement from battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tisḥah</td>
<td>battle-axe or halbert.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tūb or tūbah</td>
<td>cannon; artillery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tufakji</td>
<td>soldier armed with a rifle or arquebus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'ūsbah</td>
<td>two files of armed, or four files of unarmed men: a total of 32 men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wardyān</td>
<td>a guard; a look-out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zabtānah</td>
<td>a weapon shooting small pellets and used in hunting; later becomes another word for arquebus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zaghfah</td>
<td>breast-plate of either metal or leather; a long coat of mail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zāhāfah</td>
<td>siege-machine manned by arbaletiers; rolled against the walls of a fortress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zānbūrak</td>
<td>cross-bow, arbalet; subsequently a small gun carried on the back of a camel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zaqāziq</td>
<td>iron-tipped staves placed about the trench of an encampment. Cf. muthal-lathah (مثالثة).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
zard or zarad  coat of mail.
zardkhānah  Royal Arsenal in Mamlūk usage.
zāriq  javelin; demi-spear.
zarrāq  naptha-thrower; in early times inflammables were attached to short spears or javelins called zarrāqah (زرآقة).
ziyārah or ziyyār  a type of bow; arbalet.
zu'mrah  division of the army containing 1,024 men.
ويتظر حوادث الزمان وما يقع من الفرج. وقد أخبر الصادق المصدوق صل الله عليه وسلم إن النصر مع الصبر، وبالحملة فإنه يجب عليه أن يملك قلوب الرعية بالعدل والإحسان؛ فإنه ليس غاية مراذ الرعية إلا ذلك. ومن عاني (13) العدل والإحسان كانت رعيته من أصح الحدود هامطنين قلوبهم إليه، ورما ضبطوا مكانهم (14) إذا غاب عنهم جند الملك إلى حين حضور من يثق به الملك من المندوبين لذلك.

وallah أعلم.
الفصل الثاني: فيما يجب على صاحب الخصين فعله حالة (3) الخصار.

قد قالوا إنه أول ما ينعتبر أن يبدأ به الخشور هو حض (5) أصبهاء على النبات وإعلامهم [بجميع عواقب (6) الصبر] وتحذيرهم من العدو وما يلقونه منه إن ظفر بهم، واللعد بكل خير عند نصرتهم وانصرف العدو عليهم، مع سلامة أنفسهم وأموالهم، إلى غير ذلك مما تمكن إليه نفوذهم، ويفصح مالهم.

وعليه أن يعرف منتهى سلاح العدو و مدى نكايته ليكون عمله على قدر ذلك؛ لأن من علم غاية ما عند خصمته بئ (7) أمره على يمين ما علم. وعليه أن يستعمل من الآلات ما فيه إفساد لعمل الخصم، ودفع عن الخصن، وإبطال لآلات العدو. وأن لا يستعمل من السلاح ولا يرى إلا بما يؤكر (8) بنكايته، لأن السلاح إذا خرج عن صاحبه، ولم يقع نكايته به في العدو، فقد عده الرامي به من غير نفع مع شدة الاحتياج إليه، ورماه ظفر به العدو قصيره عدة له على من رأى به أولا.

وعليه أن لا ينامض العدو ولا ينافيه للقتال (9) إلا عند الضرورة والحاجة (10) إلى الدفاع عن نفسه، ولا يقاتل ما وجد إلى الخيلة والحديبة سبلا، وعليه بالمطاولة والدفاع. وإن دام الخصار يغتم (11) اليوم والساعة واللحظة لتهيأ له الخيلة.
الباب الثاني

في بيان كيفية المدافعة عن الحصون وحفظها
وفي فصلان

الفصل الأول: فيما يجب على صاحب الحصن من الاعتاد لحرب العدو قبل طرق الحصن.

قال أهل التجربة والبحث عن هذا الشأن: أول ما يحتاج إليه صاحب الحصن في حال أمهته قبل أن يواجه العدو أن يكون قد حصن حصنه وأحكم مواضع القاتلة، وأن يكون مشحوناً بالرجال و بكل آلة و عدة تعين على طول الحصار و تنكر (١) في العدو و عند المناهضة؛ فإن في ظهور الاستعداد بذلك ما يعلم به العدو النازل على الحصن أن صاحبه متيقظ من ورد عليه مستعداً له، فيكون سبياً لاحتجازه ورجوعه عنه.

ومن شأن الحاكم أنه (٢) لا يزال متوقعاً للعدو في كل وقت؛ فإن قصدت العدو وجده مستعداً. وعليه أن لا يقصر في شيء من أمور مدافعة العدو في وقت من الأوقات قبل الحصار، ولا في شيء من عمه و تدبيره إلا أن يكون عليه في ذلك و هن و أخال. فإن من أضاع شيئاً في وقته أو أخره عنه فليس الملوم سواء.

وما يزيل طمع الطالب ما يراه من دوام الاحترار. ومن أجل ما يستعان

(١) ينكر في ف.  (٢) في ف.
صورة عكا وعطلان وغيرهما من المدن العظام خشية أن يملكها الفرنج فتتحصن به. وهذه كانت طريقة ملوك النّتر (38) من هولاكو وغازي (39) فن بعدهم. فقد خربوا (40) كثيراً من المدن والحصن، منها ما أعيدت عمارته، ومنها ما بقي على ذلك. ومن الملك من لا يرى تخريب الحصن لأن المقصود عمارة الأرض لا خرابها. وقد يملك الملك ما خربه من الحصن فيحتاج إلى عمارته ثانية، فبقى ذلك في غاية المشقة والكلفة.
 وأن المال (١٧) أهل الحصن إلى المanjaزة في القتال عاكمهم في مراهم، وأخذهم بالمالطة، لأنهم لم يميلوا إلى المanjaزة إلا وقد أخذهم الصحرى. وإن مالوا إلى المطالبة أخذتهم بالمانجازة، على أن المطالبة في الحرب هي رأس المكيدة، وهو الذي يقضبه الحرم. وباجملة فبني (٢٨) الحرب على عائفة غرض العدو.

ومن محسن الخصارة أن يطفف صاحب الجيش أو من يسيطره من عسكره في كل يوم أو يومين بالحصن، ويظهر لأهل (٢٩) الإجبار في أمر فتحه والعقل في أخذه، فإن في (٣٠) ذلك إرهاباً لهم.

وأما ينبغي أن ينهى (٣١) له أن الخصارة للعدو هو محصور أيضاً (٣٢) في المعرة (٣٣) لأنه لا يأمن خروجهم عليه ومناجزتهم له منتكمهم الفرصة في ليل أو نهار، لأنهم يرون الظرف كما يرون الخصارة لهم. في ينبغي أن يجبز على نفسه ومن معه من العسكر ما أمكنه، ويتخذ الخناصق إن احتاج إليها وأمكنه عملهم، فإن ذلك من أشد الحرب والاستطيار.

وأن يجعل على قدر رمية منهم من باب الحصن فسناً مراطة له، منتظرين من يخرج منه ليكونوا بمثابة الطالع للعسكر، فإذا رأوا أحداً خرج من الحصن بادروا بالإعلام به ليلاقيه (٣٤) العسكر، أو من يقادرون منهم.

وإذا ظهر الخصارة للحصن به واستولى، فقد اختلفت مقاومة الملك في ذلك؛ فبينهم من يرى بهدهم (٣٥) الخصاوة، وفيه تجربي لا يكون منلجاً لن يتحصن به [من العدو مرة أخرى] (٣٦). ولذلك هدد ملوك الترک مدن سواحل الشام من

النaming

٢٨ (٢٨) فني في ف.
٣٠ (٣٠) دافع في.
٣٢ (٣٢) دافع في.
٣٤ (٣٤) مابين الخصاصين دافع في.
٣٦ (٣٦) ما بين الخصاصين دافع في.
ما يختار من أماكن الحصن، ومواضع النقوب والتعليق ونصب السلام والكلاليب [وكم كذلك نسب] (20) المجنانق والحجارة المناسبة لها، ومواضع رمي النشاب والمقالع والنافذ، وكيفية استعمال ذلك والعمل به، بعد أن يضع من نصبه لقتال (21) الحصن في مكان لاسيما للعدو عليه، ويفعل من (22) ذلك الأنساب بالأنساب (23).

وعليه أن يعد من أصناف المقاتلة والصناع كل ما يحتاج إليه من الحديد والخشب ونحوها، وصنع (24) كل آلة تتعلق بالحرب، وتأخذ الصناع بعمل الآلات والسلاح، ولا يهم ذلك ولا يؤخره، ويظهر عمل ذلك لأهل الحصن ولا يخفى؛ فإن في ذلك إباحة لم، وتحvenience وإضاءة لقلوبهم.

ويجعل بنصب المجنانق والرمي بها؛ فإن لها على أهل الحصن روعة. ومهمها أمكنه ابتعاز الفرصة أن ترها وابذر إليها، ولا يؤخر ذلك مراجعة أهل الحصن; فإن في التأخير راحة لهم، وأخذ الأهلية، وإدارة الرأي بينهم، وذلك من أجل مقاصد العدو وما في مصلحته، وكل شيء وقت حتى تحداه أقدامه بقدر التعدى.

وإذا قع الحصار فلا يرفع عنهم رمي المجنانق، ولا يفتر عنها ساعة واحدة من ليل أو نهار؛ فإن كيف القتال عنهم (ما بعد روعتهم) (25) وقوي قلوبهم.

وإذا قع القتال بالسلاح ينبغي أن يقاتلوه بالأيسر منه فالأيسر، ويؤخر العظم المهل (26) من الآلات إلى آخر ما يقاتلون به لئنهم كل قليل ما هو أقوى من الآخر، إلى أن تدعو الضرورة إلى الابتداء بالأقوي فيبدأ به.

٣٠ (ما بين الخاصرين ذاقب في) (٣١) "قتال" في. (٣٢) "فبالأنسب" في. (٣٣) "جميع" في. (٣٤) "فلو" في. (٣٥) "ما بين الخاصرين وما يروع بروعهم" في. (٣٦) "المهل" في.
 وإن لم يتأت طاعتهم وانخفادهم فإن أمكنت حيلة يتحيل بها على خروج أهل الحصن للقتال، مثل أن يطمهم في الظفر به أو يبيّن به عنهم أو يظهر أنه راحل عنهم ليخرجوا في تبع العسكر؛ فإذا خرجوا راغبهم ودخل الحصن بغتة، كان أعين على المقصود.

الفصل الثالث: في كيفية الحصار.

قال أهل الدرية بالحصار: أول ما يبدأ به(11) من عمل الحصار أن يحصر أهلهم من أول نزولهم حصاراً لا يقدرون معه على أن يخرج منهم أحد، ولا يدخل إلىهم أحد(12) لا يسمعون له كلاماً، ولا ينظرون له إشارة، ولا تبلغ إلىهم رمية سهم. فإنه ربما بلغهم أحد أخبار العسكر مشافهة إن كانوا يسمعون كلمه، أو يشير إليهم إشارة في ذلك يفهمونها(13)، أو يكتب كتاباً ويجعله في سهم ويرى به إليهم فتأخذون حذرهم.

وعليه أن يحترز من رسيلهم، ولا يدع أحداً(14) من عسكره يدنو منهم إلا العلماء بتصاريف الكلام (15) ومصابره وموازاته من يثق به، ويحذر أن يظهر أحد منهم بلفظة ما فوقها، فرب كلمة فتحت باباً مغلقاً من الشر.

ويجب أن يكون رسيله إليهم من(16) يؤذن بنصيحته ودياناته ووفائه وصحة.

تديره.

وعليه أن يعرف أحوال الحصن والمواقع الصعبة والسهيلة والممتنة (17) والمكنة في العمل، ومواقع المخابض (18) والمغاير والجسور والقنطر التي يعبر منها إلى

(11) ناقص في ف.
(12) ناقص في ف.
(13) "يبلغ" في ف.
(14) "يفهمون" في ذ.
(15) "أحد" في ذ.
(16) "الكلام" في ذ.
(17) "من" في ذ.
(18) "الممتن" في ذ.
(19) "المغاس" في ذ.
الفصل الثاني: في بيوان الطريق السهل لفتح الحصون.

قال أحدهم علينا في ذلك: من أنفع الأعمال في فتح الحصون على اختلافها أن يأتيها صاحب الجيش على حين غفلة من أهلها، وإن وافق أن يكون ذلك والأبواب مفتوحة فهو الغالبة في النجاح. وقد وقع ذلك للملك الظاهر بيبرس البندقداري - رحمه الله تعالى - في مدينة أنطاكية من عمل حلب، فكان فتحها من أيسر الفتوح على ما هي عليه من الحصانة.

وإن لم تبدو ذلك فإن أمكنت الحياة في استسلام من في الحصن ودخولهم في الطاعة، أو استياء من أمكن منهم ليكون عونًا على الباقيين قبل المناهضة كان أولى. وإن لم يجد(6) من يوصل الخبر إليهم كتب الكتب بما فيه إثارة الفتنة(1) بينهم مثل أن يظهر أن بعض الحصن معه، ويجعل ذلك في سبيلهم، ويرى به إلى الحصن، نحو ذلك.

وعليه أن يظهر لآخر الحصن العدل والوفاء ودواب الإمامة، ووفرة النازلين إليه والإعتناء بهم؛ فإنه إذا(7) أشتهر ذلك عنه وتحقيق منه كان أسرع لانقيادهم له، وأدعي للدخول في طاعته، وإن طلبا الأمن بهله لم.

وإن خرج إليه منهم مستأتمًا أولاه من البر ما يستطيع مع(8) الحذر منه من غير إشعار له بذلك. وإن وصل إليه أحد من أهل الجرائم طمنهم(9) ووعده كل خير، وإن استطاع استجواب أحساء صاحب الحصن ليرجعوا عنه أو يكفوا مؤتمنه كان ذلك من أوقاف(10) أمور الفتح وأهمها.

(1) تجد في التصنيف.
(2) من في.
(3) ناقص في.
(4) آخاء في.
(5) ناقص في.
(6) ناقص في.
(7) ناقص في.
(8) ناقص في.
(9) ناقص في.
(10) ناقص في.
باب اياض عشر
في بيان ممارسة فتح الحصون وكيفية التوصل إلى ذلك
وفي ثلاثة نصوص
الفصل الأول: في ذكر أنواع الحصون وما يحتاج إليه كل منها في الفتح من العلاج (1).

أعلم أن الحصون في اللغة تطلق على كل ما يحصل عليه المتاح من القلاع، والمنشآت المسورة، والجبال، والخانقان، والمارق، والطيار المخفورة، وغياب (2) الشجر، وآجام القصب، والبحر، والرمال، وغير ذلك. وكل منها حكم يختص فيه (3) في الخاصية والفتح. وقد ينجم في الحصن الواحد عدة من الأصاف المذكورة (4) مثل أن يكون قلعة على جبل في داخل مدينة مسورة، وعلى ذلك خانقان دائرة، وفي الحصن مئامير مخفورة للاحتفاء، ونحو ذلك، فإنه يحتاج كل صنف من ذلك إلى علاج يختص به العمل والتدبير بحسب ما يقتضيه الحال.

ففه ما يحتاج إلى المطالبة والصابرة وبناء الحصون عليه، وإقامة المدة الطويلة كالمنشآت الخصيبة والقلاع المشحونة بالأرواح وآلات الحرب. ومنها ما يكتنف فيه أذى الخيلة والآيات القليلة. وبين هذين القدرين ضروب مختلفة الأحوال، يحتاج في كل واحد منها إلى آلات مخصوصة، وتدبير مناسب في الحصار والمحاربة.

(1) "الفلاع" في.
(2) "غياض" في.
(3) ناقص في.
(4) "مشبور" في.
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وإيجيب عليه أن المنزرين من العدو لا ينبغي أن يستقبلهم أحد من
العسكر في وجههم، وأن لا يردوا عن طريقهم، وأن لا يصداون الماء إذا
طلبهم، فإن المنزرين إذا غلب على ظهيه هلاك حمل بكليته وقائلة الانتخاب الشديد
طلبًا لسلامة نفسه. وإنما ينبغي أن يفرج عنهم، ثم يستدار بهم ليأخذوا من
الجوانب. وبالجملة فالوقف في طريق المنزرين غير ملزم.

الفصل الثاني: فيما يتعلق بأمر الغنية.

وأما يجب تقدمه (١) على ذلك أنه إذا وقعت الهزيمة على العدو أن لا
يتشاجل (٢) أهل العسكر عن أمر الانتقام بالغنيمة والليب؛ فإن الهزيمة إن
كانت حقيقة فالغنيمة لا تفوت، وإن كانت خفيدة من العدو فربما جرت إلى
فصاح يلحق (٣) العسكر عقب ذلك. وقد وقع مثل ذلك في غزوة أحد للصحابية
رضى الله عنهم أجمعين (٤) فقال لهم الله على ذلك، وذلك أن النبي صلعم أمر بعض
المرأة بحفظ مكان عينه لعمر، فلما وقعت الهزيمة على المشركين فسارع أولئك
المرأة الذين أمرهم النبي صلعم بحفظ ذلك المكان إلى الغنيمة فعرض للمسلمين
بسبب ذلك مشقة كبيرة، وأنزل الله تعالى في ذلك: "من بعد ما أراك ما تحبون
منكم من يريد الدنيا ومنكم من يريد الآخرة" (٣ - ١٥٢).

وقسمة الغنية مذكورة (٥) في كتاب الفقه، والذي يتعلق بهذا الموضوع
منها أن منذب الشافعي - رضي الله عنه - أنه يقسم للرجل سهم، ولفارس
ثلاثة أسماء، فيكون الفرس في ذلك بسهمين، ومهذب أبي حنيفة - رضي
الله عنه - أن للرجل سهم، ولفارس سهمان، فتكون (٦) الفرس بسهم واحد.
ولا حاجة إلى استيعاب الأحكام [في ذلك هنالك] (٧).

(١) "يشغل" في ي. (٢) "تقدّم" في ي. (٣) "يقام" في ي. (٤) "يحل" في ي. (٥) "مُذَكَّر" في ي. (٦) "فِيَفْعَلْ" في ي. (٧) " ما بين الحاضرين ناقص في ي. (٨)
الباب الثامن عشر
فيها يجب فعله عند انهزام العدو
وفي فصلان

الفصل الأول: فيَ يَتَعلَق بِتَهام أَمر الحَرب عند انهزام العدو.

قال المدبرون لأمر الحرب: إذا تحققت هزيمة العدو توليته فيجب حينئذ
ابتعاحهم ، فركوب أقفيهم ، والأخذ في أمرهم بالجد والاجتهاد قبل الظهر
 صفوفهم ، والتحاق مفرق خيلهم ، مع الحذر من الكمين والتبقي له ؛ فإنه
 ربما كانت الهزيمة من العدو خادعة ومكيدة كما تقدم ، والهزيمة الصحيحة لا
 تكاد تخفى على متيقظ ، وربما خفيت عليه لنفاد القدر.

وإذا استحكمت الهزيمة فينقغي أن تختص الميمنة والميسرة بطلب العدو.

ويكون صاحب الجيش في القلب شاهر الألواح وأعلامه بسير (1) على رشته
 قليلاً قليلاً ، فإذا انتهى إلى الموضع الذي يستطيع الوقوف فيه وقف من مه من
 القلب ، وتبقى الميمنة والميسرة في القلب للعدو بحيث أنهم لم يبقوا عن بصر
 صاحب الجيش . وإن استرسلت الخيل في طلبه ف ينبغى أن تحمل الرجالة
 على العدو ، وليشغلا رجاله العدو عن التعرض للخيل إن رأى صاحب الجيش
 ذلك . وإن خففت كثرة العدو بعد انهزامه أمر صاحب القلب أهل الميمنة
 والميسرة أن يخفحوا إليه من غير أن يملوا ظهورهم ، بل يكون رجوعهم انحرافاً
 وأوزاراً وصدورهم في وجه العدو ، كما تقدم .

(1) تسير في
قبل قتله. وكذلك يجب حفظ المستأمنين والأسراء و إيثاقهم بعد الموتية بما وقع
هم من الالتزام.

واعمل أن أحوال الحرب لا تجري على نظام واحد، بل تختلف أحوالها
وتغير، وربما دبر صاحب الجيش أو بعض قواده(65) أمرًا فأنا الحال يخلفه.
فيعمل حينئذ بما يقتضيه رأيه، ويؤدي إليه اجتهاده.

وقد حكي أن أفرودة من مراكب الفرنج قصدت مدينة سبتي(66) من بلاد
المغرب، فخرجت المقاتلة، وجرى بينهم مصادع عظيم كانت النصرة فيه آخرًا
للمسلمين. [فرعت النصارى] (67) قلاع مراكبهم وأقتحمت، فتأخر مركب
كبر لعسر حركته، فاجتمع رماة المسلمين عليه، فسردوا عليه بالدروع والطواور،
فصاح شيخ من مشايخ المسلمين على الرواة: عليكم بحمل النصارى [فارموا
عليه، فرموا عليه فاقتبل التشاب فيه] (68) فتعذر جريانه في البكر لاشتباك
السماء فيه، فأدركه المسلمون فأخذهوا.
وإذا (٤٧) جن عليهم الليل، ولم ينصف القتال، فينفغى لفرسان العسكر ورجلته أن لا يرولا عن موقفهم حتى ينصف عدوهم، ثم ينصروا بعد ذلك بصرفهم على تعبتهم الأول فالأول. وفي هذه الحالة يجب الحذر من هجوم العدو ودخول جواسيسه.

فإذا دخل الناس إلى مواضعهم انصرف أرباب الخيل إلى مراكزهم، وسدوا أبواب خنادقهم، ودار الحرس، وقواد مع روؤساء الأجيال بالحرس حتى يصبحوا (٤٨).

وإن صفت الصنوف وهجم الليل (٤٩) ولم يكن بد من الميت فلينعطف [صف المرسلة] (٥٠) على صدر القلب، وينعطف (٤١) طرف الميمنة حتى يصل إلى المرسلة، فيستدير العسكر، ويكون الإقالة حيث في الوسط قد أخذت بها الفرسان، فإذا كان القلس الأكبر عادوا إلى مراكزهم.

وينفغى أن يدس إلى العدو من يأتى خبرهم في الليل، وما حدث لم يحبذ ذلك اليوم، وما أبموه في ليلهم (٥٢)، ليغزوا في نفقه يحسب ما يقتضيه الحال. وقت ذهب الجواسيس إلى العدو في هذه الحالة عند استغلال في الرجوع إلى مواقفها (٥٣).

وينفغى أن يكون في جوانب العسكر من رجال اليفظة من ينتظرون في وجوه الناس ويتاملهم، فإن رآه مرجأ أو تحله فيه خشيق قبض عليه واستعمى (٥٤) أمره؛ فإن المراب يظهر حاله من وجهه، ويزنوه أهل النباهة والفراسة، وإذا أنكر حال شخص وأقدم على قبضه فيبنيده منه حينذ، فإنه ربما غلب عليه نظره أنه يقتل فيبادر إلى قتل الذي قبض عليه ليتجو بنفسه، أو يأخذ بتل ينفسه.

(٤٧) (وإن) [في ف].
(٤٨) [تصبحوا] [في].
(٤٩) [صبت] [في].
(٥٠) [الالغ] [في].
(٥١) [ينعطف] [في].
(٥٢) [ما بين الخصرين] [وما أبموه في حربهم ليلهم] [في].
(٥٣) [مواطنهم] [في].
(٥٤) [استعلمه] [في].
بين الفريقين. وقد نبه الله تعالى على ذلك بقوله: "إن تكونوا تأملون فإنهم يأملون كما تأملون وترجون من الله ما لا يرجون" (4 - 104).

وإن دخلت هيئة العدو إلى بقيمة (١٠٤) للعسكر فليس لأحد من أهل العسكر أن يخرج من العسكر، إلا أن يكون واقعاً بأنه يدرك قربه قبل رجوعه إلى موقعته، لأن ضبطه مكانه ودفع عدوه [وهو فيه] و(١٠٤) أول من الانصرف، لأن المنفصل عن مكانه لا يدري كيف يكون حاله إلا أن يعلم أن العدو الداخلي عليه ليس بناء فيحسن طلبه حينئذ.

الفصل الثالث: فيما يجب من الاحتراز في حال لقاء العدو.

قال أهل التجربة والدرية بالحروب: إذا [طرقت العسكر] (٢٦١) من ظهره خيل من خيل العدو [في حال المناص] (٣٣) أو خرج عليهم كمين، حينئذ فيجب على صاحب الجيش أن يقيم [خليلا يفردها] (٤٤) لذل لدفعه عن العسكر، فإن لم يكن انتخب من المسرة فرسناً تدفعهم و(٥٠) في تورهم وتصدمهم (٤٦) عن ذلك.

قالوا: ويجب على الخارجين لم أن لا يرجعوا إلا بأذن صاحب الجيش، وأن لا يتجاوزوا الموضع الذي حده لم لأنه أعلم بما يجههم فيه، وهو في تلك الحالة كالطبيب للمريض.

(٤٠) "عينة" في ف.
(٤١) ما بين الحاضرين ناقص في ف.
(٤٢) "طرق العدو" في ف.
(٤٣) ما بين الحاضرين "من المصارف" في ف.
(٤٤) "يفرد خليلا" في ف.
(٤٥) "يدفعهم" في ف.
(٤٦) "يصدم" في ف.
أول حملة القوم 
في أول هيئة، فتحْرُف الجبهة عن مواقفهم، فيكون ذلك سببًا للكرسة. فإن اتفق أن يقع لهم ذلك فطريق أن يمر بضحطيهم، يجعل معهم من رجال الحرب من يثبت معهم ليثبتوا بثوبهم، ويقووا ما خار من قلوبهم.

فإن قدر أن يبول أحد من أهل العسكر عند خروجه الحرب أو عند أم الجراح فلا يعترضه أحد من أهل العسكر بالوقوف في طريقه، أو رده إلى الموقف من العسكر، ولكن يرقد به، ويؤخذ بالمدارة حتى يخرج إلى خلف الصفو.

وإن كثير العدو على العسكر، وعجزوا عن دفع صولته، رجعوا إلى عسكريهم حتى جميعهم حتى يلمعوا أطرافهم، ويعبروا خيولهم ورجالهم، ويتقوا بالسلاح، ويععوا بطلب المدد والتعجيل به، فإذا اجتمعت له أطرافهم ووافهم مددهم استأنفوا الحرب بحسب ما يقتضيه الحال.

وإن زحف العدو إلى العسكر إلى خنادقهم استدعوا لهم باتم حالة، وحملوا عليه حملة واحدة، ناظرين مواطئ أقدام العدو دون وجودهم، فإن ثبت العدو لملقاتهم حينئذ فليس لهم إلا النزول إليهم بالسيوف والدبابيس المخرقة والأطبار، واتخذ العسكر من عرضا الحرب قدر رمح من العدو، وتولى ذلك، فقد عده أحد التجربة من مبادئ الظهر.

وعلى أهل العسكر أن يلزموا مواقفهم مع إحكام الصفو حيث قصدهم العدو، ولا يتركوا إشاع الأمة في صدورهم، والرُجّة عليهم من كل ناحية. وإن طال العدو وصبر فلا يأخذ أهل العسكر ضجر ولا فلق، فإن الأمم مشتركة.

(35) ما بين الخاضرين ناقص في، (36) "حد في ف.
(37) "يطير في ف.
(38) "عليهم في ق.
(39) "ظافر في ف.
في وجوههم من كل ناحية، ويتحرك صاحب الجيش مع البند الأعظم، وتحمي
الخيل كلها وتحذقه. فإن في ذلك روعة وإهاباً للعدو، لا سيما إذا ذاقوا حد
الحاد. وَإِذَا تأخر العدو حينئذ فهو ابتداء الظهير إنشاء الله تعالى.
وإذا بارز مبارز من العسكر فليكن موقفه على الثلث مما بين أصحابه وبين
العدو، وإن استطرد على الثلثين، ولا يتجاوز ذلك. ومثله من قال: لا يتجاوز الثلث
بينه وبين أصحابه بكل حال.

[الفصل الثاني] (٣٠) : [فيا إذا زحف العدو على العسكر قبل زحف العسكر].

قال أهل التجربة في الحرب: إذا حمل العدو على العسكر قبل حملته
أو استحكام رتبته وتبته، فالطريق في ذلك أن يحث (٣٢) أهل العسكر على
الركب، ويشعروا الأمة في تحورهم، ويستمروا بالدرق والطوارق، ويكونوا صفاً
واحدًا متعاقدين، إلى أن يندفع العدو أو يتهيج الركب واللقاء. قال أهل
التجربة للحرب: وهي ساعة في (٣٣) شدة على من لم يعتد مثلها.

وإن كانت حملة العدو على العسكر بعد استحكام تعبية العساكر،
فالطريق في ذلك أن يتلاقاه رجالة العسكر، ويشعروا الأمة في تحورهم،
ويلبوزوا مواقعهم، وبعضهم (٣٤) رماة العسكر بالرمية في وجوههم. فإن لم تنفق
الرجالة في ذلك أجبات الخيل حينئذ.

ومن أنتفع ما يعتمد في هذه الحالة الصبر؛ فإنه لا يثبت لذلك إلا
أهل القوة [والساقة ومن له عادة باللقاء]. والحذر أن يتضعع العسكر عند

(٣٠) ما بين الحاضرين «الفصل الثالث» في.
(٣١) ما بين الحاضرين «فيا إذا زحف العسكر على العدو قبل زحف العسكر» في.
(٣٢) يحثوا في النصين.
(٣٣) ناقص في.
(٣٤) يقصدهم في.

لا تنسى أن تراجع ما بالساحة ومن له عادة باللقاء واحذر أن يتضعع العسكر عند
وأما ينبغي التنبه إلى أن يعلم أن رجوع الفارس (77) في الحملة إلى موضعه الذي خرج منه أولى إن أمكنه ذلك، ليكون في مكانه (78) الملزم له. فإن لم يكن ذلك وقف على القرب منه، ولا مشاحة (79) في ذلك، لأن القصد (80) إنما هو قيامه في صفه في ذلك المكان بعينه.

وينبغي للحامل على العدو أن لا يستغرق جهده في جرى فرسه، وأن لا يتبع خصمه إلى (81) أكثر من الثلث مما بينه وبين العدو، فيكون بينه وبين العسكر (82) الثلث من المسافة، وبينه وبين العدو (83) الثلثان منها؛ فإن في الزيداء على ذلك تغير، "وأما المغر بحمود ولو سلما".

ولأيمن عند انسحاب العدو أمامه أن يكون ذلك بكيد من خروج كين وخرجوه، اللهم إلا أن يظهر فشل العدو و行きذالك ففيجب اتباعه، لكنه لا يسرع في الدخول في عسكر العدو، وإن ظهر فشله، وتأخر خذه، حتي يتلاحق من عسكره أهل الشجاعة والصبر، وتزاحف (84) فرسان الحرب.

وإن استطاع العدو فأرهجوا فلا تقع الحملة عليهم حتى يسكن الرهج، ويتيبن أمرهم حذرا من الكمين. وإذا ولى العدو وتحققت هزيمته فلا يتعبه كل العسكر، بل يكون بعض العسكر خلفه [وبعض العسكر للغبيمة] (85). وبعضهم الحفظ؛ فإن اتباعهم بالجمع مذموم.

وإن نبت العدو بعد انسحابه تقدم صاحب اللواء قليلا، وتحمل الخيل إلى قد اتخذت لذلك وأعدت (86) له. وينبغي في هذه الحالة أن يȘاد (87) العسكر

(77) "الفارس" في ف.
(78) "المقصود" في ي.
(79) "مانحة" في ي.
(80) "لا" في ف.
(81) "العدو" في ي.
(82) "لاستله" في ي.
(83) "تزايف" في ي.
(84) "ما بين الحاضرين" نافع في ف.
(85) "أعدت" في ي.
(86) "يشد" في ي.
(87) "ينبغي" في ي.
وإذا حملت طائفة من العسكر على العدو، ثم اضطروا إلى الرجوع إلى مواقعهم، فعليلهم أن يتجنوا قرب الرجعة والسماحة فيها، لما في ذلك من الدلالة على الخرف والهلوس. بل يكون رجوعهم على آثم المهيئات والآثبات في الرجوع.
فإن سو سعى رجعته قد يؤدي إلى طمع العدو فيه، فيتبع العدو، فنصيره هزيمة.

وإن كان [الذي حمل على العدو وهو] 19 أهل القلب بأجمعهم واحتاجوا إلى الرجوع رجعوا القهقرى إلى وراء ظهورهم احترافاً وزوراراً بالنظر، وقيل بعض المناكب والروس. وتكون الصدور مواجهة لصدور العدو، ولا تنحرف عنها حتى يصلوا إلى مواقعهم. وهم في ذلك مظهرون للقوة، داعين بالظفر وطلب النبات والنصر، بحيث يسمعون أصحابهم ذلك؛ فإن ذلك مما 12 يشعر بحضور القلب وقته في مثل هذه الحالة التي تضعف فيها القلب. وإذا حمل أحد من القلب، وانتهى الضرورة من العدو ثم رجع، انطفي منياً إلى الميسرة، أو إلى ما بين جناح القلب والميسرة.

وإن كان الذين 14 حملوا هم من أهل الميمنة رجعوا القهقرى إلى مواقعهم.
وإن حمل أحد منهم وانتهى فرصة ثم أراد الرجوع عطف مفتوحاً إلى القلب أو إلى ما بين جناح القلب والميمنة؛ فإن ذلك أسهل له في رجوع من أن يرجع إلى الميسرة وما يقرب منها.

وإن كان الذي جمع الميسرة رجعوا القهقرى إلى مواقعهم كما تقدم في الميمنة، وإن حمل أحد من الميسرة ثم رجع عطف مفتوحاً، فإن عطف الأيسر من الميسرة [بعد الحملة] 16 إلى نحو القلب أيسر منه إلى الأيمن.
فيجب فعله عند لقاء العدو وقتله
وفي ثلاثة فصول

الفصل الأول: في إذا زحف العسكر على العدو [قبل زحف العدو]  

وإذا زحفت العساكر على العدو ابتدأ فتبيني أن يكون زحفهم  عليه
من مكان عال مرتفع عن الأرض، لبكون العسكر أعلى  من العدو، وكون
زحفهم إلىهم بالنثبت  والتحفيز والتزود  . وكون أمام الخيالة من الرجال من
يدب عنها ويحمي الفرسان من رجاله العدو؛ فإن رجالة العسكر ملى هزموا رجالة
العدو ربما تبعهم فرسان العسكر في الهزام . وإذا هزمت رجالة العدو رجعت
على فرسانهم  دعا ذلك خيلهم  إلى الحلفا، وربما دام طلب رجالة
العسكر لم، فيكون ذلك سبباً لكسر العدو وأهلهما.

وإنه احتاج القلب إلى الزحف على العدو، وسار أهل الهوية قليلاً قليلاً،
بلا ركض ولا عجلة، فإنه إذا حدثت عجلة في الحركة إلى العدو ربما
خطر لم يخفى الصف أنهم صاروا إلى العدو ليكونوا معه، فانزعوا لذلك
وتأثروا به.

(1)  « خروجهما » في .
(2)  « خروجهما » في .
(3)  « أعلا » في النصين .
(4)  « بالنثبت » في .
(5)  فرسان في .
(6)  فرسان في .
(7)  فرسان في .
(8)  حديث في .

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ضعفًا للقلب، وإن كان فيه قوة للجناحين. ولذلك كان من يصف صفة كذلك يجعل أهل الأناس والنجدة ميمنة وسيّرة ليكون أشد للقلب. والمغل من الترك معتادون أن يكون القوم كرديساً واحداً ليتدافعوا(28) على العدو، ويتمنع على كل واحد منهم المزية والوجوع، ولم بذلك الدرة العظيمة التي ليست لغيرهم.
الحيز الرابع وراء الحيز الثالث، وحكمه أن يكون حافظاً من خلف الأثقال. وقد شرطوا في هذا الحيز أن يكون فسهانه خفافاً انتجاً من أهل التجارب في المعارك.


وعلى هذا الحيز والحيز الرابع حفظ مؤخر العسكر، والاحتراز من الغارة على مؤخر العسكر حسب الاستطاعة، فإن العدو يطبع في أطراف العسكر.

الفصل الثالث: في بيان أشكال الصفوف في العدو الكبير.

وقد اختلقوا في ذلك، فذهب أكثر العارفين بأمور الحرب أن أحسن الصفوف الصف المستوى المنقم (١٢) بعضه إلى بعض. وذكر أن ذلك هو (٢٤) مصطلح الفرس قديماً. وقد (٢٥) مدح الله هذه الصفة في كتابه العزيز، فقال جلبت قدرته: "إن الله يحب الذين يقاتلون في سبيله صفاً كأنهم بنيان مرصوص" (٤ - ٦١).

وقد استحسن بعض من له دربة بالحرب أن يكون الصف خارجاً من جناحيه، داخلاً من صدره، وهو أقوى لقلب الصف وأضعف بجناحيه، [قد كان من] (٢٨) يفعل ذلك يعد لكل طرف من الجناحين كردوساً من الخيل المقومة عوضاً عما هو داخل من (٢٧) صدره.

وكرهوا أن يكون الصف خارج الصدر، داخل الجناحين؛ فإن فيه

(٢٠) ما بين الحاضرين نافص في ي. (٢١) ذوو في. (٢٢) «ليا» في ي. (٢٣) المنض من في ي. (٢٤) نافص في. (٢٥) نقص في. (٢٦) «لكن كان» في ي. (٢٧) في ي.
ما على بين القلب والمسيرة ما على يساره ولكل من الثلاثة حكم خاصه (8)
وقد يقسمون الميمنة والمسيرة المنحنين، وتمت الميمنة والمسيرة الجناحين (9) فيقال، جناح الميمنة، وجناح المسرة [وربما يقسم كل من الميمنة والمسيرة جناحاً (10).

وقد يقسم كل من القلب والميمنة والمسيرة إلى ثلاثة أجزاء على ما تقدم، فيجعل للقلب قلب وميمنة وميسرة، والميمنة كذلك، والميسرة كذلك.
ويجعل على كل جزء من هذه الأجزاء مقدما، فتسر (11) في مقدمة العسكر تسعة مقدمين، ليكون أقرب لتدبير أمرهم. فإن كثرة المقدمين على الفرسان في أجزاء العسكر مما يزيدها قوة، ويديم ثبوتها، لا سبب إذا كان مع كل مقدم جزء من الجيش، قالوا: ينبغي أن يجعل ما (12) بين جناح القلب الميمنة المسرة طريقاً، ويبيع بينهما نتر (13) في الخيل وأرباب المبارزة.

الحوز الثاني وراء الحز الأول، ويكون (14) في الترتيب على ثلاثة أجزاء.
قلب وميمنة وميسرة على نظير الصفد الأول: القلب خلف القلب، والميمنة خلف الميمنة، والميسرة خلف الميسرة. وقد شرطوا في هذا الحز أن تكون (15) فيه مشاهير الفرسان من يكنى ثم ذلك من عرف بتدبير الحرب، والقيام بمهامها، والصبر على وقائعها، وصحة الوئى عند ورود المستصعبات (16) فيها.
فية الحز الثالث وراء الحز الثاني، وهو الموضوع لحفظ الألفاظ. وقد علم أنه لا مقام (17) للعسكر إلا بثقه؛ ف本当 أن يكون الثقل محفوظاً بين [ يخف معرة الفرار أكثر مما ] (18) يخف الموت [ألا أنه لا قوام للعسكر إلا بثقه] (19).

(8) ما بين الخاصرين ناقص في ي.
(9) القسم الكامل في ف ما على يساره و لكل من الثلاثة حكم خاصه و يقسم كل من طرق الميمنة والمسيرة الجناحين.
(10) ما بين الخاصرين ناقص في ي.
(11) للمسيرة في ي.
(12) في ي.
(13) في ي.
(14) في ي.
(15) ينكل في ه.
(16) مكنان في ي.
(17) المقصود في ي.
(18) ما بين الخاصرين ناقص في ي.
(19) ما بين الخاصرين ناقص في ي.
على ما تقدم، واعترف واحد منهم ناحية إن لاحظ له فرصة من العدو وانذرها، وإن احتاج أصحابه إلى مضايقة عاضدهم، وهو أفتع من اختلاطه بهم، إلا أن يحملوا كردوساً واحداً فتكون الأربعة مجتمعين.

وإن كان العدو ستة ترتبوا على ما تقدم: في القلب الثاني، في الميمنة الثاني، في الميسرة الثاني. وإن كان العدو ثمانية فالآخران أن ينتدب ستة على ما تقدم، ويجعل الاثنين الباقيان كناة، لأن الخروج(5) الكمين عند وقع القتال بعثة روعة عظيمة.

وذهب بعض أهل الحرب إلى أن العدو المتصدى للحرب إذا كان قليلاً في [الجملة أنهم] (6) لا يترتبون، وإنما يحملون على العدو كردوساً واحداً، فإن الانتفاع أمرهم، والحملة، فأمر في ذلك راجع إلى اجتهاد المقاتل بحسب ما يقتضيه الحال.

الفصل الثاني: ففي إذا كان العدو المتصدى للحرب كثيراً.

وقد اصطلحوا على أنه إذا كان العدو كثيراً كالعسكر الكبير جعل العسكر خمسة أحياز: الحمبر الأول في مقدمة العسكر، وهو الذي عليه العدو، فيجب أن يكون من فيه من السربان في غاية القوة والشجاعة والاستطوار والدرية بالحرب، فإنهم الذين في نحر العدو، وعليهم اعتبار من وراءهم من الأحياز.

وقد اصطلحوا على تقييم المقدمة إلى ثلاثة أجزاء: القلب، والميمنة والميسرة؛ فالقلب هو الذي في الوسط، ويعنون (7) به قلب العسكر، والميمنة.

(5) "الخروج" في.
(6) "ما بين الحاصلين الجملة إلى أنهم" في.
(7) "يريدون" في.
الباب الثاني عشر

في بيان كيفية تبعية المساكر عند المتصدف للقتال
وفي ثلاثة فصول

الفصل الأول: فيها إذا كان العدو المتصدى للحرب قليلاً، ويتتفت ذلك
باختلاف حالته في القلعة.

فإن كان المتصدى للحرب واحداً(1) لوجه خصمه بالقتال، ولا عمل له
غير ذلك؛ فإن اجتمع على واحد اثنان أخذ عنهما جانباً، وأخذ
كل منهما عنه(2) وإن كان المتصدى للحرب ثلاثة نفر فتكون واحد منهم
قلباً، وواحد ميمنة، وواحد ميسرة. ومنهم من ذهب إلى أنه إذا اجتمع ثلاثة
لا يتربون على هذا الوجه، ولكن(3) يتحفظ كل رجل منهم ظهر صاحبه.
وهو باب عظيم في الحرب، وعليه عمل كثير من أهل الدرد بالحروب.

إن كان المتصدى للحرب تسعة نفر جعل القلب ثلاثة نفر، والميسرة
ثلاثة نفر، والميمنة ثلاثة نفر.

إن كان المتصدى للحرب اثنين جعل كل واحد منهم ظهره لظهر
صاحبه إن تفرق العدو عليها، وإلا واجهاه إن كان من جهة واحدة.

إن كان المتصدى للحرب أربعة نفر(4) ثلاثة منهم قليباً وميمنة وميسرة

(1) "قليباً" في ف.
(2) ما بين الحاضرين "في كل منهما عن نفسه" في ف.
(3) "لاكن" في ي.
(4) "يرتب" في ي. 73
أما الموضوع الذي يكمنون فيه فإنه يجب أن يكون خفياً مستمراً، وأن يكون مما يجعل الإقامة فيه إذا دعت الحاجة إلى طول الإقامة، بأن يكون فيه الماء والمراعي وسائر ما يحتاج إليه أهل الكمين بحسب الإمكاني.

الفصل الثاني: في تدبير أمور الكمين (7)

أول ما يتبع على أهل الكمين أنهم يقيمون لهم ديدبان يطلع على أخبار العدو ومتجدادات أمور العسكر، و يعرفهم بذلك. ويجب أن يكون ذلك الديدبان ممن يوثق به ويتحقق نصبه; فإنه إذا كان يخلاف ذلك ربما (8) مال إلى العدو، فدل على الكمين، فأخذوا(9) بدلالته.

وعلى أهل الكمين أن يجيبوا التعرض للصيد من الطير والوحش مما حولهم، فإن ذلك مما يوجب نقار الطير والوحش، وربما رأى أحد من أهل البسيرة بالحرب نقار الصيد فاستدل (10) به على أنه إذا نفر من منفر له، فيتوصل بذلك إلى العلم بالكمين (11) فوفده.

ويتبع بأن يكون وقت ظهور الكمين في حال غفلة العدو، و بأن يكون ذلك غدنة الظهار، أو عند حط العدو عن دوبهم وإراحتها، بأن يكون ذلك في آخر ساعة في أيام الصيف أو أربع ساعة في أيام الشتاء. ويجب أن يكون خروجهم من الكمين على العدو كراديس كراديس متقطعة (12) من غير أن يبعد بعضهم من بعض، وأن يسرعوا الرجعة إلى مكانتهم (13) إذا لم يظهروا بحاجتهم، وإن حصل ملاقاً بهم العدو [بصدورهم للقتال] (14) وأظهر كل واحد منهم ما عنده (15) من القوة والبسالة.

(7) "الكمين" في (8) ناقص فيه.
(9) "تأخذ" في (10) "فاستدلوا" في.
(11) "ما بين الحاضرين إلى الكمين" في.
(12) "متقطعت" في.
(13) "مكتسبهم" في.
(14) "ما بين الحاضرين وصدورهم القتال" في.
(15) "ليذه" في.
الباب الثاني عشر
في بيان إكمان الكمائن وتدير أمرها
وفي فصلان
الفصل الأول: ذكر صفة رجال الكمين وخيله ولكلان الذي يركمون فيه.
أما الرجالة فينبني أن يكونوا أشجع فرسان العسكر وأدرهم بالحرب، وأرفعهم بالتجارب فهؤلاء يندردون من العسكر، ويوكون في مكان ليس له فيه من يعيهم ولا ينجدم من أهل العسكر في بعدهم. ويتبعون مع ذلك أن يكون عليه مقدماً عارفاً بأمور الحروب، درباً بمحاربها، عالماً بأحوال الأماكن الصالحة للاختفاء، ليكون ذلك أعون لحصول الغرض من أمر الكمين في اختفائه حيث يحب الاختفاء، وظهوره حيث يقتضي الظهور.
وأما خيلهم فيتبعين أن تكون ثابتة الخوارف، سالمة الظهور، عربية عن الحر والمجاع، على ما تقدم في خيل الطالع، وان لا يكون فيها من الخلق ما يستدله به عليهم حال أكابهم من الصليب ونحوه. [وينبغي أن تكون] خيلهم كلها ذكرهاً أو كلها إناثًا؛ فإن اجتذاع ذكور الخيل وإناثها ربما أوجب إثارة جلبة من صليب الخيل أو صيامها، فؤدي ذلك إلى العلم بالكمين، وربما جرى إلى حصول الضرر بجميع العسكر. وباختلاس فكل أمر يظهر به ما يروم صاحب الكمين سره، فإنه يتعين تركه.

(1) ما بين الخاصرين أن يكونوا من أشجع في ف.
(2) ما بين الخاصرين عنهم ويتبعين في ف.
(3) الحرب في.
(4) نقص في ف.
(5) ما بين الخاصرين وسوا تكون في.
(6) سيره في.
والثبات وحسن التدبير، ويضيى في حماية إلى الميمنة مما يلي جناح القلب.
فإن وجد هناك مستشرفاً أشرف منه، وإن لم يجد هناك [مستشرفاً وطلبها] [(8)] في ناحية المسيرة [(9)]. فإن لم يجد وأمكن أن ينصب له في القلب شيء يعلو عليه ليشرف منه على العسكرية فعل.

الفصل الثاني: في اختيار وقت المصاد.

يجب على صاحب العسكر أن يجتهد أن يكون مصدره في وقت يكون الشمس أو الريح [(10)] فيها من وراء ظهر عسكره. أما استشراب الشمس فلا أنه إذا استقبلها وقع شعاعها على السلاح الم),$ smelled من السيف والخزد وغيرها، فيجعل شعاعها الأعين، فتتك الأضرار عن النظر، وربما أثرى في بعضها ذهب البصر بالكليتي.
وأما استشراب الريح ليس لمما يلبقي الريح في العين من التراب والرمل، فإنه متي سفت الريح التراب والرمل في الأعين دعي ذلك إلى إطلاق الجنون مما يصيبها من ذلك. وقد ينه عن إطلاق الجنون في الحرب عند اللقاء، ولو أنه يرى السلاح يكاد يدخل فيه عينه، لأن بإطلاق الجنون يصير المقاتل كأنه أعمى، والأعمى لا يقع له في الحرب.

فإن لم يكن استشراب الريح جعل مجازاً في طرف ميمنة إلى ميسرة عدو، ليعق [اشتراك عسكر العدو] [(11)] مع عسكره في ضرره، فينال مثل ما ينال أهل عسكره. فإن يمكنه ذلك حرص على احترازها ما استطاع لأخذ العدو منها بنصبه. فإن لم يمكنه ذلك، وألح العدو في طلب القتال في ذلك الوقت، أو تغير الريح وهو في المصاد، أما الفرسان بالنزول عن خيلهم وقائمه رجالة متزاحمين كأنهم رجل واحد، فإن إصابة الريح للفرسان أشد من إصابتها للرجالة لارتفاع النارس عن الأرض وانخفاض الرجل بوقفه عليها.

((8)) ما بين الخاصرين "مستشرفاً وجد وطلبها" في ف.
((9)) ما بين الخاصرين و"الريح والشمس" في و.
((10)) ما بين الخاصرين "الريح والشمس" في ر.
((11)) ما بين الخاصرين "اشتراك العدو" في ف.
الباب إرباع عشر

في اختيار موضوع المصف للقتال وزمانه

وفي فصلان

الفصل الأول: في اختيار موضوع المصف.

قد استحسنوا (١) أن يكون موضوع المصف للقتال (٢) بحيث يشهد أهل
العسكر ظهورهم في مصاف القتال إلى جبل [أو نهر أو تل] (٣)، بحيث
يأمنوا (٤) هجوم العدو عليهم من ظهورهم، وخروج الخذام من وراءهم
[كما تقدم في الزول في الطريق] (٥) على ما تقدم بيانه في الباب العاشر. فإن
لم يبياء له شيء من ذلك احتف الخانداق، واستظهر بأكاذب الكمال من خلف
عسكره، لتخرج الكمالان على العدو إن قصد ظهر عسكره.

وعليه أن يحرص أن يكون موضوع قلب العسكر على جبل أو شرف مرفوع
صلب ليس فيه غبار، صاحب العسكر في وسطهم ليشرف على العسكريين،
ويعبين ما يدبره في أعماقه وعدوهما من انتهاز فرصة، وصد خلل، وغير ذلك.

فإن لم يجد إلا منخفضاً (٦) من الأرض لا يرى منه العسكريين (٧)، ولم
يكن من اللقاء بيد، فعلبه أن يخلف في القلب ناباً من أهل الدرة في الحرب

(١) «استحو» في ف.
(٢) «في المقات» في ي.
(٣) ما بين الخاصتين «أو نهر أو تل أو تل» في ف.
(٤) «يوم» في ي.
(٥) ما بين الخاصتين ناقص في ف.
(٦) «منخفضا» في ي.
(٧) «المقات» في ي.
لصادمة الأبطال في ميض الأوقات. والصنف الثاني من يكون مطيعاً بأن هو أعلم منه بذلك، لأنه يصير كالآلة للعوارف بالحرب، فيتفنح به كما يتفنح بالأئـت الحرب من سيف ويل وهما. ولكن لا بد مع الطاعة من وصف الشجاعة والصبر والجلد والتحمل لما ينوب، وإلا فلبان ضره في هذا الموضع أكثر من تفعه.

الفصل الثاني: في كيفية اليات.
قد استحسن أهل الدرية بالحرب أنه إذا أراد بيات العدو، وهجمت فرقة من العسكر قاصدة وسط العدو، ويوحظ الباكون بهم، ثم تصبح الفرقة التي قصدت إلى وسط العدو، فإنهم إذا صاحوا في وسطهم على حين غفلة أخذهم الدهشة والدنور؛ فإذا طلبوا أطراف عسكرهم وجدوا بائق العسكري الذي بينهم قد أحاط بهم، وأخذ الذين هم خارج العسكري في الرؤى عليهم بالنشاب من الخارج؛ فإن لذلك في الليل والظلمة أثر عظيم في البادية.
وإن استطاعوا أن يبقوا دواب عسكر العدو ويخرجوا بالربية بعد أن يقطعوا أرمانها وشكلها فعلوا ذلك؛ فإنها إذا أطلقت من الشكل والأرسان وأصابها الحديد جائت في العسكر لما نالها من الأله، مع ما يحصل لها من هول الأصوات وإزعاجها.
ما ينسجم في ذلك أن القوم الذين يبئون العدو إذا خالطهم لا يبتون في مكان واحد، بل يكثرون الجلوان فيه؛ فإنه أشد إرهاضاً وأعظم نكاثاً، وأوهن للعدو. ومن اللازم أن يجعل لهم علامة فيها بينهم يتبادون بها مثل فرج الله أو نصر الله، وما شاكل ذلك [لمتنازع] [عن العدو بذلك] .

(7) من في .
(8) أثرب في ي .
(9) ناقص في ي .
(10) طالبين في ي .
(11) ناقص في ي .
(12) ناقص في ي .
(13) ما بين الخاصرين بين العدو في .
(14) ما بين الخاصرين بين العدو في .
الباب الثامن عشر
في بيان كيفية بيات العدو إذا لاحت فرصة
وفي فصلان
الفصل الأول: في بيان الوقت الذي يحسن أن بيط فيه العدو وصفة الرجل الذين يفضلوا لذلك (1).

أما الوقت الذي يحسن أن بيط فيه العدو فيه فبين أن يتحرى لذلك الليلة المظلمة وليلة الرياح، وإن كان ذلك عند حصول دوي (2) أو خرير ماء لمنع حس الطريق الذي يطرق العدو فهو أحسن. ثم إن كان العدو الذي يريد بياته كثيراً درهمهم نصف الليل ليكون الوقت متسعاً لما يردده من البيات، وإن كان قليلاً اختار له وجه الصبح لقرب الأسنان [وظهورهم بطلع الصبح] (3) فيأخذهم العسكر. وقد مدح الله تعالى الليل بالإغارة [في الصبح] (4) يقوله: "والعاديات صبحاً فالموريات قدحاً فالغيرات صبحاً" (100 : 1).

وأما الرجال الذين يفضلون لذلك فقد ذكرنا أن الذين يختارون للبيات صنفان: الصنف الأول أهل التجارب للحرب والثبات، لأنهم الذين يتفع بيهم في ذلك المقام، لأنه لا ينتفع حينئذ [لا يعان] (5) علم منه الثبات والصبر.

(1) في هامش ي مكتوب "معنى التبيان" أن يأتي العدو في وقت مبتهج.
(2) "ذوي" في.
(3) ما بين الخاصرين "ظهورهم الصبح للعدو" في.
(4) ما بين الخاصرين ناقص في.
(5) ما بين الخاصرين "ال뿐" في.
الفصل الثاني: في حفظ خزائن الأموال والأقلاع.

أما الخزائن فقالوا: ينبغي لصاحب العسكر أن يوكِّل خزائه رجلاً ناصحاً أميناً، ومعه جمع من الخيلة تسير بسيرة الخزائن، وتزل بنزولها: تكون حولها في السير والنزول خفظها(3) من طوابق العدو، وصولها(4) عن قرب أهل الخيالة. ويأمر(5) عامة الجنود والجيش بالتنحية عنها، والهجانية لها في المسير والمنزل، إلاّ من استخلصه لذلك، أو أهله له. فإنه إذا لم يكن للخزائن من هو موكِّل بها من أهل الحفظ لها، والذب عنها، والقوة على من أراد نهبها، ربما طرقها العدو أو أسرع الجناد إليها، وتداعوا(6) نحوها حتى يقاد بئرها ذلك بالله إلى انتهاج العسكر ثوران(7) الفتنة. فإن أهل الفتنة وسيئي السيرة، ومنهم الشرك كثير، ومسارعتهم إلى الخير بعيدة.

(4) "تصوبها" في ي.
(5) "تأمروا" في ي.
(6) "ندعوا" في ف.
(7) "ثوران" في التسخين.
الباب الثاني عشر

في بيان كيفية التعبئة عند الخوف في المسير

وحفظ خزائن الأموال

وفيصلان

الفصل الأول : في بيان كيفية التعبئة عند الخوف في المسير.

قال أهل المعرفة بتدبير الحروب : إذا عرض للعسكر خوف في المسير فإن الخوف قدم العسكر جعل نصف الميسرة قدم الصوف في السير، ونصف الميمنة على أثرها، ثم القلب على أثرها، ثم نصف الميسرة على أثر ذلك، ثم نصف الميمنة على أثر ذلك. وإن كان الخوف من جهة الميمنة جعل سير الميمنة أمام الصوف، ثم القلب، ثم الميسرة، وإن كان الخوف من جهة الميسرة (1) جعل سير الميسرة أمام الصوف، ثم القلب، ثم الميمنة. وإن كان الخوف مجهولا لم تعرف جهته بث البعلاموع وجد (2) الكشف في نواحي جهات العسكر وناس على مراتهم ومراكهم، ويكون صاحب الجليس في وسط القلب.

(1) مكتوب فوق السطر في ت. (2) خيل في ت. 56
ذلك ويتأكد الحال فيه. وبالجملة فإنه يجب أن يكون مستظهرًا في حال سيره ونزوله وإقامتة، آخذاً أهبه في جميع الأوقات، فإنه مَن أخَل بالتأهب [أو فوته] (٩) كان قد عرض نفسه من الحوادث لما لعله لا يستطيع تداركه.

الفصل الثاني: في بيان [ما يجب من] (٧) التعبد حينئذ.

قال العلماء بآمور الحرب وأحوالها: إذا كان الحارب على مسافة قريبة من العدو فلا يسير إلا في مقدمة وعينة وميسرة، وساقفة قد شهروا الأسلحة الأسلحة ونشروا البند والاعلام، [وقد عرف] (٠) كل منهم مركزه ووضعه من العسكر (١٠) سائرين تحت ألوتيهم، قد أخذوا أحبة القتال واستعداً للقاء العدو، وعازفين مواضعهم في سيرهم ومعسكرهم (١١). ويكون رجليهم ونذولهم على روابتهم وأعلامهم، وفي مراكهم (١١).

وقد عرف كل قائد أو أمير منهم أصحابه مواضعهم من الميمنة والميسرة والقلب والساقفة الطبيعة، لا روى له [غير مخالب] بما استنجدوا له ولا مهابين بما ندبوا إليه حتى يكون العسكر (١٣) في كل منهل يصل (١٣) إليه ومسافة تجتازها (١٤). كأنها عسكر واحد في اجتثاعها على العدو، وأخذها بال alm. ومسيرها تحت روابتها، ونذولها في مراكها، ومعرفتها مواضعها (١٥).

(٦) ما بين الحاضرين ذاقص في. (٧) ما بين الحاضرين ذاقص في. (٨) الناشرة في. (٩) الناشرة في. (١٠) الناشرة في. (١١) الناشرة في. (١٢) الناشرة في. (١٣) الناشرة في. (١٤) الناشرة في. (١٥) الناشرة في.
الباب إياها 

في بيان متى يجب تعبئة العساكر وترتيبها وما يجب من التعبئة حينئذ وفية فصلان

الفصل الأول: في بيان متى يجب تعبئة العساكر وترتيبها.

قال أهل الدرك بالحرب والتجربة لوقائعه: ينبغي لأهل العسكر إذا توجوا إلى عدوهم أن يكونوا في مسيرهم (١) وزولم على تعبئة، وأنه يجب التعبئة في حال الأمن كما يجب في حال الخوف، إلا إذا توجب الضرورة ترك ذلك، وأنه لا يترك ذلك ما استطاع. وقد حكى عن بعض أهل الحزم أنه توجه من الشام إلى الشرق يريد التجارة، فخندق في أول منزل نزله [من الشام] (٢) مع نفية التعبئة حقها، ولم يزل يفعل (٣) ذلك إلى أن بلغ موضع فصده، وظهر بهدوه. وقد ذكر أن هذه كانت حال المهلب بن أبي صفرة، شيخ الحروب وإمامها.

وذهب آخرون إلى أن التعبئة إذا تكون إذا كان [من العدو] (٤) على مسافة قريبة قدرها بعضهم خمس مراحل، وكان [المراد أنه] (٥) حينئذ يجب

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(١) "سيرهم في ي".
(٢) "ينعل" في ي.
(٣) "ما بين الخاضرين نافص في ".
(٤) "ما بين الخاضرين نافص في ي".
(٥) "ما بين الخاضرين "المارد به" في ي".
المتشرفات والمضايق من أبواب العسكر إلى غروب الشمس. فإذا دخل الليل أقام غيرهم مقامهم حتى تطلع الشمس.

وقد استحسنوا أن يجعل في الليل خيالا من وراء الجيوش (11) غير بعيد، يرفعون أصولهم بالليل والتكبير لإيقاظ العسكر وطلب النصر (12) من الله تعالى. وهذه الخيالا تسمى الدراجة. وأن يجعل وراء هؤلاء على نصف شوط عرسا يدورون بالعسكر. وهم سكوت ليدركوا من هو مختبئ (13) أو كامن من المكيدة يقيدها (14) لا أس (11) حتى إذا كان الكائمين خارج العسق والحرس، وإيقاد النيران في جميع نواحي العسكر لإرهاب العدو (15) (على البعد) (16) والأطلال عليهم بظهور النور أن يقربوا (18).

وإن اتفق أن العدو طوقتهم ليلا من جهة من جهات العسكر خرج عليهم الكميين، وتقلاهم الخيالة والحرس الذين هم خارج العسكر، ليصير العدو الذي طوقهم مصورة بين العسكر وبين الذين خرجوا عليه. وعلى أهل العسكر في هذه الخيلات أن يلزموا أماكنهم، ولا يخرج واحد منهم عن مكانه ما استطاع. ولا يكلم منهم أحد إلا أهل الجهة التي جاء (14) العدو منها؛ فإنهم يكرون ثلاث تكتيرات متواليات عند مجيء العدو. وليعلم أن العدو قد أتى من جانبهم؛ فإن ترك العدو ذلك الجانب وجاء من جانب آخر، أو أتى إلى الجانب الآخر طائفة من العدو غير الأولى كبير أهل تلك الناحية أيضاً تميل القوم إليها.

فقد لم يكن هناك ما يحفظ ظهره ربما هجم العدو على العسكر على حين غفلة من مشهورهم.

الفصل الثاني: في ترتيب العسكر في المنزلة وما يجب من الاحتراز فيها.

أما ترتيب العسكر في المنزلة فيجب أولاً أن يكون نزول العسكر بترتيب صحيح، لكل أحد من الأمراء وأرباب الوظائف منزلة معروفة في جهة من جهات منزل صاحب العسكر، لأنه إذا كان لكل رئيس موضوع معروف، ودعت الضرورة إلى طلب وハン وحده، ولو شردت دابة من دواب واحد منهم وعرفت بموتها هان عودها إليه.

وأما الاحتراز في المنزلة إذا خيف هجوم العدو في ينبغي (٧) إذا أخذ كل واحد من العسكر منزلة، أن يختبروا خندقاً مستدراً على العسكر، ويجعل له بابان، أو أكثر من ذلك، إن كان العسكر كثيراً، ويقف الرؤساء والفرسان على أبواب الخندق على أثام أباه. وقد كان أصحاب العساكر (٨) في الأزمة السائقة إذا نزلوا منزلة تاو خارج الخندق حسب الحديد المعروف الآن بالزاقيق، وهو حديد له شوكة كثيف وضع على الأرض قامت له شوكة منه ليكون ذلك كالسور على العسكر، لأنه مثبط دهم العدو دخل تلك الشوكة (٩) في حوارف الخيل وأرجل الرجال (١٠) فيمنعهم (١١) الحركة.

وإذا كان العسكري نازلا منزلة فعلي صاحب العسكر أن يبعث الطلاب من عسكره نهاراً في الطرق والمواضع الحوفة، ويقيم خياله خارجاً عن عسكره على

٨ (٨) يبني في في.
٦ (٦) ناقص في في.
١٠ (١٠) الرجال في في.
٩ (٩) الشوكة في في، وكلمة "ثلاثة" مكتوبة في الهامش، لعل عند الحاسك ثلاث شوكة.
١١ (١١) منهم في في النصين.
الفصل الأول: في اختيار موقع المنزل.

قال أهل التجربة لأمور الحرب: يجب أن تكون المنزلة التي ينزل فيها(1) الجيش ذات ماء وعشب وحطب وغير ذلك ما يرتقي به العسكر، وأن يكون الموضوع الذي يقع فيه(2) النزول لو أراد العسكر التقدم إلى العدو أمكنه ذلك، ولو أراد التأخر عنه لمصلحة اقتساماً الحال أمكنه ذلك.

ويفتحد أن يسنذ ظهور أصحابه إلى الجبال، أو التلال، أو الأنهار، وما أشبه ذلك، مما يؤمن سرعة التطرقات والكمين والحيوات من العدو، فإن لم يجد خلف عسكره جيلا ولا تلا ولا تلبا، ولا غير ذلك مما يتي ظهور(3) أقام خلف العسكر نظارة كالطلائع، ينظرون ما يأتي من خلفه ليأمن هجوم العدو عليه بقية، وذلك أن العدو إن أتى مواجهة واجبه أهل العسكر بالقتاء بالسلاح، ودافعوه بما تصل(4) إليه طاقتهم من الدفاع. وأما إذا أتى من جهة ظهر العسكر...
العسكر للكشف ما وراء المنزلة بحسب ما يقتضيه الحال، ثم يلاقيه بخبر ذلك.

وخبر نزول مقدمة العسكر (١١) ليكون على بصيرة من ذلك قبل وصوله إليه.

فإن أطلق عليه من جهة للكشف، أو داخله ريبة في أمر ما هو أمانه، أرسل
من يكشف ذلك وتحققه ويعيد الخبر إليه. فإن بلغه الخبر يكرهه لم يظهر خوفًا
ولا هلعًا؛ فإن ذلك مما يشوش قلوب عسكره.

وعلى صاحب الجيش أنه إذا عرض في الطريق مضيق، أو عقبة، أو
نهر، أو نحو ذلك، وقف بنفسه حتى يجوز (١٣) العسكر عن آخره؛ فإن له إن
لم يفعل ذلك ربما طلب كل واحد منهم تقديم نفسه على غيره، وقعت المضايقة.
وجرى الخلاف بين العسكر، وأدى ذلك إلى إثارة الفتنة. وقد حكى عن الملك
الظاهر بيبرس البندقداري أنه لم دخل بلاد الروم وفتح قيسارية وعاد كان هو
الذي يولى أمر ذلك بنفسه، ويفقه في المضايقة وتعدية الأنهر حتى يجوز
الجيش واحدًا واحداً.

وعليه أن يوكى بساقطة عسكره جعلاً من يرجع إليه ويعمل بقوله في جماعة
من أصحابه، يحبس الجند والعلماء، ويمنع أحدًا منهم من الرجوع إلى ما وراء
العسكر، ولا يمكن أحدًا منهم من التخلف عن العسكر، فإنه منى رفع
أحد منهم أو تخلف عن العسكر ربما أخبر عن العسكر بشيء مما اتفق فيه
بما لا ينبغي إشعاعته، أو يردد فيه أو ينقص، فزيد بذلك تشويش خواطر
الناس.

(١١) «عسكره في ي».
(١٣) «يجوز في ي». 
الأماكن ذات الطريقة المختلفة أشد من المكان الذي ليس فيه إلا طريق واحد.

وعلى صاحب العسكر أن لا يمكن أحدا من أهل عسكره يتقدم على طلائع العسكر (ب حال فإنه ربما أصيب أحد من تقدم فيكون سبباً لطمع العدو في العسكر 

(1)). وقد (2) ينظر ذلك إلى فساد عظم لا يمكن تداركه، فإن الأمور بأوائلها.

الفصل الثاني: في بيان ما يجب فعله في حال المسير.

أول ما يجب على صاحب الجيش أن يقدم طلائعه على عسكره لكشف خبر العدو، على ما تقدم في الباب قبله؛ ثم بعد الطلائع يقيم رجلا من أهل الصرامة وصحة النظر والمعرفة بالطرقات في جماعة من ثقات عسكره. ويقيم رجالا لإصلاح الطرق، وقطع الأشجار (3)، وإقامة الحسور والقناطر على الأنهار، وإزاحة سائر ضروبات الطرق؛ فإن في ذلك تسبيب الطريق على العسكر (4) وإزالة التعب عند ازدحام العسكر (5)، وربما أوجبت تقييدا في السير أو تأخيراً عن بلوغ المقصود الذي يريد في وقت معين.

ثم أول ما يقدم من عسكره مقدمة العسكر (6) وهي الخيلاطة التي تكون في أول العسكر (7)، وراء ذلك على الترتيب إلى الساقة، وهي آخر العسكر، على ما سيأتي بيانه في ترتيب المصاف إن شاء الله تعالى.

وعليه أن يأمر بعض طلائعه أن يجاوز المزيلة التي تنزل (8) فيها مقدمة

(6) «و في ف»
(7) «فقد في ف»
(8) «الشجر في ف»
(9) «ما بين الخاضعين ناقص في»
(10) «ما بين الخاضعين ناقص في»
(11) «يقول في في»
الباب الثاني

في بيان ما يجب من التحرز عند الرحل وبيان ما يجب فعله في حالة المسير وفيه فصلان

الفصل الأول: في التحرز عند الرحل.

قال أهل النظر في أمور الحروب(١) على صاحب الجيش أن لا يذن لأحد من أهل عسكره جملة في الرحل إلا بعد تعبئة عسكره وتربيته، وركوب خيولهم، وليس لامة حربهم، ووقف المقدم على العسكر القائم(٢) بعبئته، وتربيته بأعماله في نواحي العسكرية بعدهم وسلاحهم. فإذا فعلوا ذلك أخذ الناس في التحميل والرحل والخيل محيدة بهم من كل جانب، حتى إذا استقلوا ساروا حيثئذ بعد أن يعرف صاحب العسكر كل أمير أو قائد من أمراء عسكره وقوده والمقامين على الطوابق(٣) وولاية الأعمال بما يفعل كل واحد منهم في حزينة ذلك، وما هو من شأنه بحسب ما يناسب في كل موطن ودعا الحاجة إليه.

ويختلف الحال في الاحتراز من الرحل باختلاف الأماكن والأوقات؛ فلا خفاء أن الرحل في الليل أولى بشدة الاحتراز من الرحل فينهار، وفي

(١) "حال" في ف. (٢) "الحرب" في ف. (٣) "طوابق" في ف. (٤) "ناقص" في ف.
واحد بالخبر وثبى اثنان لإسترقاء الكشف، وإن كانت أكثر من ذلك صرفهم المقدم عليهم بالإتيانٌ بالخبر والبقاء في الكشف على ما يختاره.

وينفي أن يكون الذي يرجع بالخبر من الطالع عادلا صدقاً، وإذا أتى بالخبر وصار، بحيث يرى العسكر نازلا أو سائرًا خفف جري فرسه على التدريج إلى أن يصل العسكرية فيدخلها برفق، ويخبر صاحب العسكر بما رأى لا يخبر بذلك غيره.

وينفي أن يكون بين صاحب العسكر وبين الذي يأتي بالخبر إشارة يفهم بها، صاحب العسكر الخبر حيث لا يسمع إظهاره. فقد روى أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم لما أرسل للكشف خبر بن قريظة قال: إن رأيت خبرنا فأعلنا به، وإن وجدتم عذرًا فألحنا إلى لحنا أعرف به، ولا تفتوا بآعداء المسلمين، بمعنى لا تخبرهم بخبر يسوهم.

وذلك ينفي أن يأتي بالخبر إذا وقعت الإحالة بينه وبين العسكر بعدو أو نزول العدو وسيره. وكررته وقلته مثل أن يكون نزوله عن فرسه إشارة لزول العدو وسيره، إلى جهة إشارة إلى سيره لتلك الجهوة، ويركض فرسه إشارة إلى غارة العدو، نحو ذلك.

(10) في الآتيان في.
(11) ناقص في.
(12) في.
(13) ؛ قريضه في.
(14) تفتوا في.
(15) وترفع في.
(16) ما بين الخاضرين ناقص في.
(17) ركض في.
(18) في
الفصل الثاني: في أحكام الطليعة وما ينبغي أن يعتبده فيها.

أول ما يجب أن يعتمد في أمر الطليعة أن لا يكون على أحد منهم درع، ولا معه (6) ترس؛ وأن يكون في جعبته عشرون سهماً فما فوقها، وأن لا يكون معه شيء يقلله البينة، لأن ذلك مما يمنع سرعة الخبر، وقد تقدم أن المطلوب منها سرعة الخبر.

والأحسن أن يكون مسيرهم في أرض مستوية ليس فيها غبار إن أمكن؛ لأنه أقرب لرؤية العدو؛ فإن احتاج الأمر إلى الصعود إلى مكان عال من جبل أو نحوه صعد البعض وباقي البعض في الأرض المستوية.

ولا ينتهي الطليعة في السير إلى أكثر من ثلاثة الطريق فيما بين العدو؛ وعليهم (7)، أن لا يسرعوا إلى جهة العدو متوغلين في جهتهم، بل يكون سيرهم بالرفق والتأني، مع ملاحظة (8) الكشف ميماً وشاياً.

وإن أظهر العدو هزيمة بين يد الطليعة فلا يتبعوه؛ فإنه ربما كان هناك كيس يخرج عليهم لا سيما إذا كانت هزيمة طليعة العدو في غير جهة عسكر العدو، مثل أن يكون العدو في القبلة فتغمر (9) طليعته إلى جهة أخرى، فإن مثل ذلك لا (10) تفعله طليعة العدو في الغالب إلا عند إدان كمين لم في تلك الجهة، وهذا مما يucket كثيراً للطلائع، فيجيب التحرز منه.

ثم إن كانت الطليعة فارساً واحداً فقط كشف الخبر وأتى به، وإن كانت اثنين بين واحد في الكشف وأتى واحد بالخبر، وإن كانت ثلاثة أثناً (6) ناقص في ى. (7) ملاحظة في ف. (8) فيهم في ف. (9) ناقص في ى.
الباب الثاني

في الطلاع وترتيب أمورها وما يعتمد في ذلك

وفيه فصلاً


أما الطليعة فإنها عبارة عن الخيالة التي تتقدم العسكر لاستطلاع الأخبار وكشفها؛ سميت بذلك الطلاع لاطلاعها على خبر العدو، وتسمى الكشافة أيضاً لكشفها الخبر.

وأما رجاها فقد قالوا إنه ينبغي أن يختار للطليعة رجال النصح والمرمية بمواصف الحروب؛ فإن النصرة هي حصلت الطليعة. كانت النصرة للعسكر غالبًا، ولذلك يستبشير أهل العسكر إذا حصلت النصرة لطليعته. ينبغي أن يجعل على الطليعة مقدماً ترجع إليه ونتبعه، لأنه إذا لم يكن عليهم مقدم يرجعون إليه، يقفون عند قوله، أدركهم الخلف، وفانت المصلحة فيها هو فيه.

وأما خيله في ينبغي أن تكون خيله سوابق جيدة، ظهوراً، سالة الخوارج، ليس بها جماعاً ولا فيها حرون؛ فإن المقصود من الطليعة سرعة رد الخبر. وإذا كان في الفرس حرون أو جماع أو نحو ذلك فوت المقصود من الطليعة.

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(1) ما بين الخاصرين ناقص في ي. (2) ما بين الخاصرين ناقص في ي. (3) لطليعة في ي. (4) جيلة في ف. (5) 51
أرباب العقول هي انقياد العدو ودخوله في الطاعة؛ فإذا حصل ذلك فقد حصل الفوز بالمقصود. ولو لم يكن من القتال بالطاعة إلا سلامة النفس والأموال لكان في ذلك كفاية. وإذا بذلت له الطاعة فعليه أن يكفر عن القتل وسفك الدم ما استطاع إذا وثق (٣٢) من عدوه بذلك؛ إذ لا فائدة من قتل الطائع، ففعل من يسلم من (٤٢) القتال يصير عونًا له بعد أن كان عونًا عليه.
الفصل الثاني: في إذا كان الجماعة ضعيفة والعدو قويًا.

وفي هذه الحالة يجب التأكد وترك العجلة في لقاء العدو. وعدم التعرض له إن أعرض، والأخذ في أمر بالخيل والخديعة والنكيدة ما أمكن، ولا يسوع التعرض له في هذه الحالة ابتداء، فإنه مثلى تعرض له كان كمن أن تأثر (17) الحيلة من وكرها(18) مع عجزه عن مقاومته ودفعها، فعرض نفسه للضرر، واتباع بيده إلى البلاطة، وقد قال بعض العلماء (19): خذ بالانية في الحرب ما استقامت للك. قال بعض العلماء (19): يعني ما كنت على جانب من الأمن.

وجملة فعلى المتصدى لقتال العدو أن لا يعجل إلى لقاءه. وأن يقبل الافية والسلامة ما وجب له. فقد قال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: لا تتموا لقاء العدو، وأسألوا الله الافية فإنهم ينصرون كما تنصرون، فإذا قيمتهم قالوا. وعلى أن لا يسهم مطاولة العدو، فإن في خلال الانتظار انناب الفرصة (20) والظهور على أحوال العدو وختي أمورهم. ولا يطلب الظلم بالقاء ما وجد إلى (21) الظلم بالحيلة مسيلا، فإن الخروج إلى العدو يقتضى التغريب بالنفس، واستيلاك الأموال، والغيرة عن البلد، ولو بظاهرها، مع ما في ذلك من توقف تلاف النفس، وركوب الأخطار، وتحمل المشاق. وربما فعلت الحيلة ما لا يفعله الحرب على ما تقدم في باب الخديعة والخيل.

وعليه أن يصرف أدرك اهتمامه إلى دخول العدو في طاعته واتباعه إليه، حتى يكون ذلك مقدماً عنده على الغنية (22) العظمى عند

(17) في ف.
(18) في ف. لكن مكتوب تحت السطر "الحكا".
(19) فصيلة في.
(20) فصيلة في.
(21) ناقص في.
(22) ناقص في.
(23) من جبها في.
(24) ناقص في.
(25) أثر في.
(26) علماء في.
حتى انتهى إلى خراسان [ وأعمالها ] (7). وكذلك فتحت [ في أيامه قري من
قوى الشام ] (8) ومصر وبرقة وغيرها. وفتح في خلافة عثمان [ رضي الله عنه ] (9)
من جهة الشرق كروان وسجستان وفارس وترفستان وغير ذلك، ومن جهة الغرب
أفريقيا وهي بلاد تونس، ومن جزيرة البحر قبرس.
وغزا معاوية في أيامه القسطنطينية (11)، قاعدة ملك الروم، وصيقتها (11).
وتولت غزوات الحلفاء بعد ذلك، وفتحهم في الدولة الأموية والدولة العباسية
بعدها، حتى قال إن المعتصم، أحد الحلفاء بن عباس، بلغه أن امرأة شريفة
آسرت تعذب (12) عند صاحب عمورية من بلاد الروم، فصاحت المرأة:
واعتصمت! فالله ما ملك عمورية: يتأ من المعتصم خلاصك إلا على أبلق.
فنادي في عسكره بركوب الخيل البلق، وخرج خلاصها، وفي مقدمة عسكره
أربعة آلاف أبلق، فخُلصت وعاد (13).
وكذلك تولت الفتوح العظيمة من ملوك مصر؛ ففتح الملك الناصر
صلاح الدين يوسف بن أبي بكر رحمه الله تعالى وأجده العادل أبو بكر ما كان
غلب عليه الفرج من بلاد الشام، وثبي القدس والساحل وأنطاكية وبعض
أعمال الفرات. ثم غلب الفرج على بعض ذلك أيضاً حتى استخلصه منهم ملوك
الترك بالغزوات المتالفة من الملك الظاهر بيرس وغيره، حتى كان آخر ما انتزع
منهم من ذلك من سواحل الشام على يد أشرف بن قلاوون في سنة [ تسعين
وسبعة ] (15).
الباب الثاني
في بيان متي يجب ملاقاة العدو وقتاله
وفي فصلان

الفصل الأول: فإن إذا كان الجيش قوياً والعدو ضعيفاً.

وفي هذه الحالة تجب مناهضة العدو ومناجزته وغزوه في بلاده. وقد أمر الله تعالى صلーム بقتله أهل الكفر [إلغاء عليهم] (١) فقال جلت قدرته: "يا أيها النبي جاهد الكفار ومنافقين وأغلظ عليهم" (٩: ٤٣). وأمر بقتل من جاور المسلمين من (٣) الكفار، فقال جل من قائل: "قاتلوا الذين يلونكم من الكفار وليجدوا فيكم غلظة" (٩: ١٢٣).

قال العلماء أغلب ما يجب[٣] الغزو في هذه الحالة في كل سنة مرة. وقد غزا[٤] النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم اثني عشر رحلة غزوة، وفتح أكثر بلاد العرب قبل وفاته صلائم. وقال أبو بكر الصديق - رضي الله عنه - بعده في خلافته أهل الردة الذين ارتدوا بعد وفاة النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم ومانع الزكاة، وقال: لم يمنحون عقلاً كانوا يعودون إلى رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم لقاتلهم عليه. وفتح بعض من بلاد الشام في خلافته [وهي أول مدينة فتحت من بلاد الشام] [٥]. [وفيمن عمرن الخطاب رضي الله عنه بعده دمشق وسائر بلاد الشام] [٦] وما وراء ذلك من جهة الشرق،

(١) ما بين الناسطين نافص في ف.
(٢) "و في ف.
(٣) ما بين الناسطين "قال وأقل يجب" في.
(٤) "غزى في ف.
(٥) ما بين الناسطين نافص في ف.
(٦) ما بين الناسطين نافص في ف.
ومنها ما يقتضى الإيقاظ والتذنيب خاصة، مثل أن يسلك غير طريقه (32)، أو يقف في غير موقفه، أو ينزل في غير منزله.

وبالجملة فذلك موكول إلى رأي صاحب الجبه، حيث رأى المصلحة في الفعل فعل، وحيث رأى المصلحة في الترك ترك. ولكل حالة حكم يختص بها.
من قولهم [26] ؛ فإن التآلف أدعى للنصرة، وأقرب إلى حصول الغرض.

وأن يمنعهم من التعرض لمن مروا به من أهل الطاعة والانقياد، وبسط اليد إلى شيء من أمورهم، والتعرض لحريتهم، ويعدمهم العوض عن ذلك بما بثتاه من عدويهم إذا ظفروا به.

ومن أن ينهم ذنبًا قابلًا عليه وأنبه بحسب ما يقتضيه ذلك الذنب، مثل أن يدل العدو على عورة أصحابه أو يطلعه على خباياهم، فإن الذي يفعل ذلك عدو في الحقيقة، لأنه [27] يطلع العدو على ما يتسلط به على أصحابه، فيكون قد بلغ بالعدو ما لم يكونوا يبلغونه لولاها.

ومنها ما يقتضى العقوبة، مثل أن يوارى الأمير حتى يحرب، أو يصف أصحابه بالضعف، أو يخذل أصحابه عن العدو، أو يزحف بهم؛ فإن من يتعاطى هذه الأمور [28] موهن لأمر الجيش المضضف لقلوب العسكر.

ومنها ما يقتضى التوبيخ والعنف، مثل أن يتأخر عن الموافقة يوم الحرب بغير عذر، أو يطلع على خبر من أخبار العدو ولا [29] يبلغه لصاحب العسكر؛ فإن تأخر الحبكة ساعة قد يعقب تعب سنة.


وينبغى له (١٤) أن يعرف مع ذلك أحوال سائر أهل عسكره وأرباب وظائف دولته، وما يستقبل عليه كل واحد منهم من المناقب السنية (١٥) ليتعين كل واحد منهم فيما يصلح له يجعله في الموضع الذي يستحق أن يكون فيه.
وينبغى أن يعرف ذا الرأى الصائب من أرباب دولته، فإجعله أقرب الناس إليه وأخصهم به، فإن الرأى شديد النفع في أمر الحروب، بل هو مقدم على الشجاعة. وناهيك قول ابن أبي (١٧) تمام الطائى:

الرأى قبل شجاعة الشجعان هو (١٨) أول وهي الخل الثاني.
وحكى عن المهلب بن أبي صفرة، شيخ الحروب وإمامها، أنه غاب عنه رجل من أهل عسكره اسمه بيس [ فقال] (١٩) : ما يسري أن يكون في عسكري ألف شجاع ويغلب على بيس. فقال له (٢٠) : إن لي من (٢١) الغال السام من الشجاعة. فقال : نعم، ولكنه شديد الحزم، محكم العقل، فلو كان مكانته ألف شجاع لما أمنت عليهم.

الفصل الرابع: في كيفية سياسة صاحب الجيش جيشه وتدير عسكره وما يأخذه به.
أول ما يجب عليه من ذلك أن ينزل كل واحد منهم منزله، ويقصد به إلى منزلته (٢٢) اللائقة به، وبوفيه من الإكرام حقه، ويعرف له (٢٣) قدر كل ما فعله مما يستحسن من مثله، وأن يجارى احترام على إحسانه، وينبغي المسه على إساءته: يقبل المنصوب من الذنب عرته. وعلى أن يأمر جنده وأتباعه بالألماء والمعاضدة والمناصرة ونزع الغل (٢٤) من صدورهم [ وصل الشحنا

(١٦) ناقص في ف. 
(١٧) ناقص في ف. 
(١٨) ناقص في ف. 
(١٩) ناقص في ف. 
(٢٠) ناقص في ف. 
(٢١) ناقص في ف. 
(٢٢) المربعة في ف. 
(٢٣) ناقص في ف. 
(٢٤) Ndash; في ف.
وإن كان راجلاً بأن(11) يكون صبوراً على السعي على رجليه، عارفاً بمواضع الضرب والتسير منه، والمفارضة في ملاقاة الرجال، ومحاربة الفرسان ومدافعتها، وتشريد الخيل وتفيرها، إلى غير ذلك من الأمور اللازمة للقiras والراجل.

الفصل الثالث: في يجب على صاحب الجيش من معرفة أصدقاءه.

قال أهل التجربة للحروب: ينبغي لصاحب الجيش أن يعرف ما استطاع معرفته عن أصدقاءه وجنده وهو دائماً واحداً بما خصصت له، وما يعانين من أنواع الحرب، وما يختص به من الشجاعة والجبن وسائر أحواله، وأن يعرف مراثب الشجعان وما يعتناء كل منهم في شجاعته؛ فإن منهم الشجاع الثابت الملازم لمقامه، والمصمم [على خصمه](12). ومنهم الشجاع الكرار الفرار الذي يذهب وياتي. ومنهم الشجاع الحامل على الأفران الذي لا يجلل له حضراً بعيداً، بل الدنيا لاحظته فنهرها. ومنهم من يجيد القتال فارساً، ومنهم الذي يجيد القتال راجلاً. ومنهم الذي يجيد الضرب بالسيف، والذي يجيد الطلع بالرمح، والذين يجيد القول بالسهام. ومنهم الجبان الذي يشبه الشجعان في زهيمهم، والجبان الظاهر الجبن، وغير ذلك من صفات الشجاعة والجبن.

فإن إذا عرف كل واحد من هؤلاء صفته أنزله في الحرب منزلته، وأقامه فيما يليق إقامته فيه، فحص على الغرض المطلوب منه. وإن كان جباناً صرعه من مواقع القتال، وعدل به(13) عنه. وإن لم يعرف حاله في الشجاعة والجبن لم يعرف أي(14) يضعه ولا أي منزلة ينزله.

(11) فإن» في ف. (12) ما بين الخاصرين ناقص في ف. (13) منها في ف. (14) أن» في ف.
على صلاح أمضاء والنزمه، وإذا بدأ أماناً فيه به، مع حفظ الناموس وقيام الآبة وإظهار المهبة.

إذا اشتمل على هذه الصفات وما في معناها كان حقيماً بالتقدم على الجنين والقيام بأمر العسكر و[ القيام بأمر الله] (5) الحرب.

الفصل الثاني: في صفات الجنين وأهل العسكر من الفرسان والرجال الذين يصلحون لقاء العدو وقائلاً.

[ ينبغي لمن يتصدى للخروج لقاء العدو وقائلاً] (6) من الجنين أن يكون شجاعاً مقداماً، درياً بأمر الحرب مجيباً لأمورها، شديد الصبر على الغربة ومشقة الأسفار ومقاساة الأهل والغالب من الناس ولا يعترض ولا يصبر ولا يستسلم ولا يتراجع. (7) وأن يكون مع ذلك شديد الحب من هو في خدمته، ناصحاً له، حريصاً على نصره، مؤثراً ليحيته على حياة نفسه، قائماً بما يلزم من الخدمة، موفقاً حق منه وما به تحمله قدرته ويصل إليه وسعه.

مع كونه عارفاً بالخيل وآليتها وطرف (8) من البيطرة، بحيث يضع المسار في النجاح إذا سقط منه (9) في الطريق، وإصلاح ما يحتاج إلى الإصلاح من ألات خيله وسلاحه حيث تدعو الضرورة إلى ذلك. وإن كان عارفاً بأن يكون له درية بركوب الخيل وحركاتها في الحرب، وما يجب على الفارس حال اللقاء من المقابلة والقتال والثبات حيث [ احتيج إليه الكر والفر حيث (10) احتيج إلى ذلك، والمواجهة والاستطوار حيث دعت الضرورة إليه.

(6) ما بين الخاصرين ذاق في.
(5) طرق في.
(7) مهله في.
(9) ذاق في.
(8) ما بين الخاصرين ذاق في.
(10) ما بين الخاصرين ذاق في.
الباب السابع

في صفة مقدم الجيش وجنده وما ينبغي أن يأخذهم به
وفي أربعة فصول

الفصل الأول: في صفة مقدم العسكر

قال العلماء بشأن الحرب والدرة بأموره: ينبغي أن يكون مقدم الجيش كامل العقل، ثابت القلب، تام الشجاعة، وافر البقظة، كثير الحذر، شديد الحزم، بصراً بأحكام الحروب ومواضع الفرص منها، عارفاً بالخيل والماكي وخدمته فيها، عالماً بتنفيذ العساكر وترتيب الجيوش، خبيراً بالطرق والمخاطر ومناهل المياه وأحوال المراحل والمنازل، والأوقات التي يستحق فيها السير والذي يستحق فيها النزول، مجاهداً في إدخال الأمن على عساكره، مدافعاً عن القتال بلطف الهزيلة ما أمكن، متقدماً في العلم بمزايا القتال ومحاربة الحصن والمدافع عنها، صبوراً على المطالبة في القتال والحصار، حسن الانسحاب بعد بلوغ الغرض.

وأن يكون مع ذلك عارفاً بالخيل شياتها (1)، والآثاب والقيام بتحملها، وأصناف السلاح، وما يستحسن منها، وما يليق لبأس من أنواعها في كل وقت من أوقات الحرب، مع كونه حسن السيرة، ظاهر السرية، نقي الحيب، صالح النية، سخياً ببذل المال، مرتاحاً لطلبه، مؤثراً لعفوه، على العقوبة، والصفع على الموازنة. وإذا وعد وعداً أنجزه، وإذا قال قوله، فعله، وإذا عاقب

(1) «الجيش» في.
(2) «لاخلف» في.
(3) «يعد» في.
(4) «تشارها» في.
(5) "الف" في.

(32) في ف.
(33) ناقص في.
(34) في.
(35) ناقص في.
الضرب الثاني أن يكون المستشار فيه ما لا تسع (٢٤) إشاعته، كما
إذا كانت الاستشارات في أمر خفي يحتاج إلى الكيان عن العامة دون الخاصة،
مثل أن يقصد غزو العدو في ديارهم على حين غفلة، ونحو (٢٥) ذلك خص به
من يختاره من خاصته ونصحته وذويه الذين يثق بهم.

إذا اختص به (٢٦) واحداً بفرده لم يطلع عليه غيره؛ فقد حكي أن ملكاً
من ملوك الهند الاستشار وأراه في أمر، فقال له أحدهم: أصلح الله الملك؛ إن
في تحصين السر الظهر بالحاجة والسلاحة من الخلل، ولا يصح لسراً
هذا إلا لسانان وأربعة آذان، يعني أن يكون المشاوران اثنين فقط، فخلا به
الملك وكلمه بفرده.

وإن احتاج إلى مشاركة جميع من أخصائه فيه استشار كل واحد منهم
بفرده، ولم يعلمه أنه أظهره لغيره؛ فإن ذلك أدعي لكلائه وعدم إشاعته،
لأن كلاً منهم يخف من إظهاره فيشع، مع أن (٢٧) في ظنه أنه لم يعلمه غيره.

وإن لم يسع إظهار ذلك السر، ولا استشاراً أحد فيه البثة خطر أمره،
فالطريق في ذلك أن يقيسه على أشياءه من الأمور، وتأخذه بنظايرة،
وينتسبن (٢٨) ما يقع من قلاب الناس في ذلك من غير إظهار لقصد سماوته.
فقد حكي أن المتصرف بن أبي عامر، ملك الأندلس، دخل في بعض مغايذه
إلى بلاد الكفر بالأندلس، وتوغل فيها، فدخل عليه الشناعة، وأحاط به العدو
وحصره، وسواه عليه الدروب، وحصناً بالرجال، فقتل [ذلك عليه] (٢٩)
[وخوف الهلاك على نفسه] (٣٠) على المسلمين، فخرج منكراً يمشي في

(١٣) "الفصل" في الف.
(٢٤) "يقظ" في الف.
(٢٥) "ودون" في الف.
(٢٧) "ذاق" في الف.
(٢٨) "يقظ" في الف.
الفصل الثاني: في أداب (12) الاستشارة في الحرب.

قد ذكر (13) العلماء بأمر الحروب (14) أن الأمر المستشار فيه في الحرب على ضررين: الضرر الأول أن يكون المستشار فيه لما (15) يستغَّل إظهاره، ولا ينبغي بالاشتراك كالاستشارة في أمر العدو الظاهر المواجه بالقصد، فأولى به أن تقدم فيه مشاورة أهل العقل والعلم; فقد سأى بعض الحكماء: أي الأمور أشد للملك (16) تأييداً [وأيضاً أشد ضرراً عليه]؟ (17) فقال: [وشكها تأييداً له] (18) ثلاثة أشياء: مشاورة العلماء، وتجربة الأمور، وحسن النثبت؛ وأشدها إضراراً بها ثلاثة أشياء: الاستباد بالرأي من غير مشورة، والباون، والملجة.

وقيل لرجل من بن عباس: ما أكثر صوابكم. قال: نحن ألف رجل، وبيناه حازم واحد، فنحن نشواره، فكانا (19) بذلك ألف حازم، وإن لم يظهر (20) له صواب في رأى الأكابر عم (21) الرأي، واستشار كل كبير وصغير؛ فإن الرأي قد يوجد حيث لا يظن وجوده.

قال الحسن: كان النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم يستشير حتى المرأة، فنشير عليه بالشيء فيأخذ به. ويقال لم تزل حزمة الرجال يستشيرون صواب الرأي حتى من الأمة الودوء، والله وله (22) في القائل:

لا تحزن الرأي وهو موفق، بره الصواب إذا أتي من ناقص.
ما وراءنا من القلب، يعني الآبار، ثم بنى عليه حوضاً فنالاه ماء، ثم نقلل فنشرب ولا يشربون. فقال رسول الله صل الله عليه وسلم: لقد أشرت بالرأي. ثم نقض رسول الله صل الله عليه وسلم بمنه من الناس، فصار حتى أن أدى ماء من القوم، فنزل عليه، ثم أمر بالقلب فغورت، وبي حوضاً على القلب الذي نزل عليه وقاتله، فكانت النصرة للمسلمين، كما أخبر الله تعالى بقوله: "ولقد نصركم الله بيده وأنتم أذهلا" (2: 11). وروى (1) الواقدي في مغازي أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم لما نزل على خيبر نحاها (7) فنزل بني ظهراي النخل (8) بالقرب من الحصن، فقال له الحباب بن المنذر أيضاً: يا رسول الله إنك نزلت متزلك هذا، فإن كان عن أمر أمرت به فلا تتكلم، وإن كان الرأي تكلمنا. فقال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: بل هو الرأي. فقال: يا رسول الله دنيو من الحصن، ونزلت بني ظهراي النخل (9)، فكون نبل القوم إلينا أسرع لارتفاعهم [على حصولهم] (10). مع أن لا آمن من بنيهم لنا، يدخلون في ذرى (11) النخل. تحول يا رسول الله إلى موضع برئ من النز وواباء، نجعل الحرية بنيا وبيه، حتى لا تنازلنا سههمهم، وتأمن بناهم وترفع عن النز.

قال رسول الله صل الله عليه وسلم: أشرت بالرأي. ثم دعا محمد بن مسروق فقال: انظر منزلا بعيداً عن حصولهم برئ من الوباء، تأمن فيه من بنيهم. ففعل، وكانت النصرة للنبي صلى الله عليه وسلم أيضًا.
باب الثامن

في الاستشارة في أمر الحرب

وفي فصلان

الفصل الأول: في الحديث على الاستشارة في الحرب.

لا نزاع في أن الاستشارة في نفس الأمر مطلوبة؛ وقد روي أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم قال: ما خاب من استخار، ولا ندم من استشار. ولا شك أنها في الحرب أكده. وقد أمر الله تعالى النبي ﷺ بها، مع أنه أكل الناس عقولاً، وأذكىهم لياً.

 فقال جل من قال: "لو كنت فذاءاً عليك القلب لانفضوا من حولك، فاعف عنهم، واستغفر لهم، وشاورهم في الأمر" (3: 159). وذهب الكثير من المفسرين إلى أن المراد بذلك الاستشارة في الحرب.

[ويرى أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم كثير الاستشارة في الحروب] (1). وقد روى ابن إسحاق في سيرته أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم، لما نزل بدر للقاء فريش وقناهم، قال له الحباب بن المنذر: يا رسول الله أرأيت (2) هذا المنزل؟ أنت أزلك الله ليس لنا أن نتقده ولا نتأخر عنه؟ أم هو الرأى والحرب والكبدة؟ فقال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: بل هو الرأى والحرب والكبدة. قال: يا رسول الله، فإن هذا ليس مظلل، فإنفسك بالناس حتى تأتي أدنى ماء من القوم، فنزله ثم نفور (3).

(1) حروبه في ف. (2) أويت في و. (3) نقول في ف. (4) ما بين الخاصرين ذاق في ف.
تلك العصا إليه وعرفه بأمر الكتاب، فاستخرجه وقرأه، فشق ذلك عليه، ونفت على ذلك الأمير الذي انضم إليه من جهة أبو عزرزالملك الفرس، وحلف إنه وقعه عليه ليبتليه شرقية. فلما بلغ ذلك الأمير فرأ نفسه، ورجع ملك الروم إلى ملكه. فلما بلغ ذلك الخبر أبو عزرزالملك الفرس، قال: إن كلمة هزتهم أربع مائة ألف بحيل (37) قدرها.

ولما كان الحرب بين أهل الشام والعراق بصفين، وطالت الحرب بينهم، حصلت القوة في آخر الأمير لأهل العراق، لاح لثم الأمير (38) والنصر والظهير، وعلم أهل الشام أنهم قد (39) أحيط بهم، وتجرؤوا (40) للهزمة؛ فباشر بعض أهل الشام برفع المصاحف على الرماح، فوقع الحلف بين أهل العراق بسبب ذلك؛ بعضهم يقول: نقاتلهم، وبعضهم يقول: [لا نقاتلهم] (41) رفعوا لنا المصاحف، فبردت بذلك نار الحرب، وكان سبباً لنصر أهل الشام على أهل العراق. والحكايات في ذلك كثيرة يطول ذكرها.

(38) ناقص في ف.
(39) ناقص في
(40) ظهروا في ف.
(41) ما بين الحاصرتين لا نقاتلهم لأنهم في ف.
فهبت الملك لذلك، وزاد تعجبه، وقال له: أفي هذه المملكة من يرى زمانتك؟ فضحك، وقال: أيها الملك، إلى من أضعفهم رواية. فقال له الملك: إن ملككم جاهل، أما علمني قرايت من دياره؟ فضحك وقال: إن أعطاني الملك الأمان نصحته. قال: قد أعطيتكم الأمان. فقال: إن ملكنا إنا فعل ذلك استنهاك، وصغيراً لأمرك، وتلتوط في بلاده حتى لا تخرج من قبضته؛ فإن عندنا ماشف ألف رام كلهم يرى أجرد مى. فلما سمع ذلك الملك كلام براهم قال: قد نصحني، وأمر مقدم جيشه أن يرحل راجعاً إلى بلاده. وانصرف براهم إلى دار ملكه ليلاً، فلما أصبح قعد (33) للناس، فدخل عليه وزراءه وعظماء دولته، فسألهم عن خير العدو، فأخبروه بانصرفاه، فضحك وأخبرهم الخبر.

وحكى الجاحظ أيضاً أن كسرى أبو بيز، أحد ملوك النزاس، وجه إلى قنال ملك الروم أمهراً من أمراه، فعصى عليه، وانتحاز إلى ملك الروم، وحمله على أبو بيز. فخرج ملك الروم لقتال أبو بيز في [أربع مائة] (33) ألف، فلما بلغ ذلك أبو بيز عند إلى كتاب كتبه إلى أميره الذي عصى عليه بلاد الروم يقول فيه: إذا وافاك (34) كتباه هذا فأحرق ديار الروم، وقد أنت بملك الروم في يوم كذا. ونقب عصاً، وجعل ذلك (35) الكتاب في ضمنها، وطلب نصرانياً كان عنده أميراً يظهر الخبيبة للملك، فعرفه بأمر الكتاب الذي في العصا، ودفع إليه العصا وقال: اذهب إلى أميرى فإنك في بلاد الروم، ودفع له هذه العصا، وعرفه بالكتاب الذي فيها. فخرج النصراني حتى أتى (31) ديار الروم، فسمع نحو عشرة آلاف ناقوس تضرب، فآدركه حمية النصرانية، مال إلى دينه. فأتي إلى ملك الروم واستأذن عليه فأذن له، فدفع

(31) "داره في" في.
(32) "نفر" في.
(33) ما بين الحاضرين "أريحاية" في.
(34) "وفاك" في.
(35) "أنا في" في.
(36) نافق في.
دعاك أبو العباس، فأعلم بضعه منكم.

فلما دنا العدو من دياره دخلوا عليه ليختبئوا الخبير، فلما بلغهم أمرهم
عبرت(21) كل واحدة من قصبة(22)، وليس هو أيضاً ثوبًا مصبغًا
وأركب قصبة، خرج والخوارج يغنين بين يديه، وهو يغني أيضاً(23) معهم،
فلما رآه الوزراء وأكابر الدولة يتساءلون منه وتركتوه(24) ومضوا.

فدخل من ساعته إلى بيته، وخلق رأسه، وليس مسحاً من صوف
وصير إلى الليل، خرج ومعه قوسه(25) ونشابه، حتى انهى إلى القريب من
طلائع العدو، فكم في مكان على ظهر الطريق، وكان مجردًا في الرمي،
فجعل لا يمر به طائر في السماء ولا وحش في البرية إلا رماه فأصابوه، حتى اجتمع
له من الصيد قدر كثير.

فيما(26) هو كذلك إذ مر به المقدم على طبعة العدو، ونظر(27) إلى
الصيد، فبعث لكرايه، وقال له: من(28) أنت؟ قال لؤي: إن أعطيتني الأمان
أخبرتك. قال: لك الأمان. قال: أنا غلام سايس خيل(29) غصب علی
مولى فنزاع نابي وخلق رأس وألبستي هذا المسح، وأجابني بعد أن كان
محسناً إلى(30) لافغنته وخرج أطلت شيئاً أصيبته فآكلها، فاستعاناني ذلك
إلى أن رويت هذا الصيد يجمع ما معني من السهام.

فأخذه مقدم الطليعة، وحمله إلى ملكه، وقص عليه القصة فقال له:
أرم بين يدي فرّ، فكانت تقع سباعه في أي مكان أحبة الملك من الصيد.

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(21) "ألف" في ف.
(22) "نقاش" في.
(23) "فركو" في.
(24) "في" في.
(25) "لأني" في.
(26) "ما" في.
(27) "ل" في.
(28) "من" في.
(29) "جني" في.
(30) "ف" في.
(31) "ناس" في.
(32) "في" في.
(33) "في" في.
(34) "في" في.
(35) "في" في.
(36) "في" في.
(37) "في" في.
(38) "في" في.
(39) "في" في.
(40) "في" في.
رسول الله صل الله عليه وسلم: أذهب فأخذل عنا ما استطعت، فإن الحرب خدعة. فخرج
نعيم بن مسعود حتى أتى بني قريظة يهود (10) المدينة، وكان نديماً لهم في
الجاهلية، فقال: قد عرفتم ودي لكم، وأنا لكم ناصح أن قريشا وغطفان قد
جاءوا من بلادهم لقتال محمد وأصحابه، وقد وافقتهم على قتاله، وأتى مقيمون
بها البلد وفه أموالكم ونسبةكم وأبناءكم، وأموالكم ونسبةهم وأبناءهم بعيدة، فإن
وجدوا خيراً أصابوه وانصرفوا إلى بلادهم، وخلوا بينكم وبين محمد وأصحابه، ولا
طالبة لكم بهم فلا قتالوه معهم حتى تأخذوا منهم رهنًا من أشرافهم يكونون
عندكم؛ فقالوا: أشرت بالرأي.
ثم انصرف إلى قريش وغطفان وقال: قد علمتم مودتي لكم وفرائكم محمدًا.
وقد أتينكم بصيغة فاكتموها عنى. إن بني قريظة قد نذموا على حرب محمد;
وأوقفوا عليك，则 وعدهم أن يأخذوا منكم (11) رهنًا من أشرافهم، وبدفعهم
إليه ليقتلكم فلا تدفعوا إليهم [ رجلاً واحدًا منكم] (12).
فلما أرسل قريش وغطفان إلى بني قريظة يسألونهم المساعدة طلبوا منهم
الرهن من رجالهم، فلما سمعوا ذلك منهم قالوا: صدق نعم بن مسعود فإنما
وأبى أن يعطيهم (13) الرهن، فوقع الخلاف بينهم، وكانت المزاجة عليهم والنصر
لرسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم وأصحابه.
وحكي الجاحظ في بعض مصنفاته أن بهرام جور، أحد ملوك الفرس، لما
ملك بعد أبيه زيدرود غلب العدو على بعض أطراف بلاده، فأظهر الاستنكار
بأمر العدو والاستخفاف به، حتى قوى أمر العدو، واشتدت شوكته، وزحف
 نحوه (14) فاجتمع ورآيه [ الملك بهرام] (15) إليه، وكلموه في ذلك، فقال:
(10) ﴿هجوا في ي.﴾ (11) ﴿منه في ي.﴾ (12) ﴿منكم رجلاً واحدًا في ي.﴾ (13) ﴿ودؤهم في ي.﴾ (14) ﴿عليه في ي.﴾ (15) ﴿ما بين الخاصرين منكم رجلاً واحدًا في ي.﴾ (16) ﴿ما بين الخاصرين في ي.﴾
وأما استحسنو في ذلك أن يكتب إلى بعضهم كتابًا كأنها جواب عن كتب
وصلت منهم إليه، وكتب كتابًا عن (11) ألسنتهم إليه (11) ويلي فيها في
المواقع التي يتوقع أن تشير إلى رئيسهم. فإنه إذا وقف رئيسهم على شئ
من هذه الكتب كدرت خاطره عليهم، وأنزل عندها منزلة الهمة، فيكون ذلك
سبأ إلى افتراق كلمتهم، وتشتيت جماعتهم، وتغيير خواطرهم، أو تغيير
خاطره عليهم. فإن وُب على واحد منهم، أو قتله (12)، أو سفك دمه،
داخلهم الخوف منهم، وشملهم الرب، ودعاه ذلك إلى الحرب من رئيسهم
إليه. وإن كان رئيسهم متأثراً محتملاً فلا بد أن يبني في نفس كل منهم وحشة.

الفصل الثالث: في ذكر طرف من الخدمة والخيل التي وقعت لأهل تدبير
الحروب.

ودذا هذا نسب مما لا ينتهي إلى حد، وفي كتاب التواريخ وسير الملك
في الجاهلية والإسلام منه ما يملأ الدفاتر وشحها.

فمن أحسن ذلك موضعًا، وألفتهًا مأخذاً، ما رواه ابن إسحاق (13) في
مغازيّه أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم، في يوم الأحزاب، قضى قريش وبني غزليان من مكة
وما حولها، وصراوا إلى المدينة الشريفة قطاعها، ووقفهم على قطاعه بنو قريظة
بهد المدينة. وكان من مضابطهم ومحارصهم للمسلمين ما أخبر الله تعالى بقوله:
"إذا جاومكم من فوقكم ومن أسفل منكم وإذا زاغت الأحبص وبلغت القلوب
الخناجر" (33: 10).

فبينما النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم على ذلك، إذ أنهم نعم بن مسعود، أحد بني غزليان،
فقال: يا رسول الله إلى قد (14) أسلمت، وإن قومي لم يعلموا بي. فقال له

(11) ناقص في.
(12) ناقص في.
(13) "اسحق" في.
(14) "قلت" في.
(10) "على" في.
(11) "على" في.
(13) "على" في.
(14) "على" في.
الفصل الثاني: في كيفية التحليل والخادعة.

وهذا، وإن كان باباً لا يدخل تحت الحصر، إلا أن الأصل في السياسة والأتخاذ بالقلوب في الظاهر، وإعمال الفكر فيها في طريق شمل العدو، ووقف الجهل بينهم، ووثب بعضهم ببعض بألفطه الحيل وأحسن المكافحة والعمل في كل واقعة بما يناسبها من ما يدل عليه العقل.

ومن أحسن المواقف في ذلك أن يدس إلى عدوه الدسايس، ويتوقع له الغوايل، ويدخن رؤوسهم بما فيه استجلاب قلوبهم واستيالة خواطرهم، وخروجهم عن طاعة صاحبهم، بأن يدعهم كل جميل، ويطرع آمالهم في بلع كل مقصود، والعفو عنهم وأنصاف عن جرائمهم إن مالوا إليه أو فارقوا صاحبهم وقصدوه. وبذل الأمان لكل من سأله منهم، ويرغبهم من كل وجه يقضيه الشرب، ويعرفهم أنهم إن أقاموا على المخالفة حتى يظهر بهم أوقع بهم أشد النكال والحزى واللومان، ويدعون إلى الرؤب بصاحبهم إن أمكنهم أو اعتزاله والخروج عنه إن لم يكن لهم يوثب عليه طاقة.

(4) ما بين الخاصتين «وإنه سمع بعض خاصكيته ذا يوم تحدث و يقولون في ي.
(5) "لمقالة" في ي.
(6) "الخфер" في ف.
(7) "نافذ" في ي.
(8) "شميل" في ي.
(9) "سال" في ي.
الباب الرابع
في الخديعة والخليط المغنية عن الحرب
وفي ثلاثة فصول
الفصل الأول: في الحث على الخديعة في الحرب والخليط فيه.

لا نزاع أن الخديعة والخليط في الحرب مطلوبة شرعاً وعقلاً؛ أما الشرع فقد ورد في الصحيحين عن حديث أبي هريرة وجابر بن عبد الله الأنصارى - رضي الله عنهما - أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم قال: الحرب خدعة.


ومن أحسن ما يحكى في ذلك أن الملك الناصر سعد بن قلاون - رحمه الله - في آخر زمانه بعد الصلح (3) مع النتر، كان يحسنهم ويراسلهم ويهاديهم ما بين كبير وصغير، حتى يهادي العجاجز في البيت كسرأ للفتن.

(1) ملاقات في [1].
(2) "الفتح" في [2].
(3) "الصلح" في [3].
شيئًاٰ [حتى يرسل مع رسول آخر يحكي] (٨٠) للرسل إليه كتابه أو رسالته حرفًاٰ حرفًاٰ ومعنى معنى ؛ فإن الرسول ربما فاته بعض ما يوصله فافتعل الكتب وغير ما شوقي به ؛ فحرم بذلك المرسل على المرسل إليه ؛ فأدى ذلك إلى فساد شديد ، كما تقدم في حكاية الإسكندر في القصل الأول من هذا الباب .

(٨١) ما بين الخاصتين «حتى يرسل رسولاً يحكي» في يٰٰ
بمقام الإله، فلو كان إلاّا (19) كما يزعمون لما تسلط عليه اليهود بالقتل والصلب بزعمهم.

فإذا حصل رسول الملك على هذه الشروط وما في معناها كان حقيعاً بأن يرسل بالمهمات وبمشي بالرسالة بين الملك، ومني فات فيه شرط عن ذلك لا ينبغي أن يستعمل في رسالة أصلاً.

الفصل الثاني: في تدبير أمر الرسول وما ينبغي أن يعتدد في أمرهم.

قال المتكلمون في آداب الملك: على الملك أن يمتنع رسوله مدة طويلة قبل أن يوجهه في رساله، ليعلم حقيقة حاله، فيكون على يدي من أمره، فينقبه فيها يرسله فيه. وكان من شأن ملوك الفرس فيا سلف، إذا أرادوا إرسال شخص، قدنوا امتحانه بإرساله إلى بعض خواص الملك ممن هو في قار داره في بعض المهمات، ثم يجعل عليه عينًا في يرسل فيه من حيث لا يشعر ؛ فإذا أدى الرسول رسالته رجع بجوابها، سأل الملك الذي أرسله في أمور الكشف (20) عنه، فإن طلب ما أتى به كلام الآخر صار عند الملك مميزاً لأن يكون رسولاً له إلى الملك.

وكان أزديش بن بابک، أحد ملوك الفرس، يقول: على الملك الحاكم، إذا وجه رسوله إلى ملك، أن (21) يرسل باخر، وإن وجه برسولين وجه بعدهما باثنين، وإن أمكنه أن لا يجمع بين رسول في طريق فعل. ومن الحزم أن الرسول إذا أتاه برسالة أو كتاب فيه خبر أو سر وارتباه به أن لا يحدث في ذلك.

(19) ما بين الخاصرين، «ما لا يلبق بالإله، ولو كان إلاّا» في ف. 
(20) «الكشف» في ف.
(21) «بأن» في ف.
فقص عليه الخبر، وذكر له (12) ما قاله ملك الروم، فقال: والله ما أردت.

إلا ما قال.

ومن أن يكون عالماً بمواقيع الخطاب والجواب: أما الخطاب إذا كان عارفاً بمواقيع (13) أورد الكلام في موقعه، وقام بالحجبة على من أرسل إليه، كما روى أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم دعى الكابي - رضي الله عنه - إلى هرقيل ملك الروم بالشام، قال له: ناشدتك الله، أعلمن أن المسيح كان يصل؟ قال: نعم. قال: فإني أدعوك إلى من كان يصل إليه المسيح، فنظر إلى هذا الخطاب الملزم للخصم (14) الحجة، لأن النصارى يعتقدون في المسيح أنه الله والإله لا يصل إليه، وإذا صلى العبد. فلما قره بصلاة المسيح، أنزمه من ذلك أن المسيح عليه السلام عبد الله.

وأما الجواب، فإنه إن كان عارفاً بمواقيع فورد عليه سؤال، أجاب عنه بما يقطع الخصم ويدفعه، كما روى أن خطاب ابن أبي بلنطة - رضي الله عنه - بعثه النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم إلى المقويس ملك مصر، سأله المقويس عن حال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم في القتال، وأنه يغلب قومه أو يغلبونه. فقال: الحرب بينه وبينهم سجال، تارة له وثارة عليه. فقال له المقويس: النبي يغلب. فقال له خطاب (15): فالله يصلي. فسكت المقويس، وذلك أن المقويس أراد أن يقيم الحجة [على خطاب بن أبي بلنطة بأنه ربما يتعالب في الحرب] (16)، والنبي لا يليق به ذلك في زعمه، فناقضه خطاب [بن أبي بلنطة] (17). رضي الله عنه - بأن النصارى يزعمون أن المسيح إنه (18)، ويقولون إن اليهود قتلوه وصلىوه، وذلك [ما لا يليق

(12) [مواقيع في]
(13) [يا محمد] في ف.
(14) [يا محمد] في ف.
(15) [يا محمد] في ف.
(16) [يا محمد] في ف.
(17) [يا محمد] في ف.
(18) [يا محمد] في ف.
أٓم أنت شاك فيه؟ فقال الرسول: بل (7) أنا على يقين منه أنه قاله. فأمر الإسكندر أن يكتب الألفاظ حرفًا حرفًا، وتبع إلى الملك مع رسول آخر فقرأ عليه، وترجم له. فلما قرأ الكتاب على الملك مرّ بذلك الحروف فأنكره، وقال للترجم: ضع يدًا على هذا الحروف ووضعها فأمر بعلامة فوضعت عليه، وكتب ذلك الملك إلى الإسكندر كتابًا يقول فيه أن الملكة صدقت لهجة الرسول إذا كان عن لسانه بنطق، وإلى أذنه يؤدى.

فلمحا وصل الرسول إلى الإسكندر دعا رسوله الأول، وقال: ما حملك على كلمة قصدت بها فساد ملكي؟ (8) فذكر أن ذلك وقع منه لتقليد من الملك في حقه. فقال له الإسكندر: فأراك لنفسك قد سبت لا لنا، فلما فاتك ما أمتله ما لا تستتحقق على من أرسلت إليه جعلت ذلك فأو توقه في الأنس الخظيرة الرفيعة، ثم أمر بلهانه فلعن من قفاه.

ومنها أن يكون جسورًا مقدماً، فإنه متي كان جبانًا امتنع عليه تأديه الأمور المكروهة إلى الملك الذي أرسل إليه (9) خوفًا منه ورهبة. ومن أحسن ما ينصح في ذلك أن معاوية بن أبي سفيان أحد أصحاب النبي صلعم، في خلافته أرسل رسولاً إلى ملك الروم، وأعطاه دية رجليين على أنه إذا أدى الرسالة إلى الملك وفرع من كلامه معاوية بن أبي سفيان بين يديه. فلمحا وصل إلى ملك الروم أدى الرسالة رفع صوته بالأذان بين يديه، فهم البطارقة بقائه، فثنى الملك وقال: ليس هذا منه، وإنما هو من معاوية، فإنه أراد أن أقتل هذا الرسول فقتل كل مستأمن في بلاد الإسلام. ويفهم كل كنيسة فيها.

ثم إنه أدركه وبعث به إلى معاوية فلمحا عاد [إلى معاوية ورأته] (11) ضحوك.

(8) ملكي في ف.
(7) ناقص في ي.
(10) ناقص في ي.
(9) ناقص في ي.
(11) ما بين الخلاصتين وراء معاوية في ف.
الباب الثالث

في الرسول وما يتعين عليه من الصفات وما يستحق من خرج منهم عن جادة الطريق وفيه فصلاً

الفصل الأول: في صفاتهم.

قد ذكر العلماء المتكلمون في آداب الملك أنه ينبغي أن يكون رسول الملك ذكي الغطنة، صحيح المزاج، بصريًا بالأمور، عارفًا بالأحوال، عالماً بمواقع الكلام: ففقد كان أزديش بن بابك، أحد ملوك الفرس، يقول: كم من دم سفره الرسول بغير حلة، وكيف جيشه هزمت بذلك وقتل أكثره، وكيف حومة انتهكت، ومال قد نهب، وعهد. قد نقض بخيانته الرسول وأكاذيب ما يثبت به.

وقد شاروا في رسل الملك شروطاً منها: أن يكون صدوقًا للطمع، فهذا حكي أن الإسكندر وجه رسولاً إلى بعض ملوك الشرق، فجاء برسالة شك الإسكندر في حرف منها، فقال له الإسكندر: ويلك إن الملك لا تخلو من مقوم وسعود إذا مات. وقد جبت برسالة صحة الألفاظ بينه المعاين، وقد وجدت فيها حرفًا يناقضها، أفعل يقتين أنت من هذا الحرف.

(1) "يعني" في.
(2) "الفطرة" في.
(3) "نافذ في.
(4) "عند" في.
(5) "تخلوا" في.
(6) "قال" في.

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بقوله، لأن كل واحد منهم قد يرى خلاف ما يراه الآخر، ويسمع غير ما يسمع.

وإذا عثر على أحد من جواسيسه الطرق النصحاء بزلة سترها عليه، ولم يعقبه عليها، ولم يوجهه إلا أن يرى في التوبيخ مصلحة، فإنَّه يوجهه بمخلوي ويعانبه على ذلك عبثاً لطيفاً، فإن ذلك أدعى لاستصلاحه.

وإذا حضر إليه جاسوسه، يخبر عن عدوه استعمل فيه الثبوت ودؤام البشر، من غير أن يظهر من آنائه بالخبر سروراً بما قدم عليه من خبر عدوه، ولا فرحة به بحيث يظهر معه الخفية، ولا عرضاً بفوت قدر المباحة. ولا يظهر جاسوسه كراهية ما يأتي به من الأخبار المكروهة، فإن ذلك مما يستدعى كما كان السر عنده في الأمور المكروهة، فيؤدي إلى الأضرار. فقد حكى عن بعض الملوك أنه كان يعطي من يأتيه بالأخبار المكروهة أكثر من الذي يأتيه بالأخبار السارة، ويقول: إن الذي يأتيه بالأمر المكروه قد ينبغيه على ما فيه مصلحى.

واعلم أن صاحب الجيش لا يستطيع أن يمنع عسكره من جواسيس عدوه، فيجب الاحترام منهم بكل السر ما أمكن.

11821 (21) «نيوحة» في .
11823 (22) «يعتبه» في .
11825 (23) «قد تنبيه» في .
11824 (24) «الثبوت» في .
وإن قضى على من وجه ممن إلى العدو مموت (١٤) ، وقبض العدو عليه أحسن على من خلفه من أهله ، وجعل لم من بعده من الإحسان ما كان يجعله له إذا عاد ليكون داعياً لغيره على النصيحة. وإن قدر أن أحداً منهم عاد غير ظاهر بقصده ، وهو من يثبت بقوله (١٥) ، فلا يظهر له وحشة ولا يلح عليه وذلك ، ولا يربح عليه ، بل يليله الجميل ، ويعامله بالإحسان ؛ فإنه إذا لم يصعد له شيء في هذه المرة صعد له في المرة الأخرى.

الفصل الثالث : فلما يجرب عليه من تدبير عينه وجواسيسه.

على صاحب الجيش أن لا يعرف أحداً من عسكره بأحد من جواسيسه؛ فإن ذلك مما يؤدي إلى انتشار الخبر وظهوره ، إن استطاع أن لا يعلم بينه وبين أحد من جواسيسه واسطة فعل ، وإن لم يكن ذلك جعل لكل واحد منهم واحداً من خصائص بوصله إليه بمفرده.

وعليه أيضاً أن يحرص أن لا يعرف جواسيسه بعضهم بعضاً [ فإنه إذا عرف بعضهم بعضاً (١٦)] ربما اتفقوا على أمر (١٥) وربما وأخبروه به إذا رجعوا ، وتفقوا على ممالة (١٦) العدو والليل إليه ، بخلاف ما إذا لم يعرف بعضهم بعضاً ؛ فإن كل أحد منهم يأتي يخبر على حدته ، يظهر الصحيح منهم والسقيم بقرائ الأحوال . وليس ممالة (٦٦) البعض للعدو كمامالة (١٦) الكل.

وعليه أن يضن إلى كل ما يلقى كل من جواسيسه عينه وإن اختلعت أخبارهم ، ويثبت بالله يرغم فيها يؤدي إليه (١٤) اجتهاده من ذلك . ولا يجل اختلافهم ذنباً لأحد منهم ؛ فقد تختلف أخبارهم وكل منهم صادق فيها.

١٤ (١٥) "موت في" في.
١٥ (١٦) "نافص في" في.
١٦ (١٦) "مالات" في.
١٧ (١٦) "يؤيد" في.
١٨ (١٦) "كما" في.
ومنها أن يكون له درية بالأسفار ومعرفة بالبلاد التي يتوجه إليها، فيكون غنياً عن السؤال عنها وعن أهلها، فإنه إذا سأل ربما تنبه له العدو وفنن به، فيكون ذلك سبباً له للاهله، بل ربما يعوق، فدل على حال مرسله، فصار (٧) عيناً عليه بعد أن كان عيناً له.

ومنها أن يكون عارفاً بمسان أهل البلاد التي يتوجه إليها، ليلتقي ما يقع من الكلام الذي يسمعه من يخالطه من العدو، ومع ذلك لا يكون من جنس العدو؛ فإن الجنس يميل إلى الجنس بالطعن، فيفسد الأمر على من أرسله.

ومنها أن يكون صبوراً على ما لعليه يصير إليه من العقولة إذا ظفر به العدو، حتى لا يخرب بأحوال مرسله، ولا يطلع على وليم فيه وفي عسكره؛ فإن ذلك قد لا يخلصه من بد (٨) عدوه، ولا يدفع عنه سطوعه.

فإذا وجد من العينين والحواسين من (٨) هو مشتمل على هذه الشروط كان حقيقياً بالإرسال في المهام واستطلاع أخبار العدو.

الفصل الثاني: فيما يجب من إكرام العينين والحواسين والأخذ بقراهم.

ينبغي على الملك وصاحب الجيش، إذا اختار عيناً أو جاسوساً، أن يظهر له الود والمصافاة (٩)، ويتخفه بالإحسان، وبعده بالمرير، ويعاهده بالصلات في كل وقت قبل احتجاج إليه، ويزيد في الإحسان إليه عند توجهه في المهام، ويعهده أهل بالبر في حضوره (١٠) وغيته. يملك بذلك قلبه ويعتصمي (١١) خاطره، ولا يخطر إلى انحطاط رمزه وصغر قدره، إذا كان صغير المقدار، فإن الأمر الذي هو فيه كبير.

(٦) يكون في ف. 
(٧) نافص في ف. 
(٨) من في. 
(٩) المصافات في ف. 
(١٠) نافص في. 
(١١) يضع في.
الباب الثاني
في العين والجواسيس وما يتعلق بذلك
وفيه ثلاثة فصول
الفصل الأول: في الصفة التي ينبغي أن يكون العين والجواسيس عليها.
قد شرطوا في الجاسوس شروطاً يتبعون الحرص عليها؛ منها أن يكون
ممن يوقت بتصبحته وصدقته. فإنه يتوجه إلى العدو، وإذا كان متهاولاً لا ينفع
بخبره، وإن كان صادقاً لأنه ربما أخبر بالصدق فانه فيه فلا يعمل بقوله. فتقول (1) في النصيحه (3) بسبب ذلك. بل إن كان غير ناصح فإنه يعود
بالضرر على مرسله، لأنه يكون عنفا على أنه لا له.
ومنها أن يكون ذا حدس صائب وفراسة ثامة، ليدرك بفور عقله وصاحب
حذسه من أحوال العدو، والمشاهدة ما كتبه العدو عن النطق به يستند
بعض الأمور على بعض؛ فإذا أخذ بالفراسة في أمر ثم لاح له أمر آخر،
قوى عنه واعتقد (3) بالتفاهم بعض القراين إلى بعض.
ومنها أن يكون كثير الدهاء والحيل والخديعة ليتوصل بدهائه إلى كل
موصل، ويدخل بحيلته في كل مدخل، ويدرك مقصده من أي طريق أمكنه؛
إنه مث أي كان قاصراً في هذا الباب ربما ظفر العدو به، أو عاد بغير مقصوده
وطبته (4).

(1) «فيفوح» في ف.
(2) «المصلحة» في ف.
(3) («اعتقد» في ف.
(4) ناقص في ف.
(5) ناقص في ف.
ذلك إلى أن انقرضت دولتهم، وجاءت الدولة التركية والأمير على ذلك.
فلمما ولى الملك الظاهر بيرس البندقشري – رحمه الله – السلطة، واجتمع له ملك مصر والشام وحلف إلى الفرات، وأراد تواصل أخبار الممالك إلى، قرر البريد بالديار المصرية والبلاد الشامية. وقد كانت [مراكز البريد] متصلة من القلعة الحروسة إلى الإسكندرية، وإلى دمياط، وإلى قوص، ثم من قوص تركب (المرج إلى أسوان وعذاب). وكانت المراكز متصلة من القلعة أيضاً إلى سايب الممالك الشامية حتى تواصل بالفرات، على ما هو مقرر [مبنى لا حاجة لذكره هنا].

ودون ذلك في السرعة السعّاء، وهو الذين يبعدون على أرجلهم، ويسافرون بالملطفات عند تعذر وصول البريد إلى ناحية من النواحي، وهو من أعظم مهمات السلطنة. وقد ذكر ابن الأثير في تاريخه أن أول من اتخذ السعّة من الملك معز الدولة ابن بويه، أول ملوك الدولة ببغداد، بعد الثلاثين والثلاثين من الهجرة. وكان سبب ذلك أنه كان ببغداد وأخوه ركن الدولة بأصفهان (49) فأراد معز الدولة سرعة إعلام ركن الدولة بتجميدات (30) الأكبات، فاتخذ السعّاء. وانتشار في أبيه سعيان، بلغ من شأنهما أن كل واحد منهم كان (50) يسير في كل يوم نيفاً وأربعين فرسخاً.

ودون ذلك في السرعة العين الحواسيس، وهي أشد الجميع إبطاء بالخرب، مما يحتاجون إليه من استطلاع الأكبات واستعمالها، وتتبع آثارها.

[وسياق الكلام عن ذلك (52) في الباب الثاني إن شاء الله تع.

(45) ما بين الحاصرتين «مراكز بريدية» في
(47) («إبكر») في.
(49) («أبسان») في.
(51) ناقص في.
(46) («مقررة») في.
(48) («متجددات») في.
(50) ما بين الحاصرتين «وسياق ذلك مستمّا» في.
(52) ما بين الحاصرتين «وسياق ذلك مستمّا» في.
فقد حكي صاحب «الروس المطرف في خير الأقطار» أن الحصول كان يرسل من مصر إلى البصرة، وهي فوق بغداد في الشرق، مما يزيد على عشرين يومًا. وحكي ابن سعد أيضًا (38) في كتابه «المغرب في أخبار المغرب» أن الوزير البازوري (39) المغربي، وزير المستنصر الفاطمـِي، خليفة مصر، وجه الحمام من مدينة (40) تونس من أفريقيا من بلاد المغرب، ففجأ إلى مصر، [العهد عليهم في جميع ذلك].

وقد كانت أبراج الحمام بمملكة النديرا المصرية في الزمن المتقدم متصلة من قلعة الجبل، ثم إلى قوص، ثم إلى أسوان وعذاب، وإلى الإسكندرية ودمياط والسويس من طريق الجزء، وكذلك إلى دمشق وحلب وسائر النواحي. وكان ذلك من النفع في سرعة إرسال الخبر ما لا خفاء فيه على المتأمل.

وقد ظهرت في سرعة إسالة الخبر البريد، وهو الذي يقضي بالكتب المطولة، والأخبار المتصلة؛ فإن البريد يقطع غالبًا (41) سيرتين عشرين يومًا في ثلاثة أيام، كما يقطع من دمشق إلى مصر في هذا المقدر، وربما زاد على ذلك. فقد قطع بعض البريدية من حلب إلى مصر في أربعة أيام. وقد كان البريد موجودًا في زمن الأكاسرة ملوك الفرس، والقابرة ملوك الروم، واعتناء منهم لشأنه. ثم قررت في الإسلام معاوية بن أبي سفيان أحد أصحاب النبي صام في أيام خلافته، وبعد ذلك أيام خلفاء بن العباس وخلفاء بني أمية، يستمر تارة ويقطع أحيانًا (42) بحسب ما يقتضيه الحال. وكان المقرر له بغالًا مقوصاة الأذانات، ليكون ذلك علامة لما يعرف بها أنها من بغال البريد، وتعاناه ملوك الإسلام في أكثر الأقطار إلا بنى (43) زنكي ملوك الشام، وبنو أبو بكر ملوك مصر، فإنهم أعدوا لذلك الهجوم المتتحية السابقة. وبنى الأمر على

(38) (بازوري) في.
(39) (باي) في.
(40) (تونس) في.
(41) (خلين) في.
(42) (بكترب) في.
(43) (بافة) في.
(44) (بلك) في.
من الفرات إلى غزة ؛ فإذا حدث حادث من جهة النهر ، أوقفنا النار ودخنا ، فيتصل ذلك في أسرع وقت من الفرات إلى غزة ، فيعلم أنه حادث حدث في الجملة ، ثم يرسل الحمام من غزة إلى مصر فيعلم صدر ذلك في اليوم الواحد .

ثم بطل ذلك بوؤوق الصلح بين النهر ومملكة الديار المصرية وزلت معالمه .

ودون ذلك في سرعة وصول الخبر الحمام [ وهو أن ينتقل الحمام ](1)

من كل بلد إلى بلد آخر ; فإذا حدث في أحد البلدين التي فيها الحمام حادث ، كتب(34) القطب ، وعلقت بجنيحة الحمام وأرسل(35) فيله برجه الذي في بلده فيفحص في أسرع وقت ، ولكن لا يسع معه استفاء الخبر [ على الطريق ](36)

وإذا يلوح فيه بالضرورة من الأمر ليقع إجابة العلم به .

ولا ينفي أن الحمام من أسرع المواصلات ؛ فإن الحمام يقطع مسيرة

عشرين يوماً في بعض يوم . فقد حكي ابن سعيد في كتابه « حيا الملوك وجنى النحل » أن الوزير أبا(37) الفرج يعقوب بن كلس ، وزير العزيز أحد خلفاء الفاطميين ، قال له العزيز : إلى لم أر الق서비스 البعلبية قط ، وإلى أحب أن أراها . وكان عند الوزير حمام من دمشق ، وفي دمشق حمام من مصر ؛ كتب الوزير بطاقة وأرسلها في الحمام الذي كان عنه إلى دمشق ، فأمرهم فيها بأن يعلقو في كل طائر من الحمام المصري الذي يبسط حبات من القراضية البعلبية ، فصول الحمام إليهم بذلك ، فتعلقو القراضية في الوقت بجنيحة الحمام ، ووجهوا بها إلى الديار المصرية ، فطلع بها الوزير [ من وقتها إلى الخليفة في يوم طلبه إياها ](38) فأعجب بذلك غائية الإعجاب . بل ربما زاد الحمام في قطع المسافة عن هذا القدر .

(32) `ما بين الحاضرين فأقص في` .
(33) `كتب في` .
(34) `أرسلت في` .
(35) `ما بين الحاضرين فأقص في` .
(36) `أبو في` .
(37) `ما بين الحاضرين` من يومه إلى الخليفة `وف`. 
(38) `أبيه في` .
وأما نصب المرايا على الأماكن العالية للنظر (22) فقد كان للملوك إهتمام به في بلاد الشغور، حتى أن الإسكندر لما بني الإسكندرية جعل فيها ميناراً طوله أربع (24) مائة ذراع، ونصب في أعلاه مرآة من أخلاق إذا نظر فيها الإنسان رأى البلاد التي تقابلها من جزر البحر وما يصل فيها من عمارة المراكب وغيرها، فيقع التأهب لم، إلى غير ذلك من أمور الملوك الماضية التي يقع بها الاحتراس [وَلَهُ تَعَايَنُ أَعْلَمٌ] (25).

الفصل الثالث: في استطلاع أخبار العدو واستعمالها ليقع التأهب له.

لا يشك (26) في أن استطلاع خبر العدو واستعلام أمره من أهم الأمور وأوعدها نفعًا؛ فإنه بذلك يعلم حال عدوه، وما هو عليه من قصده إليه أو كفه عنه، فتكون على علم من أمره. ثم لا استطلاع الأخبار واستعلامها عند طلب سرعة وصول الخبر أسباب:

أسرعها إمداد النيران على رؤوس الجبال؛ وهو أنه إذا حدث حادث في طرف من أطراف المملكة من طريق عدو ونحو ذلك، وكان هناك جبال عالية، فإن كان في الليل أوقفوا (27) النار على رأس (28) جبل عال؛ وإن كان في النهار أثاروا (29) الدخان، فبادر من عرس الجبل الذي يليه، فيفعل (30) كذلك حتى ينثى إلى المكان الذي يقصد بالخبير. وقد كان أول الدولة التركية، عند وقوع الحرب بين ملوك الديار المصرية وبين النتر، أناس مرتون على رؤوس الجبال، مرصدون لذلك بميزتين على السلطان، مركزون (31):
وقد شهدت مدن وقلاع كثيرة نزلت عليها الجيوش العظيمة، وحاصرتها الحصار الشديد في الزمن الطويل، ولم يظفروا منها بطول. ولزم ملك
الجاهلية بهذك، وتحتفل به غاية الاحتفال، حتى يقال إن سور أتاطكية
من بلاد الشنيل (13) محط بها ويقع بها وداخلها خمس جبال (14) حتى لا
تكون مشروفة عليها من خارجها يتسلط عليها العدو منها.

وقد (16) بنت دلوكه، المعروفة بالعجوز (17)، التي ملكت مصر بعد
فرعون، فلته الله، على الديار المصرية سورة من الطوب اللبن لذاما على جميعها,
من العريش إلى أسوان من الجانب الشرقي والجرب الغربي في سفح الجبل;
جعلت فيه أبراجاً ومحارس على كل ثلاثة أميال، وأقامت عليه حرساً،
يسع بعضهم بعضًا حتى إذا طرق جهة أحد منهم طارق تساعوا به،
حتى ينفى الخبر إلى قصر الملكة (18)، فتنبأ للذك في آسرود وأقربه،
وأثر هذا السور باق إلى الآن في الجرب الشرقي والجرب الغربي. [يسمى بحائط
العجوز] (19).

وقد كان سور القاهرة في أول بنائها من الطوب اللبن، وكان قصر
الخلافة بوسطها مكان المدرسة الصالحية وما حديثاً، ولم يكن السور المذكور
حصيناً [مكنيه في وطأة من الأرض] (20)، فإما ملك السلطان صلاح الدين
يوسف بن أبوب - رحمه الله تعم - الديار المصرية بسبب قلعة الجبل على مكان
مرتفع، أدار سوراً من الحجر عليه وعلى القاهرة ومصر جميعاً. وآثار السور
الأول (21) بات إلى الآن [بالقرب من الباب الحديدي وغير ذلك] (22).

(14) "أجل" في ف.
(15) "ذات" في ف.
(16) "الملكية" في ف.
(17) "ما بين الحاصرتين" في ف.
(18) "أنظر" في ف.
(19) "أنظر" في ف.
(20) "ما بين الحاصرتين" في ف.
(21) "أنظر" في ف.
(22) "أنظر" في ف.
وبالجملة فإنه يجب أن يكون سيَّ الظن بعده بكل حال، آنذاك حذره منه، معظماً لأمره في نفسه، مستعدًا له بما فوق قدره؟ فإنه إذا أعد له ما هو أكبر (6) منه ثم وجد أمره صغيراً (11) لم يضره ذلك، وإن واجبه كبيراً كان قد أعد له ما يكافيه أو يزيد على مكارهه، فيكون قد استظهر عليه في التأهب.
والنصر من عند الله تعالى.

وقد قبل إنه لا ينبغي أن يأمن عدوه وإن بعد عنه، ولا يأخذ في لقائه بالهونا إذا قرب منه، ولا يترك معالجة لقائه حيث تحقق قصده إليه؟ فإنه حتى ترك ذلك في وقته حتى فإنه كان قد ضع الحرم، وإذا دخل على نفسه الخوف وعرض أمره للنذم فإن الفرصة [قلمًا تعود] (7) إذا ضمت.
والحرم أن يستعد للأمر قبل وقته ليجد ذلك عند الحاجة إليه.

الفصل الثاني [8]: في التحرز باتخاذ الأسوار (9) والخندنق على المدن والخصون ونصب المراب بالآمكية العالية للنظر.

أما (10) الأسوار والخندنق، فإنه لم تزل الملك في كل زمن يحصن.
المدن والخصون والقلاع، الأسوار العالية، والخندنق الدائرة المعتملة بالماء.
ولا ينبغي على ما ذكر ذلك من عظم النفع في المدافع عند الحصار إذا هجم العدو على المدينة أو الخصن بغتة. وقد (11) ثبت في الصحيح أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم احتفر خندقًا على المدينة النبوية يوم الأحزاب، وأنه [كان صلى الله عليه وسلم] (12) يعمل فيه بنفسه، لولا ما في ذلك من النفع الكامل لما فعله النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم.

(6) «خطيراً» في ف.
(7) «ما تعود» في ف.
(8) «ما بين الخادرتين» في ف.
(9) ناقص في ف.
(10) ناقص في ف.
(11) في ف.
(12) ما بين الخادرتين مكتوب «صل الله علية وسلم كان» في ف.
الباب الأول
في التحرز في حال الأمن عند إقامة الملك في دار ملكه
وفيه ثلاثة فصول
الفصل الأول: في أخذ الحذر في الحملة.

وتروى (3) أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم قال: الحزم سوء الظن.
ويحكي (4) عن عتبة الفوäsر أنه سأل عن كثرة ظفره في حروبه وعدم نيل عدوه منه، فقال: ما كذبت على عدوى خبرًا ولا بت منه إلا على حذر.

1) ما بين الحاضرين ذاقين في.
2) ذاقين في.
3) ذاقين في.
4) ذاقين في.
وانت ممن نظر في كتاب التاريخ على اختلافها، وتدير وقائع الحروب
منها على تباين أصنافها، وما زيته في ذلك أهل التدبير من رؤسائها، وما
اقتنصها رأى كل من مشايخ الحرب وعلمائها، وما أوردده أفضيل الكتاب في
وصايا المقدمين على الساكر، وما وقع لدهاء (1) الحروب من حيلة محتال
ومنك ماكر.

دعائي ذلك إلى أن أخدم خزاناته الشريفة – عرها الله تعالى بدوان ملكه
طول بقائه، وعلو نجمه الظاهر وسطو ضيائه - بكتاب أضعاه في تدبير
الحروب وترتيبها، ومعرفة أحوال القتال وتقديريها ، ليستوي بذلك من يقف عليه
من أمرائه الأنصاب وقاد عساكره، ويقتدى منهم من لم يخبر طريق الحرب
لهدائه منه بأبصاره، وإلا فهو ثبت الله قواعد دولته، وجعل مصير أعدائه
المارين إلى قيضته، قد عرك الحروب وخبرها، وعرف بالتجارب والوقائع حائلا
وخبرها، وخدمته السعد فأعقبته بكل واقعة ظفرها، وصحبه الحظوظ لم يفارقه
النصر صفرًا ولا حضرًا، وما النصر إلا من عند الله العزيز الحكم.

وقد سميته: تفريع الكروب في تدبير الحروب، وجعلت مقاصده مننصرة
في عشرين بابا (2).

(1) لدهاء في النص.
(2) ثم تبع أيساء الأبواب والفصول في ف.
The opening folio of the Princeton Manuscript (Yahudah collection ELS 3954), containing title and author of work.

الصفحة الأولى من مخطوطة جامعة برلين (مجموعة يهودا رقم 3954 ELS)، وتشتمل على عنوان الكتاب واسم المؤلف.
أنجزت وقائعهم للأعداء مواعد الأجل، وكرعت في دماء الكافر سيفهم فعاقت بخلق النصر لا بحمرة الحبل، صلاة يطلع في مطالع النجوم نجومها، ولا يتغير على مر الزمان إن شاء الله تعالى رستها، وسلم تسليماً كثيراً.

وبعد، فكان السلطان الأعظم الملك الناصر، العالم المجاهد المرابط المتاجر (1)، المؤيد المظهر المتصرع، زين الدنيا والدين، سلطان الإسلام والمسلمين، حميو العدل في العالمين، وارث ملك ملوك العرب والعجم والتركمان. ظل الله في أرضه، القائم بسمته وفروضه، إسكندر الزمان، ملك أصحاب الأسرة والتيجان، واهب الأفاق والأمصار، ميبد الطغاة والبغاء والكافر، حايل الحورين، حائر القبائلين، جامع كلمة الإسلام، ناصر لواء العدل والإحسان، سيد ملوك الزمان، إمام المتقين، قسيس أمير المؤمنين، أبو السعادات فرح بن السلطان الشهيد الملك الظاهر أسعد برقوق، خلق الله تعالى على مدى الأيام سلطانه، ونصر على توالى الدهور جنوده وجيشه وأعوانه.

هو الذي قهر ملوك الأرض بأمسه وشذته، وأعجز الحصر والوصف عدته وعدته، وشاع في الأفق النائية صيته وذكره وتهجه، ووجه النصر من كل جانب فتوالى بتوالي الوقائع ظفره ونصرته، ما قصده فاصد بسوء إلا رد خليقاً، ولا رواه أحد يمكن إلا يرفع، سهم مكره عليه صائياً، ولا رام تذليل صعب إلا أن من تسبيله بالعجب العجيب، ولا حاول مواجهة فتح إلا فل على لسان الظفر «نصر من الله وفتح قريب» (1/ 11- 13).

فسعده أبداً بالنصر تسعد، ومن سعادته في كل زمان ينشد:

عساكر البغى قد أعت مقارعته الأنصار أعوزت في كسره الحيل كناتج صفرة يوماً ليفلقها فلم يضرها وأوضى قزنه الوعلي (3)

(1) من ديوان الأشعى.
(2) "مناع" في النص.
(3) من ديوان الأشعى.
مؤيد الإسلام من سلطانه الناصر بعزيز نصره، ورغم أنف الخارج عن طاعته بتعجيل هلاك ورد كيده في نحوره، وربه من مصارع أعدائه ما يتعظ به العاقل ويعد المتأمل من عجائب دهره، وعباد جهده العالي بإبادة أعدائه الطغاة المارقين والله غالب على أمره، على أن أخرج الأمة من ضيق إلى فرج، ورفع عن الرعية بأوفاق سلطان كل مشقة وحرج، وأطلب قلب البرية بسعادة ملك يستنحسن من طيب أيامه الزاهرة أطيب شدا وأطيب أرج.
وأشهد أن لا إله إلا الله وحده لا شريك له، شهادة تبترأها عظام الملك كابرة عن كابر، وبوصى بها على الدوام أبدا الأول منهم الآخر، ويقوم بنصربها الأول بعد الأب فيروها بالسند الناصر عن الظاهر. وأشهد أن سيدينا محمد عبده ورسله المخصص بالتأييد عن تتابع الدهر، والمنصور بالرعب المؤثر في قلب أهل الكفر على مسيرة شهر، صلى الله عليه وعلى آلله الذين

(1) هذه المقدمة ناقصة في حيث تبتدئ المخطوطة بالمقدمة الآتية:

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لله رب العالمين والغافقة للمنتفعين وصلى الله على سيدينا محمد خاتم

النبيين وعلى آله وصحبه وسلم تسليما كثيرا.

وبعد، هذا كتاب يسمى بتفريج الكروب في تدبير الحروب، مربيا على عشرين بابا ، في كل باب من ذلك ثلاثة فصول في تدبير الحروب، ومعرفة أحوال القتال وتقريرها، تأليف العبد الفقير إلى الله (تع) عبر ابن إبراهيم الأنصاري رحمه الله (تع).

في هذا النص بدلاً "ثلاثة" ذكرت كلمة "ثالث".
يضمن هذا الكتاب جزءًا من الحروب بعنوان "تفريج الكروب في تذبیر الحروب"، قمنا بتحقيقه وترجمته إلى الإنجليزية. ولا يتفق أصل له سوى مخطوطين رجعنا إليهما عند تحقيقه وترجمته: إحداهما موجودة في مسجد الفاتح بالقاهرة (رقم 3483)، والأخرى ضمن مجموعة "يثودا" في جامعة برلين (رقم 3954). ومن هذه الأخيرة عرفنا اسم المؤلف، وهو عمر بن إبراهيم الأصبحي الأنصاري. أما المخطوطة الأخرى فعرفنا منها أن المؤلف قد وضع كتابه في عهد السلطان المماوقي فرج بن برقوق الذي حكم في الفترة من عام 810 إلى عام 814 هجرية / 1399 - 1411 ميلادية.

ولم تكشف بعد أية معلومات دقيقة عن هذا المؤلف.

وقد ذيلنا النص العربي الوارد في الصفحات التالية ببعض الحواشي المتصلة بالنص نفسه، واستعملنا حرف "ى" للكتابة عن مخطوطة بريستون، وحرف "ف" للكتابة عن مخطوطة مسجد الفاتح. أما الترجمة الإنجليزية فقد ذيلناها بالتعليق والشرح والتفسيرات، كما أضفنا في نهايتها قائمة بالمصطلحات العسكرية الحربية الواردة في النص مع شيء من التوضيح. ويجدر القارئ هذا القائمة بين النص العربي والترجمة الإنجليزية.

وقد مهدنا للترجمة الإنجليزية بقدة مطولة تناولنا فيها ما كتب عن الحروب الإسلامية، وأوردو بياناً بالمخطوطات العربية الأصلية التي ما زالت في حاجة إلى التحقيق لإمكان تقدير الموضوع حتى قدره. كذلك ينبغي أن "تفريج الكروب" يتفق والفلسفة العامة للحرب في الشرق خلال فترة الحروب الصليبية والقرن التي تلتها مباشرة.

جورج سكالون

القاهرة

январь 1921
حقوق الطبع والنشر محفوظة
للمكتبة الأمريكية ب القاهرة
1961

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تاريخ-Ankhorb وتدبير الحروب

تأليف
عمرو بن إبراهيم الأوزي الأنصاري

تحقيق وترجمة
دكتور جورج سكالون

منشورات الجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة

1961
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وديب الحروف

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